

## *Mali: Extremism and Terrorism*

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On September 17, 2024, militants from the al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) carried out rare attacks in Bamako, targeting a gendarmes training center and the capital airport. According to airport and security officials, the militants opened fire on both locations. Security sources claim more than 77 people were killed and 255 were wounded. According to a statement released by JNIM, the attacks resulted in “huge human and material losses and the destruction of several military aircraft.” Mali remains encumbered by the 12-year insurgency waged by JNIM and IS Sahel (formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara or ISGS). Since the start of the insurgency in 2012, thousands of Malians have been killed and approximately 653,000 have been forcibly displaced. (Sources: [Defense Post](#), [Human Rights Watch](#), [Africa Center](#), [France 24](#))

Factions of IS Sahel have emerged as Mali and neighboring countries continue to struggle within containing militant Islamists from spreading across the region. On November 8, 2024, Nigerian security analysts reported that a new IS Sahel faction, Laukawas, had emerged in the country’s northwestern region. The group reportedly originated in Mali and Niger, gaining ground following Niger’s July 2023 coup after which regional security patrols were compromised and military partnerships with Western nations were terminated. Since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have fallen to military coups. In justifying their takeovers, each military government cited the failure of their former Western-backed governments in containing violent extremists. (Source: [Voice of America](#))

In a move to further distance the three countries from Western-aligned regional decision-making blocs, on July 12, 2024, the junta governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger signed a treaty officially establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) confederation and increasing cooperation across security, economic, and political lines. In March 2024, the trio also announced the formation of a joint anti-jihadist force to combat violent extremists across the region. Although troop size was unreported, the force was purportedly already in operation. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Reuters](#), [France 24](#), [Associated Press](#))

On December 11, 2023, the United Nations ended its 10-year peacekeeping mission in Mali. The departure was in response to the coup government’s request, as the regime previously claimed that the peacekeeping mission was inadequate in effectively combating violent extremism in the region. The withdrawal came more than a year after the last French army unit left Mali in August 2022, and more than a year after the February 2022 conclusion of the Takuba Task Force—the European military task force led by France, which advised, assisted, and accompanied Malian Armed forces in the Sahel. The withdrawal was due to Mali’s decision to hire Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, which the EU accuses of fomenting violence and committing human rights abuses in Africa. On January 24, 2023, Mohamed Toure, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Mali representative, said the departure of French and European forces left a vacuum in Mali that had been filled by jihadist groups, which are “spreading terror, killings, rapes, creating misery.” (Sources: [Associated Press](#), [Guardian](#), [U.S. News & World Report](#), [CNN](#), [France 24](#), [Associated Press](#), [BBC News](#), [Agence France-Presse](#))

### **Overview**

The Malian government declared a nationwide state of emergency in November 2015, after two Islamists killed 20 people and took as many as 170 hostages at the Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali’s capital, Bamako. Mali has continued to experience regular attacks on foreign troops, U.N. peacekeeping personnel, Malian security forces, and western tourists. On October 25, 2018, the government announced that the country would remain under a state of emergency for another year. (Sources: [Garda](#), [BBC News](#), [Reuters](#), [Long War Journal](#))

Islamist groups in Mali came to the fore after rebels of the Tuareg tribe—an ethnically Berber people concentrated in the Sahara—began an offensive against Malian government forces in January 2012. At the start of the Tuareg Rebellion, Islamic groups including [al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb \(AQIM\)](#), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar al-Dine (AAD), fought alongside the rebels against Malian security forces. Frustrated with the government’s inability to quash the Tuareg’s secession, the military staged a coup after three months of fighting. In the political chaos that ensued, the rebels, spearheaded by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), established control in the north. Shortly after, AQIM, AAD, and MUJAO joined forces to expel the rebels from northern Mali. Armed with weapons stolen from the neighboring Libyan civil war, Islamists imposed sharia (Islamic law) on the local population. (Sources: [Combating Terrorism Center](#), [Stanford University](#), [Spiegel](#))

Unable to regain control of the country’s north, the Malian government appealed to France—its former colonial ruler—and the broader international community for assistance. France has provided ongoing military support to Malian troops as a part of Operation Serval, launched in January of 2013, and Operation Barkhane, which replaced Operation Serval in August 2014. Mali has also received extensive military assistance from the

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United Nations, as part of the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which has been extended into 2019. In addition, Mali has received training from the United States as part of the U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program. (Sources: [Combating Terrorism Center](#), [Watchlist](#), [National Interest](#), [Ministère De La Defense](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#), [U.S. Department of State](#) )

In April 2017, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad formed the "G5 Sahel" to hinder the flow of terrorists and contraband across national boundaries. Mali has also worked with regional allies as a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). (Sources: [U.S. Department of State](#), [Center for Strategic & International Studies](#))

In addition to the Islamist threat, Mali also contends with rising ethnic violence, which reportedly killed hundreds of people in 2018. Hunters from the Dogon ethnic group have historically clashed over land access with herdsmen from the Fulani ethnic group. In March 2019, suspected members of the Dogon killed more than 150 people in an attack on Fulani villages. That January, men dressed as hunters from the Donzo ethnic group killed 37 Fulani civilians in a village attack. A January 2019 report by the U.N. secretary-general to the Security Council confirmed 395 civilian deaths in the previous six months. According to the United Nations, the "limited presence of State authority in parts of central and northern Mali continued to allow violent extremist elements to expand their influence in those areas." (Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Reuters](#), [Reuters](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#), [United Nations](#), [CNN](#))

On February 10, 2020, Human Rights Watch released a new report detailing the rising number of jihadist-backed armed attacks in Mali. According to the report, 2019 was the deadliest year for civilians since Mali's political and military crisis in 2012. With most of the attacks occurring in central Mali, more than 456 civilians have been killed and hundreds more have been wounded. Jihadists from both al-Qaeda and ISIS have been encouraging inter-ethnic attacks in hopes of asserting their power throughout both the state and the West African region. In the past two years, militants have further demonstrated their influence by forming a new alliance called the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the establishment of a new cell called the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. JNIM's leader, [Amadou Kouffa](#), an ethnic Fulani, has used his radio sermons to exploit the historical rivalry between the Fulani and Dogon Groups. In the face of increasing violence between the two ethnic groups, Mali's government has allowed the Dogon to form their own self-defense militias which has led to indiscriminate and rampant violence throughout the country. (Sources: [Human Rights Watch](#), [Telegraph](#), [National](#))

As the insurgency continues into November 2023, reasons for the resilience of violent extremist movements could be traced to state negligence and inadequate response to the emerging threat. However, it should also be noted that external actors sponsored the activities and strengthened the operations of these insurgent groups to ensure their successful campaigns. On November 29, 2023, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) published leaked documents by Project Raven, a confidential surveillance initiative that assists the United Arab Emirates in surveilling other governments, militants, and human rights activists. According to the document, in 2011, the Emir of Qatar instructed that \$15 million be allocated to burgeoning Islamist movements across northern Mali and the Sahel. The funds were reportedly marked as humanitarian support and were allocated via the state security service under the representation of Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Nue'eimi, a Qatari official. No further information has been released on which violent extremist groups received the funding and how they were utilized; however, the year after the donation saw violent extremists amplify their activity across the Sahel. (Source: [Middle East Media Research Institute](#))

## **Radicalization and Foreign Fighters**

In January 2012, the Tuareg separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) began carrying out attacks in northern Mali with the intent of establishing an independent state. With the backing of armed Tuareg militants who had returned to Mali after training and fighting alongside former Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi's forces in that country's civil war, MNLA posed a serious threat to the Malian government. Three months into the fighting, the Malian military launched a coup in response to what it perceived as the government's inability to quash the Tuareg's secession. The coup plunged the country further into chaos and in April 2012, MNLA declared that Azawad, a region in Mali's north, was an independent state. (Sources: [International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research](#), [Cato Institute](#), [Stanford University](#), [Deutsche Welle](#))

Beginning in October 2011, top al-Qaeda leader and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, provided military, financial, and logistical support to Ansar al-Dine (AAD)—a Malian Islamic militant group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly—to increase AQIM's territorial influence in northern Mali. Under Droukdel's leadership, AQIM formed an alliance with AAD and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in November 2015 to fight against the French and Malian militaries. On June 4, 2020, French troops launched an operation in Talhandak, northern Mali, targeting and killing Droukdel. On November 13, 2020, France announced the death of Bah ag Moussa—a close associate of Ghaly

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who not only helped launch AAD, but was also a prominent military leader in AQIM. The operation involved helicopters and ground troops, which identified and “neutralized” Bah ag Moussa who was in a truck in the Menaka region of eastern Mali. (Sources: [The Hill](#), [United Nations](#), [Mapping Militant Organizations](#), [France 24](#), [Voice of America](#))

Islamist groups in the region, including AQIM, MUJAO, and AAD, initially fought alongside the Tuareg rebels against Malian security forces. However, shortly after MNLA declared Azawad as an independent state, AQIM, MUJAO, and AAD, expelled MNLA from the region, assuming control over 10 percent of Mali’s population and over half of its territory, including the major cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. As Islamists gained control in these and other areas, they carried out a series of atrocities, including attacks on UNESCO sites in Timbuktu between May and July of 2012. (Sources: [Stanford University](#), [BBC News](#), [U.S. Department of State](#))

Armed with weapons stolen from Muammar Gaddafi’s former regime in Libya, AQIM, AAD, and MUJAO imposed a strict version of sharia over local Malians, including stoning punishments for adulterers, and cutting the hands off of thieves. Islamist police in terrorist-held areas reportedly set up checkpoints throughout northern Mali, with Kalashnikov-wielding teenagers repeating: “No cigarettes, no CDs, no radios, no cameras, no jewelry” over megaphones. The promise of a burgeoning caliphate (Islamic empire) in Mali drew jihadists from across Africa, including from Algeria, Mauritania, Sudan, Niger, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Western Sahara. As one U.S. official said in 2013: “Northern Mali has become a jihad front. People think of northern Mali like they thought of Chechnya in the late ‘90s—as someplace where you can go and do your part to restore the caliphate.” (Sources: [Spiegel](#), [Atlantic](#))

Although Islamist groups in Mali share a common goal of establishing an Islamic state, power politics and ideological differences have created a complex dynamic among the groups. MUJAO initially emerged as an AQIM splinter group that was established by members who believed that AQIM’s focus on criminal activities had caused it to lose sight of the jihadist cause. However, after Islamists had ousted MNLA from the north, AAD purportedly brokered a truce between MUJAO and AQIM. In late 2012, a former leader and co-founder of AQIM, [Mokhtar Belmokhtar](#) split from AQIM to form al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB). AMB merged with MUJAO to form [Al-Mourabitoun](#) (“The Sentinels”) in August 2013. On November 20, 2015, the group claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, which was reportedly carried out with AQIM. In December 2015, it was announced that al-Mourabitoun had formally joined AQIM. (Sources: [Stanford University](#), [Washington Institute for Near East Policy](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [Long War Journal](#))

In March 2017, AQIM, AAD, and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Since its formation, JNIM has carried out a number of violent attacks and was designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” by the U.S. government on September 5, 2018. According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, JNIM absorbed the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an AAD-affiliated Islamist group that seeks to establish an Islamic state in central and southern Mali. As of September 2018, JNIM reportedly has between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters. (Sources: [U.S. Department of State](#), [The Jamestown Foundation](#), [Center for Strategic & International Studies](#))

Over the next two years, jihadists across the Sahel united under a common banner to expel Western forces from the region. According to military leaders from the United States, France, and West Africa, the militants have carried out increasingly forceful attacks across villages and army bases. Although the jihadists have established a united front, they have yet to declare “caliphates” in favor of focusing on training and plotting attacks. Furthermore, it is reported that fighters affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS have been coordinating attacks and have even agreed upon divvying areas of control throughout the Sahel. However, on May 8, 2020, it was reported in ISIS’s latest edition of its weekly *al-Naba* newspaper, that al-Qaeda started a “war” against ISIS militants in West Africa. *Al-Naba* criticized JNIM’s leadership, specifically Iyad Ag Ghaly and Amadou Kouffa, as undermining the jihad in favor of negotiating with the Malian government. JNIM sought to diffuse the tension by releasing booklets—indirectly targeted at ISIS sympathizers who are skeptical of JNIM’s motives—by calling for unity among all jihadists. (Sources: [Washington Post](#), [Long War Journal](#), [Long War Journal](#))

On May 7, 2020, ISIS revealed in *al-Naba* that the insurgent group has engaged in tense clashes with al-Qaeda militants in Mali and Burkina Faso. ISIS accused JNIM for instigating the violence as the jihadist camp allegedly mobilized large forces to attack and prevent supplies from getting to ISIS strongholds in Mali and Burkina Faso. According to ISIS, JNIM has amped up attacks since April 17. Unverified claims from JNIM sources also claim that ISIS proposed a ceasefire on May 5, but JNIM allegedly rejected the request. Furthermore, on May 28, ISIS released a statement on Telegram claiming that the ongoing coronavirus pandemic served as punishment for the forces that have fought against ISIS. Additionally, ISIS spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, claimed that ISIS will now retaliate against al-Qaeda in Africa due to attacks initiated by the latter insurgent camp. Although specific countries are not listed, Mali and Burkina Faso have seen increasingly hostile clashes between ISIS and JNIM forces. On June 4, 2020, French soldiers killed AQIM leader [Abdelmalek Droukdel](#) in northern Mali near the Algerian border. (Sources: [BBC News](#), [Twitter](#), [Agence France-Presse](#))

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On June 11, 2022, French soldiers deployed under Operation Barkhane captured Oumeya Ould Albakaye, a regional leader and explosives expert of the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS Sahel)—the March 2022 rebrand of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The French army stated that Albakaye is believed to have carried out terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in an effort to combat French forces within Mali. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Al Jazeera](#), [Euro News](#), [France 24](#), [Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project](#))

As of 2023, IS Sahel and JNIM maintain a violent rivalry, which has led JNIM leaders to collude with local militias to counter IS Sahel. On January 23, 2023, JNIM released photos showing various local clan leaders in northern Mali pledging allegiance to JNIM leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly. Clan notables from the Daoussahak community in northern Mali have aligned with JNIM for protection from IS Sahel. In areas with IS Sahel's presence, JNIM has benefitted in protecting local communities as local clans join the group's ranks for protection. A few days later on January 26, 2023, JNIM met with several armed groups in northeastern Mali. The meeting resulted in a non-aggression pact between JNIM and the local militias in order to better combat IS Sahel. Included among the armed groups are the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, an ethnic Tuareg group with ties to Ansar al-Din and the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace Security and development, a coalition of armed groups. Also included is the pro-government militia, the Tuareg Imghad Self-Defense Group and Allies. (Sources: [Stratfor](#), [Long War Journal](#))

As of August 2023, IS Sahel has not been ousted from Talataye and continues to be a heavy threat to Mali. According to the United Nations in August 2023, IS Sahel has doubled the amount of territory they control in Mali since 2022. In particular, the group controls rural areas in eastern Menaka and large parts of the Asongo area in northern Gao. (Sources: [Human Rights Watch](#), [Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project](#), [Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime](#), [United Nations Security Council](#))

### *Recruitment*

Islamist activity in northern Mali can be traced back to 2003, when militants from AQIM's predecessor, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), kidnapped 32 European tourists and held them captive in northern Mali's remote desert for up to six months. Since then, AQIM, AAD, and other Islamist groups in the region have carried out a wave of similar kidnapping operations, using northern Mali to hide dozens of foreign hostages and raking in millions in ransom payments. Islamist groups in Mali have also generated significant funding through establishing and operating drug and human trafficking networks that extend across West Africa. (Sources: [IRIN](#), [New York Times](#), [Stanford University](#), [USA Today](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [GSDRC](#), [AMDH-FIDH](#))

AQIM, AAD, al-Mourabitoun, and other Islamist groups in Mali have used revenue generated from criminal operations for recruitment purposes. Among other efforts, Islamist groups have attempted to attract new recruits by offering financial incentives to Malians, many of whom live in extreme poverty. According to a CBS News report, Islamists have reportedly "bought" children from their parents, promising families between \$1,000 and \$1,200 a month per child. By October 2012, up to 1,000 child soldiers were included among the ranks of Islamist groups in Mali. (Sources: [International Business Times](#), [New York Times](#), [Australian National Security](#), [CBS News](#))

In addition, Islamist groups have attempted to attract new recruits though capitalizing on ethnic and regional divisions within the country. AAD was largely comprised of Tuaregs from the same tribe as its founder and leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly. MLF, led by extremist preacher Amadou Koufa, is understood to be a predominantly Fulani movement. To that end, the group has reportedly attracted 4,000 members, primarily of Fulani ethnic origin. Koufa was reportedly killed in a November 2018 French attack but resurfaced in a February 2019 propaganda video. (Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Newsweek](#), [Reuters](#))

Islamists have also reportedly attempted to attract new recruits by presenting themselves as righteous defenders of Islam. However, though approximately 95 percent of Mali's population is Muslim, many local communities reject the violent Salafist interpretation of Islam embraced by AQIM and other Islamist groups. (Sources: [Combating Terrorism Center](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [RAND](#))

### *Foreign Fighters*

There is little evidence to suggest that Malians are leaving the country to fight alongside Islamic extremists in other parts of the world. Rather, militants from across Africa, including members of the Nigerian-based terror group Boko Haram, have reportedly traveled to Mali to attend AQIM training camps and to fight alongside Islamists in Mali's north. (Sources: [Atlantic](#), [BBC News](#), [Perspectives on Terrorism](#))

## **Major Extremist and Terrorist Incidents**

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Extremist and terrorist incidents in Mali have included improvised explosive device (IED) attacks as well as rocket and mortar fire attacks, suicide bombings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, and landmines. These attacks regularly target Malian, French, and U.N. peacekeeping forces. (Source: [U.S. Department of State](#))

### *La Terrasse Restaurant and Radisson Blu Hotel Attack*

On March 7, 2015, a masked gunman opened fire on La Terrasse, a Bamako restaurant frequented by expatriates. The attack killed five—including one Frenchman, a Belgian, and three Malians—while also injuring nine others. Al-Mourabitoun, a group of extremists affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claimed responsibility for the attack. The jihadist group claimed the attack was in response to the killing of al-Mourabitoun senior commander Ahmed al-Tilemsi by French troops in December 2014. The assailant, along with four other accomplices, fled in a vehicle and a motorbike before French soldiers arrived to the scene. (Sources: [New York Times](#), [BBC News](#))

On November 20, 2015, heavily armed gunmen shouting “Allahu akhbar” stormed the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako. The men took as many as 170 hostages, killed 20 people, and injured six others during the siege. Among those killed were six Russians, three Chinese, and one American national. Malian and U.N. security forces launched a counterattack, managing to free the hostages. Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming the group worked in conjunction with AQIM. According to al-Mourabitoun, the attack was carried out in retaliation for government aggression in northern Mali. (Sources: [New York Times](#), [BBC News](#), [Reuters](#), [CNN](#))

On April 22, 2016, Malian authorities arrested Fawaz Ould Ahmeida, a Mauritanian national and al-Mourabitoun member, in Bamako. Ould Ahmeida allegedly masterminded the La Terrasse and Radisson Blu attacks. On October 27, 2020, a Bamako court began the trial of Ould Ahmeida and Sadou Chaka, a Malian who investigators claimed transported weapons in the Radisson Blu attack. The suspects faced charges of planning and executing the attacks. Ould Ahmeida was accused of personally shooting victims at the nightclub as revenge for French satirical magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*, publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On October 29, the suspects were found guilty and sentenced to death. The United States extradited Ould Ahmeida on December 9, 2022. He was arraigned in U.S. federal court on December 10 on a six-count indictment charging him with multiple terrorism offenses, including his roles in the 2015 attack. (Sources: [France 24](#), [BBC News](#), [Agence France Presse](#), [New York Times](#), [U.S. Department of Justice](#))

- **September 17, 2024:** JNIM militants carry out attacks in Bamako, targeting a gendarmes training center and the capital airport, killing 77 and wounding 255 others. Security and airport officials report that militants open fire on both locations. JNIM later releases a statement claiming the attacks resulted in “huge human and material losses and the destruction of several military aircraft.” Sources: [Defense Post](#), [France 24](#)
- **August 13, 2024:** The International Criminal Court (ICC) convicts Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, a former senior leader of al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar Dine, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. While serving as the head of the Islamic police in Timbuktu between 2012 and 2013, Al Hassan tortured and subjected civilians to rape, persecution, enforced marriages, and sexual slavery. Al Hassan’s faces sentences ranging from 30 years to life imprisonment. Sources: [International Criminal Court](#), [Africa News](#)
- **August 11, 2024:** Suspected jihadists ambush villagers in Dembo, central Mali, killing at least 26. Source: [Africa News](#)
- **July 25, 2024 - July 27, 2024:** On July 25, separatist rebels launch a three-day ambush on Wagner and government troops in Tinzaouaten, northern Mali. Tuareg separatists from the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) claim to kill at least 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers. The assailants also capture seven fighters. According to a statement from GUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence organization, Ukraine provided the Tuareg separatists with information to carry out the ambush. Also on July 25, JNIM claims to have booby-trapped a Wagner convoy killing 50 Russian fighters and 10 Malians. Sources: [Voice of America](#), [Deutsche Welle](#)
- **July 3, 2024:** Suspected JNIM militants ambush a wedding ceremony in Djiguibombo, central Mali, killing at least 21. The assailants slit the throats of their victims, loot homes, and steal livestock. Source: [Deutsche Welle](#)
- **May 26, 2024:** Suspected jihadists open fire on civilians in Diallassagou, central Mali, killing at least 18 and injuring 21 others. Police claim insurgents targeted the village for reportedly cooperating with the Malian army. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **April 29, 2024:** Suspected jihadists ambush the town of Kadji, northern Mali. The assailants kill 10 local militiamen affiliated with the Malian government. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **April 29, 2024:** Mali’s armed forces launch an operation targeting and killing Abu Huzeifa, a senior commander of IS Sahel in Liptako region, a tri-border area and known ISIS hideout that encompasses parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Further details of the operation are not reported. The U.S. Department of State previously offered a \$5 million bounty for information leading to Abu Huzeifa’s capture. The United States accused Abu Huzeifa’s crimes of participation in the October 4, 2017, IS Sahel attack in Tongo Tongo Niger, which killed four U.S. soldiers and four Nigerian soldiers. Sources: [New York Times](#), [Rewards for Justice](#)

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- **April 16, 2024 - April 29, 2024:** On April 16, suspected jihadists ambush and abduct three buses carrying civilians in central Mali. The buses are rerouted toward a forest between Bandiagara and Bankass. The attackers immediately release women and children but hold 110 civilians. On April 24, dozens of men are reportedly released due to local agreements between JNIM-affiliate Katibat Macina and the assailants. Further details of the terms of release are not reported. Sources: [Voice of America](#), [RFI](#)
  - **February 28, 2024:** More than 100 suspected jihadists ambush an army position in Kwala, north of Bamako. The assailants first detonate a car bomb before opening fire on the troops. The attack reportedly kills several soldiers. Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
  - **February 27, 2024:** Three Italian nationals return to Rome following their release from a terror group, presumably JNIM, in Mali. The victims are from the same family and were kidnapped in Koutiala, southeast of Bamako, in May 2022. Source: [Associated Press](#)
  - **February 15, 2024:** Unidentified assailants ambush a bus transporting B2Gold employees from Fekola Mine to Bamako, killing three and injuring several others. There are no immediate claims of responsibility. Sources: [Reuters](#), [B2Gold](#)
  - **December 25, 2023:** JNIM militants ambush the Mourdiah military base in central Mali. The number of casualties is not confirmed, although JNIM later releases a statement claiming “dozens” of soldiers were killed. Source: [North Africa Post](#)
  - **December 17, 2023:** JNIM releases Gerco van Deventer, a South African paramedic who was held by JNIM since 2018. The South African charity, Gift of the Givers, was able to secure Van Deventer’s release for a sum of \$500,000. On November 3, 2017, Van Deventer was kidnapped in Libya south of the capital of Tripoli. About a year later, he was relocated to Mali and sold to JNIM. Source: [Voice of America](#)
  - **November 29, 2023:** The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) publishes leaked documents revealing that in 2011 the emir of Qatar instructed that \$15 million be allocated to burgeoning Islamist movements across northern Mali and the Sahel. The documents are sourced to Project Raven, a confidential surveillance initiative that assists the United Arab Emirates in surveilling other governments, militants, and human rights activists. The funds were reportedly marked as humanitarian support and were allocated via the state security service under the representation of Qatari official Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Nue’eimi. It is uncertain if those funds were directed toward the predecessor and affiliate groups of JNIM, including AQIM, Ansar al-Dine (AAD), al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front (MLF or Katiba Macina). Source: [Middle East Media Research Institute](#)
  - **November 26, 2023:** JNIM militants carry out multiple attacks in Djibo, ambushing military bases, homes, and three displacement camps. At least 40 civilians are killed and another 42 are injured. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **November 7, 2023:** Suspected jihadists ambush several buses in central Mali, kidnapping 40 people between Koro and Bankass. A majority of the kidnapped belong to the Dogon ethnic group, a community often accused by Islamist militants of assisting the state’s counterinsurgency efforts. Source: [Fox News](#)
  - **October 13, 2023:** Mali-based terror groups JNIM and AQIM release a joint statement online in response to the conflict between Hamas terrorists and Israel in Gaza. The two groups explicitly praise Hamas in the statement and encourage their followers to commit further acts of violence against Jews across the world. They further encourage followers to “light a fire in the West Bank under the feet of the Jews...so rise up and fight the Jews and those who protect the Jews.” Source: [Long War Journal](#)
  - **September 28, 2023:** A suicide bomber from Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) detonates an explosive at a military camp in Dioura, central Mali. No further details of casualties or injuries are reported. Source: [Africa News](#)
  - **September 27, 2023:** JNIM militants ambush Wagner units in Acharane, northern Mali. The suicide attack was followed by an assault with heavy and light weapons. According to the assailants, they had taken control over the post and numerous soldiers were killed. Source: [Africa News](#)
  - **September 22, 2023:** Suspected jihadists carry out a mortar attack in Timbuktu. The shelling kills two and injures five others. Source: [BBC News](#)
  - **September 12, 2023:** According to a report published by the International Rescue Committee, because of the ongoing insurgency, political instability, and climate change, approximately 40 percent or 8.8 million people in Mali are in need of humanitarian assistance, especially in the Ménaka and Timbuktu regions. Source: [International Rescue Committee](#)
  - **September 12, 2023:** Militants from the Coalition of Azawad Movements (CMA), a coalition of Tuareg separatist groups, declares itself at war with Mali, launching an attack on the Malian army in Bourem. The CMA and the central government previously signed a peace agreement in 2015. According to the CMA, the attack reportedly kills 97 Malian soldiers, however, the Malian army claims 10 soldiers are killed and 47 CMA terrorists were neutralized. Source: [Voice of America](#)
  - **September 7, 2023:** JNIM militants carry out two attacks on a passenger boat near Timbuktu and an army base in Bamba. The attacks kill 64 people. Sources: [CNN](#), [Africa News](#)
  - **August 3, 2023:** According to a report published by the U.N. Security Council, from 2022 to August 2023, IS Sahel has almost doubled its areas of control in Mali. In particular, the jihadist group controls all the rural cercles of Ménaka and Gao. Source: [United Nations](#)
  - **July 24, 2023:** The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates three Malian security and political officials for facilitating the deployment and expansion of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group’s activities in Mali.
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Colonel Sadio Camara, who is Mali's current Minister of Defense; Mali's Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Colonel Alou Boi Diarra; and Mali's Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Adama Bagayoko, are designated as specially designated nationals (SDNs) for their actions in destabilizing Mali and subjecting their population to violence at the hands of the private military company, the Wagner Group. Source: [U.S. Department of the Treasury](#)

- **July 7, 2023:** Armed men ambush a U.N. logistics convoy moving between Labbezanga and Gao in northern Mali. The ambush, which causes a tanker to overturn, injures one civilian. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **June 29, 2023:** IS Sahel militants ambush the villages of Gaena and Boya in Gao region, northern Mali. The ambushes kill at least 17—14 in Boya and three in Gaena—and injure several others. Source: [Anadolu Agency](#)
- **June 13, 2023:** Suspected extremists ambush Burkinabe peacekeepers in Timbuktu, northern Mali. The ambush, which involved both IEDs and small arms, killed one peacekeeper and injured eight others. Source: [Fox News](#)
- **May 30, 2023:** The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates Ivan Aleksandrovich Maslov, a Wagner Group senior official who leads the group's forces in Mali. Along with directing the Wagner Group's operations in Mali, Maslov is reportedly involved in efforts facilitating the acquisition and transportation of military equipment from Mali to Ukraine, where the Wagner Group provides support to pro-Russian forces. Source: [U.S. Department of the Treasury](#)
- **May 11, 2023:** Suspected jihadists ambush troops in Kita, western Mali. The ambush, which took place in an area not normally targeted by violent extremists, kills six soldiers and wounds nine others. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **May 8, 2023:** A roadside bomb detonates in Douentza, central Mali. The explosion wounds seven U.N. peacekeepers. Security officials suspect jihadists planted the bomb. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **April 23, 2023:** JNIM carries out a double suicide bombing in Sevare, central Mali. The explosions kill 13. The assailants reportedly targeted the camp as it was housing Russian combatants from the Wagner Group. That same day, JNIM militants ambush soldiers in the Koulikoro region, killing 10. Source: [Agence France Presse](#)
- **April 18, 2023:** JNIM militants ambush an official Malian delegation near Nara. The ambush kills Assimi Goita's chief of staff killed along with at least three other people. Sources: [Agence France Presse](#), [Le Monde](#)
- **April 6, 2023:** Suspected terrorists ambush a checkpoint in Nossombougou, southern Mali. The attack kills five. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **March 16, 2023:** After 711 days in captivity, JNIM releases French journalist Olivier Dubois and U.S. aid worker Jeffery Woodke. They arrive in Niamey, the capital of Niger. Dubois was kidnapped in northern Mali on April 8, 2021, whereas Woodke was abducted in southwest Niger in October 2016. The rescue mission is reportedly conducted by Niger and France. Source: [Associated Press](#)
- **February 7, 2023:** Suspected jihadists ambush a security checkpoint in Nara, western Mali. The attack kills three. Source: [Africa News](#)
- **January 24, 2023:** Unidentified assailants kidnap Dr. Mahamadou Diawara of the World Health Organization from his car in the eastern town of Menaka. The assailants also attack Diawara's driver but leave him behind. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **January 15, 2023:** Unidentified militants attack a security mission on the Kwala-Mourdiah road on the Gomitra-Kwala axis, killing five soldiers and wounding three. Malian air forces kill 15 militants. JNIM claims responsibility and shows photos of captured weapons and vehicles. Sources: [Anadolu Agency](#), [Afrik Soir](#), [Long War Journal](#)
- **January 10, 2023:** Militants attack security forces in the towns of Mopti and Segou with IEDs. Subsequent clashes between the militants and security forces leave 14 soldiers dead and 11 wounded. The Malian army claims it neutralized 31 of the attackers. JNIM claims responsibility. Sources: [Agence France-Presse](#), [Africa News](#), [Anadolu Agency](#)
- **January 9, 2023:** Militants attack a gendarmerie post at Sebekoro in the Kayes region at approximately 2 a.m., killing one and wounding three. Sources: [Sahel Intelligence](#), [CGTN](#), [Long War Journal](#)
- **January 8, 2023:** JNIM attacks a customs post in Didiéni in the Koulikoro region. JNIM later claims responsibility and provides photos of captured weapons and vehicles. Sources: [Sahel Intelligence](#), [CGTN](#), [Long War Journal](#)
- **January 2, 2023:** JNIM attacks a defense post in Marka-coungo and a local toll station in the town of Kassela, both in the Koulikoro region, killing at least seven people. Two members of the civil defense force and three civilians are killed in the attack on defense post. JNIM claims responsibility for the attacks but does not provide photographic proof. Sources: [Voice of America](#), [Maliweb](#), [Long War Journal](#)
- **December 16, 2022:** Unidentified gunmen attack a MINUSMA police patrol in Timbuktu town in northern Mali, killing two Nigerian peacekeepers and wounding four others. Sources: [United Nations](#), [United Nations](#)
- **December 1, 2022:** Clashes between ISIS and local al-Qaeda affiliates in and around Gao and Menaka kill at least 100 people, including dozens of civilians. Hundreds of civilians are reportedly displaced due to the fighting. On December 4, between 200 and 300 civilians are reportedly massacred during the fighting. Source: [TRT World](#)
- **November 21, 2022:** Suspected Islamic extremists attack the Kadji camp outside Gao, killing at least 11. The camp hosts IDPs who fled violence in northern Mali. The militants also destroy the camp's food supplies and steal its livestock. Sources: [Associated Press](#), [Crisis24](#)

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- **November 6, 2022:** An IED explodes near a unit of MINUSMA peacekeepers, wounding six. MINUSMA does not provide further details. Source: [North Africa Post](#)
  - Three IED attacks throughout the month kill nine Malian soldiers and wound eight in southern and central Mali. Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
  - **October 17, 2022:** A roadside bomb detonates near Tessalit, northern Mali, as a Chadian MINUSMA unit drives over it. The explosion kills three U.N. peacekeepers and injures three others. A fourth peacekeeper dies from his injuries the following day. Local insurgent groups linked to al-Qaeda are known for placing improvised explosive devices in the area. Sources: [France 24](#), [ABC News](#)
  - **October 14, 2022:** A passenger bus strikes an IED in Bandiagara region, central Mali. The explosion kills 10 and injures dozens of others. No group claims responsibility, but the Malian government believes that Katiba Macina, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, is responsible. Source: [Associated Press](#)
  - **September 6, 2022:** Militants from Islamic State in the Sahel (IS Sahel) ambush and seize Talataye, a town in northern Mali. The attack kills more than 45 civilians and displaces many residents of the town. Sources: [Defense Post](#), [Defense Post](#)
  - **August 7, 2022:** Suspected jihadists using drones and artillery launch an attack in Tessit. The attack kills 42 soldiers, one of the largest number of casualties in Mali's decade-long insurgency. Police claim IS Sahel was responsible for the attack. Source: [Voice of America](#)
  - **July 28, 2022:** Al-Qaeda-linked militants reportedly launch coordinated attacks in Kalumba—near the Mauritanian border—and Sokolo, central Mali. The attacks kill 12 in Kalumba while six are killed and 25 others are wounded in Sokolo. Source: [Africa News](#)
  - **July 22, 2022:** Katiba Macina militants ambush Mali's main military base in Kati, north of Bamako. The attack, which involved car bombs, killed one soldiers and left six others wounded. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **July 14, 2022:** Armed men ambush a checkpoint in Zantiguila, southwest Mali. The ambush kills six and injures two others. The attack is unusual as violence rarely reaches near Bamako, Mali's capital. Source: [Al Jazeera](#)
  - **July 5, 2022:** A U.N. armored vehicle strikes a mine on the Tessalit-Gao highway in central Mali. The explosion kills two Egyptian peacekeepers and injures five others. Source: [Washington Post](#)
  - **June 23, 2022:** A mine explodes in Timbuktu, an area known for terrorist activity. The explosion, wounds eight U.N. peacekeepers from the Burkinabe contingent of the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Source: [Defense Post](#)
  - **June 11, 2022:** Unidentified gunmen ambush a checkpoint in Koutiala, southeast Mali. The assailants kill five. According to media sources, at the time of the attack, the Malian army was conducting an operation in the Koutiala area. Source: [The National](#)
  - **June 3, 2022:** An IED detonates on a road near the town of Douentza, central Mali. The explosion strikes a convoy, killing two soldiers from the Egyptian contingent of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali and injures two others. No group claims responsibility for the attack, but IEDs are a weapon of choice for terrorists against MINUSMA and Malian forces. Source: [France 24](#)
  - **June 1, 2022:** A convoy patrolling the town of Kidal in northern Mali comes under attack by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. One U.N. peacekeeper, who is a Jordanian national, is killed and three others are injured. The casualties were members of MINUSMA. No group claims responsibility for the attack. The same day, unidentified armed men ambush a car in Kayes, western Mali. The Malian drivers and a staff member of the Netherlands Red Cross are killed. Sources: [France 24](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **April 24, 2022:** Katiba Macina militants launch three attacks on army bases in Sevare, Niono, and Bapho, central Mali. The attacks kill six soldiers and injure 20 others. Source: [Defense Post](#)
  - **April 19, 2022:** A Malian military convoy strikes an IED in Hombori municipality, in Douentza region. The military subsequently detains approximately 500 people and launches an operation that kills at least 50 civilians, according to a U.N. report. Source: [TRT World](#)
  - **March 27, 2022 - March 31, 2022:** The Wagner Group, in coordinating with Malian troops, launch a multi-day operation in Moura, Mopti region. The mercenaries reportedly carry out large numbers of extrajudicial killings, leading to the death of more than 500 civilians. The operation was intended to target alleged members of JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliated group. Sources: [The Guardian](#), [United Nations](#)
  - **March 21, 2022:** ISIS militants attack a military outpost in Tessit, northeastern Mali. The terrorist group reportedly took control of the military base before proceeding to torch it. The same day, militants ambushed a patrol in Boni, central Mali. Casualty numbers for each attack were not reported, but 16 soldiers were killed and 18 others were wounded in the two attacks. Source: [Agence France Presse](#)
  - **December 29, 2021:** Militants ambush an army unit in the Nara region. The assailants, who detonated an IED and used heavy weapons, kill four soldiers and injure around a dozen others. Source: [Voice Of America](#)
  - **December 3, 2021:** Unidentified gunmen open fire on a bus traveling from Songho to a market in Bandiagara, central Mali. The attack kills at least 31 and injures 17 others. Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked insurgents are known to carry out attacks in the Mopti region, of which the two villages are located. That same day, unidentified gunmen attack a convoy belonging to MINUSMA. The convoy was traveling from Kidal to Gao, central Mali. The attack kills one and injures another. Sources: [Reuters](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **November 14, 2021:** Suspected extremists ambush Malian soldiers in Guire, near the border of Mauritania. The ambush kills four and injures 14 others. Source: [Borneo Bulletin](#)
  - **October 30, 2021:** An army escort is ambushed in Mourdiah, north of Bamako.
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The ambush kills two and injures three. That same day, an army truck hits a roadside bomb near Segou, northeast of Bamako. The explosion kills five. The Malian army arrests two suspects following the attacks. Source: [Reuters](#)

- **October 21, 2021:** Suspected jihadists kidnap five civilians in Blendio, southern Mali. Although abductions are common in the north given the ongoing insurgency, the south has generally been spared from violence. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **October 6, 2021:** Suspected jihadists detonate an IED and open fire on Malian troops in the Mopti region, central Mali. The explosion and gunfire kill 16 and injure 10 soldiers before the insurgents are repelled by the army. Sources: [Africa News](#), [Deutsche Welle](#)
- **October 3, 2021:** A convoy carrying U.N. peacekeepers hits an improvised explosive device near Tessalit, northern Mali. The explosion kills one U.N. peacekeeper and injures four others. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **September 29, 2021:** JNIM militants ambush a convoy heading towards an Australian-owned gold mine in southern Mali. The ambush kills five gendarmes and injures four others who were escorting the convoy. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **September 15, 2021:** French President Emmanuel Macron tweets that French forces neutralize Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, the leader of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). According to media sources, al-Sahrawi was killed in a French-led air and ground operation in Mali sometime between August 17 and August 21. Sources: [Associated Press](#), [SOFREP](#)
- **August 8, 2021:** Jihadists on motorbikes invade the villages of Karou, Ouatagouna, and Daoutegeft near Mali's border with Niger. The suspected jihadists massacre more than 51 civilians in the coordinated attacks. A Malian army patrol was sent to the targeted communities the next day. No group claims responsibility for the attack, but the area is prone to attacks from groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Sources: [Guardian](#), [France 24](#)
- **June 25, 2021:** Unidentified militants ambush a military outpost in Boni, central Mali. The attack kills six soldiers. That same day, a car bomb strikes a temporary base near Tarkint, northern Mali. The explosion injures 15 U.N. peacekeepers, 12 of whom were German. Germany has around 1,100 soldiers in Mali, mostly based in Gao. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [France 24](#)
- **June 21, 2021:** A car bomb detonates near a French armored car in central Mali, the explosion injures ten, including six French soldiers. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [France 24](#)
- **May 5, 2021:** Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) insurgents kidnap Olivier Dubois, a French journalist, in Gao, northern Mali. GSIM circulates a video in which Dubois, a journalist for several French media outlets, confirms his abduction and begs for the French government "to do everything in their power" to get him released. Sources: [Arab News](#), [France 24](#)
- **April 3, 2021:** Suspected jihadists attack a military post in Diafarabe. The attack kills two and wounds six others. The same day, insurgents attack a military complex manned by MINUSMA in Aguelhok. The attack kills four peacekeepers from Chad and wounds 19 others. No group claims responsibility, but the insurgents were heavily armed. Sources: [Arab News](#), [United Nations](#)
- **March 15, 2021:** ISIS fighters ambush a military post southwest of Asongo, near Mali's border with Burkina Faso and Niger. The attack kills 33 soldiers and injures 14 others. Sources: [Defense Post](#), [France 24](#)
- **March 1, 2021:** Suspected Islamist militants attack three villages in central Mali. The attacks kill four in Gorey, four in Djamnati, and one in Simikanda. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **February 25, 2021:** Unidentified assailants ambush a gendarmerie—a police unit under the command of the military—post in Bandiagara, central Mali. The attack kills nine gendarmes and injures nine others. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **February 10, 2021:** Unidentified militants attack a temporary operating base of MINUSMA near Kerena, central Mali. The attack injures around 27 peacekeepers and kills one other. Source: [United Nations](#)
- **January 16, 2021:** A MINUSMA logistics convoy strikes an improvised explosive device (IED) in Tessalit. The explosion kills one peacekeeper and injures another. Source: [United Nations](#)
- **January 14, 2021:** A military convoy carrying U.N. peacekeepers strikes an explosive device in Bambara-Maoude, Timbuktu. The explosion kills four and injures five others. No group claims responsibility for the attack, but it is suspected that Islamist militants planted the explosive device. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **January 3, 2021:** An armored vehicle carrying French soldiers hits an IED in Menaka, northwestern Mali. The attack kills two French soldiers and injures another. Source: [Deutsche Welle](#)
- **December 29, 2020:** An armored vehicle carrying French soldiers strikes an IED in Hombori, central Mali. The attack kills three soldiers. The al-Qaeda-linked Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) claims responsibility for the attack. Sources: [Deutsche Welle](#), [Defense Post](#)
- **November 30, 2020:** Al-Qaeda linked militants attack French military bases in the towns of Menaka, Gao, and Kidal. The suspected coordinated assaults do not result in any casualties. However, the attacks result in some material damage. Sources: [Defense Post](#), [Reuters](#)
- **November 13, 2020:** French ground forces and helicopters launch an operation in the Menaka region of eastern Mali. The operation targets and neutralizes Bah ag Moussa, an AQIM military leader. Sources: [France 24](#), [Voice of America](#)
- **October 27, 2020:** A Bamako court begins the trial of two men accused of orchestrating terror attacks in 2015 that targeted foreigners in Mali. At least 26 people were killed and at least 14 others were injured in an attack at La Terrasse restaurant in March 2015 and at the Radisson Blu hotel in November of the same year. The suspects face charges of planning and executing the attacks. The alleged mastermind—Mauritanian national and suspected al-Mourabitoun member—Fawaz Ould Ahmeida, is accused of personally shooting victims at the nightclub as revenge

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for French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Also implicated in the attacks is Sadou Chaka, a Malian who investigators claim transported weapons in the Radisson Blu attack. The November 2015 Radisson Blu attack saw two armed men hold over 170 guests and staff hostage, killing 20 and wounding 14 others before security officers stormed the building. On October 29, the suspects are found guilty and sentenced to death. In December 2022, the United States extradites Ould Ahmeida and charges him with multiple counts of terrorism. Sources: [BBC News](#), [Agence France Presse](#), [U.S. Department of Justice](#)

- **September 10, 2020:** Armed assailants attack Malian security forces in Alatona, central Mali. The attack kills four. No group claims responsibility for the attack, but the area is prone to jihadist attacks as well as inter-communal violence. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **September 5, 2020:** An armored vehicle carrying French military personnel strikes an improvised explosive device in Tessalit, northeastern Mali. The attack kills two and injures one other soldier. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [Deutsche Welle](#)
- **August 11, 2020:** Unidentified jihadists ambush Kimparana, central Mali. The assailants set fire to a jail, resulting in the release of five inmates. The attack kills a police officer and a soldier. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **July 23, 2020:** The Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) claims to ambush a French military camp in Gossi, northern Mali. The al-Qaeda linked group raided the camp with two explosive-packed vehicles. The attack kills one soldier. Source: [Defense Post](#)
- **July 3, 2020:** Unidentified armed men ambush several villages in central Mali. The attack kills over 31 villagers and nine soldiers. Source: [France 24](#)
- **June 15, 2020:** JNIM militants ambush a dozen military vehicles in Bouka Were. The ambush kills more than 24 soldiers. Source: [SOFREP](#)
- **June 13, 2020:** Unidentified gunmen ambush a convoy in central Mali. The attack kills at least 24 soldiers. No group claims responsibility for the attack, but the area is known for Islamist militant violence. Source: [BBC News](#)
- **June 13, 2020:** Unidentified gunmen ambush a U.N. convoy traveling between Tessalit and Gao in northwest Mali. The attack kills two U.N. peacekeepers. Source: [Al Jazeera](#)
- **June 4, 2020:** French troops launch an operation in northern Mali. The operation targets top al-Qaeda leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal, the head of al-Qaeda's affiliates in North Africa and the Sahel. Droukdal engineered al-Qaeda's expansion throughout the Sahel and Magreb through financing, planning, and carrying out terrorist attacks. Source: [The Hill](#)
- **May 11, 2020:** A convoy of United Nations soldiers from Chad strikes a roadside bomb in Aguelhok, northern Mali. Three soldiers are killed in the attack and four more are wounded. No group claims responsibility for the attack. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, however, states that attacks targeting U.N. peacekeepers could constitute war crimes under international law. Source: [Al Jazeera](#)
- ISIS fighters detonate a truck bomb along the desert frontier between Mali and Burkina Faso. Unlike similar previous attacks—where ISIS fighters targeted soldiers and villagers—this attack targets al-Qaeda militants. It is suspected that several al-Qaeda fighters are killed. The explosion set off a series of al-Qaeda reprisal attacks against ISIS, and both camps disseminated statements and sermons threatening and denouncing the other jihadist entity as “apostates.” The violence follows a yearlong truce between the jihadist franchises in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Chad. Source: [Wall Street Journal](#)
- **April 23, 2020:** During a Malian operation targeting “armed terrorist groups” in the Liptako region of southeast Mali, a military tanker belonging to the French-led Operation Barkhane is hit by an IED. One French soldier was killed and another was wounded. Source: [Associated Press](#)
- **April 6, 2020:** Militants ambush a military base in Bamba. The attack kills over 25 soldiers. No group claims responsibility for the attack, however it is suspected that jihadist Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM) was behind the ambush. The same day, suspected jihadists kill a custom officer in Sebekoro town, the details of the attack are unreported. Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [International Crisis Group](#)
- **March 31, 2020:** According to reports, the days leading up to and the day of Mali's parliamentary elections have been subject to kidnappings, ransacked polling stations, and roadside bomb attacks. An unreported number of village chiefs, election officials, and one electoral observer are kidnapped. It is uncertain if the perpetrators are jihadist militants or political dissidents. Source: [Al Jazeera](#)
- **March 29, 2020:** An unidentified local official claims that a vehicle hit a landmine in N'gorkou, central Mali. At least nine people are killed. Sources: [International Crisis Group](#), [Al Jazeera](#)
- **March 25, 2020 - March 27, 2020:** Malian opposition leader Soumalia Cisse is kidnapped by suspected Katiba Macina militants while campaigning in the Niafounke district in Timbuktu. Five others were kidnapped with Cisse but were released on March 27. Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Al Jazeera](#), [International Crisis Group](#)
- **March 24, 2020:** A Malian Armed Forces vehicle strikes an IED in the Mopti region of central Mali. The attack kills two soldiers, and injures three others. Source: [Anadolu Agency](#)
- **March 19, 2020:** Armed men ambush a Malian army camp in Gao, northern Mali. At least 29 soldiers are killed and at least five others are wounded. No group claims responsibility for the attack, however, the ambush is similar to those carried out by al-Qaeda linked groups in the region. Source: [Associated Press](#)
- **March 14, 2020:** A Canadian woman and an Italian man who were kidnapped in December 2018 in Burkina Faso are released in Mali. It is unreported who kidnapped the two or who arranged for the release of the hostages. Source: [Associated Press](#)

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- **February 26, 2020:** A roadside bomb strikes a German vehicle being driven by Irish troops near Gao, northern Mali. The attack injures three Irish soldiers. It is unreported who is responsible for the attack. Source: [Associated Press](#)
  - **February 14, 2020:** Suspected jihadists launch an attack in Ogossagou, a village that is home to mostly Fulani herders. At least 31 people are killed in the attack. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [New York Times](#)
  - **January 26, 2020:** Militants ambush an army camp in Sokolo, central Mali. The attack kills at least 20 soldiers. No group claims responsibility for the attack, although it is suspected that the attackers were linked to al-Qaeda. Sources: [North Africa Post](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **January 16, 2020:** A U.S. federal court charges a Malian man in absentia for his role in two 2016 terror attacks in Burkina Faso. The attacks killed 30 people, including Michael J. Riddering, an American missionary. The attacker, Mimi Ould Baba, reportedly scouted attack locations for AQIM and arranged the transport of weaponry to be used in the attacks on a hotel and a café in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Several weeks after the Burkina Faso shooting, Baba helped plan a similar attack on Westerners in Ivory Coast. In that attack, three men armed with hand grenades and AK-47s walked along a beach in Grand Bassam and opened fire. Nineteen people were killed. Baba was eventually captured in 2017 in Mali, where he remains in custody. Sources: [Fox News](#), [U.S. Department of Justice](#)
  - **November 26, 2019 - November 28, 2019:** French troops launch an air operation to support ground forces engaged in combat with militants. Two helicopters collide, killing 13 French soldiers. On November 28, ISIS claims its West African branch caused the collision. The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) said the helicopters collided after one of them retreated under fire from ISWAP fighters, but it did not provide evidence for its claim. Sources: [Guardian](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **November 1, 2019:** ISIS militants attack an army post in Indelimane, northern Mali. The attack kills at least 54 people and injures another 10. French forces claim that included among the casualties was one of its soldiers who died after his vehicle hit an improvised explosive device. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **October 9, 2019:** French forces carry out an operation successfully killing Ali Maychou, the second in command of JNIM. Maychou was a former radical Imam who was added to international sanctions list by the United Nations for his links to ISIS and al-Qaeda. Source: [Deutsche Welle](#)
  - **October 6, 2019:** A vehicle hits an improvised explosive device in Aguelhok, northern Mali. The vehicle carried a U.N. peacekeeper and four others. All five sustain injuries. No group claims responsibility for the explosive. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **October 3, 2019:** Insurgent forces simultaneously attack the G5 Sahel force camp in Boulikessi and the Malian army base in Mondoro. The insurgents kill at least 25 Malian soldiers. At least 60 soldiers are missing. No group claims the raids, but Malian authorities blame the al-Qaeda-linked Burkinabe jihadist group Ansaroul Islam for the assaults. Source: [Long War Journal](#)
  - **September 30, 2019:** JNIM militants attack military bases in Boulikessi and Mondoro, both in central Mali. The attacks kill at least 38 with dozens of other soldiers missing. Sources: [Deutsche Welle](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **September 3, 2019:** A vehicle hits a makeshift bomb in Mopti, central Mali. The attack kills at least 14 people and wounds another 24. JNIM claims responsibility for the attack, claiming they intended to target French troops and not civilians. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **August 21, 2019:** Suspected jihadists ambush Malian soldiers in Bamako. The attack kills five. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **June 18, 2019:** Unidentified gunmen attack the villages of Yoro and Gangafani 2. The attacks kill at least 41. The victims of the raids were mostly ethnic Dogons, where 24 people were killed. Another 17 died in Gangafani 2. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **June 17, 2019:** Insurgents attack Gaganfani and Yono, two ethnic Dogon villages in the Mopti region of central Mali. The attack kills 38 and leaves many others wounded. No group claims responsibility for the attacks. Source: [The Defense Post](#)
  - **June 16, 2019:** Allied French and Malian forces kills 20 ISIS militants in an operation in Akabar, northern Mali. Despite the deployment of 4,500 French troops meant to contain the violence in the Sahel, it has steadily worsened, and the Islamists have succeeded in triggering an ethnic conflict. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **June 9, 2019 - June 10, 2019:** A Malian militia believed to belong to the Fulani ethnic group raids the Dogon village of Sobane Da. Over two days of violence, the attack kills at least 95 people and wounds another 38, with reports of over 20 people missing. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [Defense Post](#)
  - **April 21, 2019:** Gunmen attack and burn down a Malian army base in Guire district, Central Mali. The ambush kills 11 soldiers. No group claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **March 23, 2019:** A group of armed men dressed as traditional hunters attack the Ogossagou village in the Mopti region, killing at least 157 people and wounding at least 73. The village is home to members of the Fulani ethnic group. The attackers are suspected of belonging to the Dogon ethnic group. The two groups have historically clashed over land access. On March 24, the Mali government dissolves a Dogon militia, which had previously helped in counterterrorism operations. The United Nations sends human rights experts to investigate the attack. Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Reuters](#), [CNN](#)
  - **March 17, 2019:** Gunmen launch an overnight raid on a military base in the village of Dioura in the Mopti region, killing at least 23 soldiers. The gunmen briefly seize the military base. Malian officials suspect jihadist militants linked to a Tuareg militia and al-Qaeda. JNIM claims responsibility. Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Reuters](#), [Voice of America](#), [Long War Journal](#)
  - **February 22, 2019:** French troops carry out an operation involving air and ground assets in Timbuktu. French troops kill several militants including Yahia Abou Hamman, the number two in command of JNIM. Source: [Reuters](#)
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- **January 20, 2019:** Militants attack MINUSMA forces at a U.N.-run camp in the village of Aguelhok in the Kidal region, killing at least 10 Chadian U.N. peacekeepers and wounding 25 others. AQIM claims responsibility, claiming the attack is in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Chad. Sources: [CNN](#), [Al Jazeera](#)
  - **January 15, 2019:** Gunmen on motorbikes kill at least 34 Tuareg civilians in two villages in northern Mali. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **January 1, 2019:** Armed men dressed as traditional Donzo hunters kill at least 37 Fulani civilians in the village of Koulogon Peul in the Mopti region. U.N. human rights experts announce intentions to investigate. Sources: [Reuters](#), [United Nations](#)
  - **December 11, 2018 - December 12, 2018:** A series of attacks on Tuareg camps in the Ménaka region of eastern Mali claims the lives of at least 42 people, including children as young as eight. The attacks are reportedly carried out by men on motorcycles, who are suspected to be jihadists. Source: [CBC News](#)
  - **November 12, 2018:** Three Malians are killed and 30 others are wounded when two suicide bombers detonate vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices near U.N.-owned villas in the city of Gao. JNIM claims responsibility for the attack. Sources: [News 24](#), [News24](#), [GardaWorld](#), [GardaWorld](#), [U.S. Department of State](#)
  - **July 1, 2018:** In an attack on French troops in Gao, JNIM militants kill four French soldiers and four civilians. JNIM claims that the attack is intended to send a message to French President Emmanuel Macron, who is scheduled to arrive in Mauritania the following day. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **June 29, 2018:** Islamists exchange gunfire with security officials after a suicide bomber is prevented from entering the headquarters of an anti-terror taskforce located Sévaré. Six people are killed and others are wounded. Source: [Guardian](#)
  - **July 29, 2017:** Al-Qaeda releases South African hostage Stephen McGown, who had been kidnapped nearly six years earlier at a hotel in Timbuktu. Source: [BBC News](#)
  - **June 18, 2017:** Gunmen storm Le Campement, a luxury hotel outside of Bamako, killing five people. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility for the attack. Sources: [BBC News](#), [Independent](#), [Reuters](#)
  - **June 8, 2017:** A U.N. base in Kidal, northern Mali, is attacked with heavy mortar fire. Three U.N. peacekeepers from Guinea are killed and five others are wounded. Three Guinea soldiers are killed just outside the base. An al-Qaeda affiliate group claims responsibility for the attack. Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Associated Press](#)
  - **June 1, 2017:** Several French soldiers are wounded in a mortar attack on a U.N. peacekeeping camp in Timbuktu. JNIM claims responsibility for the attack. Source: [Associated Press](#)
  - **May 23, 2017:** An attack on a U.N. patrol in the Kidal region kills two Chadian peacekeepers. Source: [United Nations](#)
  - **May 15, 2017:** Four U.N. peacekeepers and three Malian soldiers are hurt when a U.N. camp near Timbuktu is hit by mortar fire. The same camp was attacked with rockets on May 3. Source: [Sahelien](#)
  - **May 3, 2017:** At least one U.N. peacekeeper is killed and nine others hurt when a U.N. base in the northern city of Timbuktu is hit by rocket fire. The U.N. reports that JNIM claims responsibility for the attack. Sources: [Associated Press](#), [Liberian Observer](#), [Voice of America](#), [United Nations](#)
  - **May 2, 2017:** Nine Malian soldiers are killed and five others are injured when a supply convoy is ambushed between Dogofri and Nampala. The convoy hit a mine before being attacked by gunfire. A Malian security official attributes the attack to “jihadists.” Source: [Agence France Presse](#)
  - **March 5, 2017:** Assaultants target a Malian army post near the border with Burkina Faso, killing 11 soldiers. The attack is attributed to Ansar-ul-Islam lil-Ichad wal Jihad (IRSAD), an al-Qaeda-linked group led by extremist Burkinabe preacher Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Sources: [International Business Times](#), [International Business Times](#)
  - **January 18, 2017:** A suicide car bomber targets a military camp in Gao, killing 47 people and wounding more than 100 others. Al-Mourabitoun claims responsibility. Sources: [CNN](#), [Associated Press](#)
  - **November 30, 2016:** Militants target two airports in Gao, leaving no casualties. Al-Mourabitoun claims responsibility. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **October 3, 2016:** Unidentified assailants target a camp hosting a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Aguelhok, in Mali’s northern Kidal region. The attack leaves one U.N. peacekeeper dead and eight wounded. Source: [News24](#)
  - **August 5, 2016 - August 7, 2016:** Unidentified assailants launch a series of bombs targeting U.N. peacekeeping targets in northeast Mali. The attacks leave one peacekeeper dead and eight wounded. Sources: [News24](#), [United Nations](#)
  - **July 19, 2016:** A joint attack—allegedly carried out by AQIM, the Macina Liberation Front, and an ethnic Peul group—targets an army base in central Mali, killing 17 Malian soldiers. Source: [Reuters](#)
  - **May 29, 2016:** Five U.N. peacekeepers are killed when a roadside bomb detonates near a convoy near Severe in central Mali. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
  - **April 12, 2016:** Three French soldiers are killed by an improvised explosive device in Tessalit. AAD takes credit for the attack. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
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- **March 21, 2016:** Gunmen attempt to attack the Bamako's Hotel Nord Sud, where the headquarters of the European Union training mission is based. One attacker is killed while trying to penetrate the perimeter as another is arrested. Authorities suspect AQIM and AMB are involved. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **March 13, 2016:** Gunmen with links to AQIM attack a beach resort in Côte d'Ivoire, killing 19 people and wounding 33. Shortly after, Malian forces arrest three people connected to the attack. On December 28, 2022, a Malian court convicts four men—Hantao Ag Mohamed Cisse, Sidi Mohamed Kounta, Mohamed Cisse, and Hassan Barry—for aiding in the attack and sentences them to life in prison. Fourteen others suspected of masterminding or aiding the attack remain at large or are in custody. Seven are sentenced in absentia to life in prison, while the other seven are acquitted. Sources: [France24](#), [Voice of America](#)
- **February 12, 2016:** A mortar attack—claimed by Ansar al-Dine—kills five U.N. peacekeepers in Kidal. Source: [BBC News](#)
- **November 20, 2015:** Two gunmen storm the Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali's capital, Bamako, killing 20 people and taking as many as 170 hostages. Al-Mourabitoun claims that it carried out the attack in conjunction with AQIM. Sources: [BBC News](#), [Reuters](#)
- **August 7, 2015:** Al-Mourabitoun gunmen attack the Hotel Byblos in the central Malian town of Sevare, killing nine civilians and four Malian soldiers. Source: [France24](#)
- **June 30, 2015:** AAD militants attack a military camp near the borders with Mauritania and Côte d'Ivoire, killing three soldiers. In a telephone call with Agence France-Presse, AAD preacher Ismail Khalil warns "[AAD will] multiply the attacks in Ivory Coast, Mali and Mauritania, countries that work with the enemies of Islam." Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
- **March 7, 2015:** Al-Mourabitoun insurgents attack La Terrasse—a restaurant frequented by expatriates—in the capital of Bamako, killing one Belgian security officer, three Malians, and wounding nine others. Source: [Reuters](#)
- **January 9, 2015:** AQIM is the suspected perpetrator of an attack on a U.N. vehicle in Kidal, Mali that wounds seven Senegalese U.N. peacekeepers. Source: [U.N. News Centre](#)
- **January 5, 2015:** Islamists open fire on Malian soldiers in Nampala, a town located near Mali's border with Mauritania. According to a source at the United Nations, five soldiers are killed. Source: [BBC News](#)
- **November 25, 2014:** Insurgents target the convoy of the Malian Minister of Rural Development with a roadside bomb. Two soldiers are killed in the explosion and four others are wounded. The Minister is left unscathed. Source: [Associated Press](#)
- **October 3, 2014:** In the deadliest attack on the U.N. mission in Mali to date, Islamist insurgents ambush a U.N. convoy and kill nine peacekeepers in north-east Mali. Source: [BBC News](#)
- **September 18, 2014:** A roadside bomb kills five U.N. peacekeepers and wounds several others in the Kidal region in northern Mali. Source: [Associated Press](#)
- **August 30, 2014:** Two of the seven Algerian diplomats kidnapped by MUJAO in April 2012 are released. Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
- **June 11, 2014:** A suicide bomber kills four Malian and Chadian soldiers at a U.N. peacekeeping camp in Aguelhok, Mali. Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
- **November 14, 2013:** Al-Mourabitoun claims responsibility for a vehicle-borne IED that detonates at the Malian Solidarity Bank in Kidal. The explosion kills two U.N. peacekeepers and injures seven Malian soldiers. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **November 2, 2013:** AQIM claims responsibility for the murder of two French journalists, Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon, in northern Mali, calling it a response to "crimes perpetrated by France and its U.N., Malian and African allies." The prime suspect in the deaths of the two journalists is AQIM militant and well known drug trafficker, Bayes Ag Bakabo. Bakabo was killed in a French-led operation in Aguelhok, northern Mali, on June 5, 2021. Bakabo was allegedly preparing an attack against U.N. peacekeeping services before he was killed. Sources: [Reuters](#), [Guardian](#)
- **October 29, 2013:** Four of the seven French hostages that were abducted by AQIM in September 2010 are released in northern Mali. The hostages are believed to have been held in the Sahel desert. Source: [Guardian](#)
- **October 23, 2013:** Al-Mourabitoun suicide bombers kill two Chadian soldiers and one Malian civilian at a U.N. peacekeeping base. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **October 7, 2013 - October 8, 2013:** Insurgents belonging to MUJAO destroy two bridges during a mortar attack in the northern region of Gao. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **September 28, 2013:** Suicide bombers belonging to AQIM attack a Malian military camp in Timbuktu, killing civilians and injuring six soldiers. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **January 16, 2013 - January 19, 2013:** Islamists belonging to AMB cross into Algeria and launch an attack on the Tigantourine gas facility in the town of In Amenas. The militants take over 100 hostages, most of whom are foreign expatriates. During the siege, which lasts four days, 39 hostages, one Algerian security guard, and 29 militants are killed. An AMB spokesperson announces that the attack seeks to punish Algeria for allowing French fighter planes to use its airspace while attacking Islamists in northern Mali. Sources: [Euronews](#), [Combatting Terrorism Center](#), [Al Jazeera](#)

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- **November 20, 2012:** MUJAO claims responsibility for the kidnapping of an elderly French tourist in Diema in the Kayes region.  
Source: [Agence France-Presse](#)
- - : Islamists destroy UNESCO world heritage sites, including Sufi shrines, in Timbuktu, Mali.  
Source: [Atlantic](#)
- MUJAO insurgents kidnap seven Algerian diplomats in Gao.  
Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- AAD insurgents attack Malian soldiers in Aguelhok, killing 82 and kidnapping 30 others.  
Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
- **January 24, 2012:** Assailants shoot and slit the throats of soldiers and civilians in Aguelhok, a town located in eastern Mali. The attack, which claims the lives of up to 100 people, is believed to have been carried out by AQIM and MNLA. Source: [Al Jazeera](#)
- **November 24, 2011:** Islamists abduct two French citizens from a hotel in Hombori in central Mali.  
Source: [BBC News](#)
- **January 4, 2011:** An individual who had trained in an AQIM camp in northern Mali attacks the French Embassy. The attack causes only minor injuries. Source: [OSAC](#)
- **July 24, 2010:** AQIM executes the French citizen NGO worker abducted in December 2009.  
Source: [OSAC](#)
- AQIM militants in Mali kidnap an Italian citizen, his wife, and a French NGO worker.  
Source: [OSAC](#)
- **November 25, 2009:** AQIM militants kidnap French citizen Pierre Camatte near Mali's border with Niger. He is released in February 2010 in exchange for four AQIM militants. Source: [France24](#)
- **May 31, 2009:** AQIM insurgents execute British hostage Edwin Dyer, who they had held since January when they kidnapped him in Niger.  
Source: [Guardian](#)
- **June 10, 2009:** AQIM militants assassinate Malian State Security officer Colonel Lamana Ould Bou at his house in Tumbuktu.  
Source: [BBC News](#)
- AQIM insurgents execute a French tourist they had held since his January 2009 abduction near Mali's border with Niger.  
Source: [Guardian](#)
- **October 31, 2008:** AQIM militants turn over two Austrian tourists—who the group kidnapped in southern Tunisia in February 2008—to the Malian government after a ransom is paid.  
Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)

## **Domestic Counter-Extremism**

### *Military Endeavors*

From January to March 2012, Mali relied on its military to suppress the northern Tuareg rebellion. After months of failed strategy and continued Tuareg attacks on Malian forces, the military launched a coup on March 22. In the weeks that followed, Mali lost large swaths of territory to the rebels who, on April 6, declared an independent state in the country's north. With its own military failing, the government of Mali appealed to France—its former colonial ruler—and to the broader international community for emergency military intervention. (Sources: [International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research](#), [Guardian](#), [BBC News](#), [New York Times](#), [Reuters](#))

On January 11, 2013, France launched Operation Serval, which sought to put “an abrupt end to the advance of jihadist groups to the south of Mali and to ensure the safety of the 5,000 French nationals in the country.” Later that month, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) began deploying troops to Mali as part of the U.N.-approved African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Although the deployment of AFISMA forces was not expected to take place before September 2013, as secessionist and jihadist attacks escalated in late 2012 and early 2013, the involved parties agreed to accelerate their plans. On January 17, Nigeria became [the first](#) ECOWAS member state to contribute military support to Mali. It was joined soon after by military contingents from Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and other ECOWAS member states. The AFISMA mission aimed to “contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces...; support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups; transition to stabilization activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; and support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.” (Sources: [Ministère de la Défense](#), [U.N. Security Council](#), [Fox News](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#))

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In July 2013, the United Nations formally took over authority from the AFISMA mission and established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Not unlike the AFISMA mission, MINUSMA [sought](#) to “support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.” (Source: [U.N. MINUSMA](#))

Despite ongoing foreign military interventions, Islamist groups continue to control territory in northern Mali and to carry out attacks across the country. Mali has been entrusted with some military and governance responsibilities for its northern region but is still heavily dependent on France and the United Nations. France’s Operation Barkhane, which was launched on August 1, 2014, has continued to assist Mali in its counter-terrorism efforts in the country’s north. On February 2, 2020, France stated that it would boost its military presence in the Sahel by adding 600 troops to its counterterrorism effort, Operation Barkhane, in Mali and the four other countries in the region. As of June 2021, there are 5,100 French troops deployed across the Sahel. The bulk of the reinforcements will be stationed in the border zone linking Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The French Armed Forces have launched counterterrorism missions particularly in Mopti which is rife with conflict exacerbated by Katiba Macina—a group associated with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), which is a jihadist group that has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Despite the increase of extremist attacks in the Sahel, on January 26, 2020, the Pentagon announced it was considering reducing the number of U.S. troops in Mali. The United States, which currently deploys over 7,000 forces in Africa, has provided critical support to France’s Operation Barkhane in terms of intelligence and surveillance via drones. (Sources: [Council on Foreign Relations](#), [National Interest](#), [Ministère De La Defense](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#), [U.N. MINUSMA](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [Deutsche Welle](#), [Defense Post](#), [Al Jazeera](#), [Telegraph](#), [National](#), [CNN](#))

In October 2018, members of the Groupement Spéciale d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GSIGN), a French embassy-trained National Gendarmerie advanced intervention unit, began its first deployment to the Segou region in support of the government’s Integrated Central Region Security Plan and Operation Dambé, a military counterterrorism operation. The unit had immediate impact, supporting current gendarme posts, intervening in an armed robbery, and arresting suspected terrorists. In Bamako, the next phase of training began with the creation of an additional 32-man team with the GSIGN at the new Department of State-funded training academy. (Source: [U.S. Department of State](#))

In January 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted a meeting with the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad to address increased jihadist activity in Africa’s Sahel region. The leaders pledged to increase their military campaigns against jihadists. On February 27, 2020, the African Union (AU)—a pan-African organization which can deploy military forces via approval from its Peace and Security Council—confirmed that it would temporarily deploy 3,000 troops throughout the Sahel region to contain the violence propagated by armed Islamists. The troops will be deployed for a period of six months, but the finer details of the deployment have yet to be worked out. (Sources: [France 24](#), [Voice of America](#), [BBC News](#))

On March 28, 2020, France and several of its European allies—including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—launched a new task force called Takuba. The task force, made up of Special Forces that fight armed groups throughout the Sahel, is planned to “have an initial operational capability (IOC) by the summer of 2020 and is expected to become operational (FOC) by early 2021.” The task force will operate in the Liptako region between Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, and forces will also provide assistance to France’s Operation Barkhane and the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force. Using intelligence provided by the United States, French troops in Mali killed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader Abdelmalek Droukdel near the border with Algeria. (Sources: [Al Jazeera](#), [Agence France-Presse](#))

On June 10, 2021, France first announced it planned to end Operation Barkhane. The mission was replaced by a more international effort focused on supporting and cooperating with armies in the region that ask for assistance. Central to the effort was the Takuba Task Force—the European military task force led by France that advised, assisted, and accompanied Malian Armed forces in the Sahel. France’s withdrawal came at a critical juncture, as militants regularly attack Mali’s army which is poorly equipped and underfunded to adequately repel attacks. The Takuba Task Force was short-lived, and on June 30, 2022, France announced that the task force officially ceased operating in Mali. On July 14, 2021, Macron announced that Operation Barkhane would also end in the first quarter of 2022, which would involve the closure of French bases. France’s decision to cease Operation Barkhane was received negatively by Mali’s government. On September 25, 2021, Mali’s Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga spoke at the U.N. General Assembly in New York City, where he accused France of abandoning Mali at the height of an ongoing Islamist insurgency. According to Maïga, the armed terrorist groups, which started their insurgency in 2012, have spread to more than two-thirds of the country. By August 2022, the last contingent of French troops left Mali. (Sources: [CNN](#), [Reuters](#), [France 24](#), [France 24](#), [Institut Montaigne](#), [Bloomberg](#), [France 24](#), [Euractiv](#))

On December 18, 2021, Mali’s foreign affairs ministry said that Chad planned to deploy 1,000 additional soldiers to Mali to support their troops contending with the Islamist insurgency that has plagued the country for more than nine years. Chadian soldiers make up nearly 1,400 of the United

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Nations' 13,000-troop peacekeeping force in north and central Mali. The deployment of Chadian troops will reportedly reinforce their existing troops in Mali as France has begun to scale back its counterterrorism mission in the country. (Source: [Reuters](#))

On January 14, 2022, Sweden announced it would withdraw troops within the year from Takuba, a European special forces mission to the Sahel region. Additionally, Sweden announced it would review its participation in MINUSMA, a U.N. force in Mali over the presence of private Russian military contractors. The Swedish parliament approved the deployment of up to 150 soldiers to Takuba in 2020 and it has some 250 military personnel as part of MINUSMA, which was intended to run until 2024. On June 29, 2022, the U.N. Security Council agreed to extend the MINUSMA mission for another year. However, the force will not have French air support, as it did in the past given France's 2022 decision to withdraw its troops from Mali. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Defense Post](#))

Despite the U.N.'s extension of MINUSMA, on July 10, 2022, Mali's military government arrested 49 Ivorian soldiers at Mali's international airport in Bamako. According to the Mali's military government, the troops arrived without permission. However, according to Côte d'Ivoire officials, the soldiers were deployed as part of a security and logistics support contract signed in July 2019 with MINUSMA. Reportedly, Côte d'Ivoire had informed the junta prior to the arrival of the troops who were the eighth rotation sent to Mali. Malian authorities have yet to respond about the detained soldiers, however, Interim President Colonel Assimi Goita stated on Twitter that he had spoken by telephone with U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres and mentioned the importance of partner nations respecting Mali's sovereignty. As of September 27, only three of the soldiers—all women have been released. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Defense Post](#), [Al Jazeera](#), [Defense Post](#))

MINUSMA support remains critical to combating the terrorist threat in Mali, particularly given France's military withdrawal from the country. On February 17, 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that French troops deployed under Operation Barkhane were beginning to withdraw from Mali. On the same day, European leaders announced that Takuba forces would also withdraw from Mali, given Mali's decision to hire Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group. However, on March 11, 2022, Operation Barkhane commander, General Laurent Michon, told a press briefing that even after the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane from Mali, France will continue to give aerial military support to Malian troops battling the Islamist insurgency. The support, however, would be limited to areas where Russian fighters are not present. Despite France's ongoing withdrawal from Mali, on June 11, 2022, French soldiers captured Oumeya Ould Albakaye, a regional chief of the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS Sahel, formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) group in Mali. The French army stated that Albakaye, an explosives expert, is believed to have carried out terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in an effort to combat French forces within Mali. By August 15, 2022, the last French unit of the original 5,000 troops left Mali as Macron claimed that the "heart" of the operation will be moved to Niger and Burkina Faso. Operation Barkhane officially ended on November 9, 2022. Macron announced some French troops would remain in the region under new agreements made with host countries. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Guardian](#), [Al Jazeera](#), [U.S. News](#), [CNN](#), [Reuters](#), [France 24](#), [Reuters](#), [Euro News](#), [France 24](#), [Associated Press](#), [BBC News](#))

Despite the tactical successes of France in capturing and neutralizing terrorist forces, on June 30, 2022, France announced the official end of the Takuba Task Force, which included troops from nine of France's allies. Over 900 elite troops from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden, were deployed in Mali to train and reinforce local armies fighting insurgents. However, given that Mali's government has struggled to contain attacks against military and civilian targets, there has been increased diplomatic tension between France and Mali, leading to France's pull-out with both Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force. (Sources: [Euractiv](#), [France 24](#))

On October 18, 2022, Mali's Foreign Affairs Minister Abdoulaye Diop announced that Bamako's military government would exercise its right to self-defense if France allegedly continued to violate Mali's airspace and deliver arms to Islamist militants. Mali first accused France of supporting Islamist militants on August 18, three days after the last French unit left Mali. According to Diop, there were 50 "flagrant violations of Malian airspace...used by France to collect intelligence" and to drop ammunitions to terror groups. France has denied the allegations, and despite Mali's accusations, reports released by the United Nations have accused Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries collaborating with the military government of committing human rights abuses against civilians with jihadists. On November 21, Mali's government banned NGOs funded or supported by France. The government called the move a response to France's recent halt to development aid for Mali. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [Voice of America](#), [TRT World](#))

Mali's security situation worsened after the departure of French troops from Barkhane and Takuba. On January 24, 2023, Mohamed Toure, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Mali representative, said the departure of French and European forces left a vacuum in Mali that had been filled by jihadist groups, which are "spreading terror, killings, rapes, creating misery." Mali and Burkina Faso further distanced themselves from their former Western allies when they dispatched a joint delegation to Niamey, Niger to support the coup government that seized power from the democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26. Following the coup, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded that Bazoum be reinstated by August 6 at midnight, otherwise the economic bloc would resort to force to restore constitutional order.



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Niger failed to comply with the conditions, and instead closed their airspace. ECOWAS has yet to deploy troops, but the bloc issued financial sanctions against Niamey. To further reiterate their support, Burkina Faso and Mali announced that “any military intervention against Niger would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Burkina Faso and Mali.” The two countries also announced their refusal to apply the “illegal, illegitimate and inhuman sanctions.” On September 16, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a joint military pact. The Alliance of Sahel States pact guarantees mutual military support to one another in the instance of any rebellion or external aggression. Niger is a critical Western ally to the fight against violent extremists in the Sahel, especially as Burkina Faso and Mali, which are both ruled by juntas, have shifted their alliance towards Russia. (Sources: [France 24](#), [Africa News](#), [Agence France-Presse](#), [Reuters](#))

### *Security Agencies*

Mali’s national counterterrorism infrastructure consists of its Armed Forces, the primary entity responsible for carrying out domestic counterterrorism operations, and its General Directorate of State Security, which is authorized to detain and investigate terror suspects. However, as noted by the U.S. State Department in its 2017 Country Reports on Terrorism, lack of coordination between security forces and law enforcement as well as inadequate resources and training, among other factors, have made it difficult for the country to effectively secure its borders and to combat domestic terrorism without the assistance of foreign powers. Mali’s security forces continue to receive military support from the United Nations and France as well as training from the U.S. government as part of the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program. Among other efforts to enhance Mali’s capacity to counter terrorism, the U.S. government has provided training programs on crime scene investigations of terror attacks, surveillance detection, incident response, and securing vital infrastructure. (Sources: [U.S. Department of State](#), [U.S. Department of State](#))

The United Nations has accused Mali’s security agencies of carrying out civilian abuses during counterterrorism missions. A November 2022 MINUSMA report recorded 375 rights violations in the country between July and September 2022. The report attributed 163 to jihadist groups and 162 to the Malian army. Abuses included a September 12 incident where 14 dead bodies with their hands tied behind their backs were discovered in Gassel village in the Douentza region shortly after Malian authorities had arrested them. On September 17, foreign military personnel and traditional hunters allegedly killed approximately 50 people in the central Malian town of Gouni. Human Rights Watch accused Malian armed forces and associated foreign soldiers of summarily executing an estimated 300 civilian men in the central Malian town of Moura in late March 2022 during a counterterrorism operation. Some of the victims were suspected Islamist fighters. (Sources: [Agence France-Presse](#), [Human Rights Watch](#))

### *National Programs to Counter Extremism*

In June 2017, Mali implemented its first national strategy to prevent radicalization, terrorism, and violent extremism. The strategy involves Mali’s Ministry of Religious Affairs working with Islamic organizations to promote moderate Islam. In 2018, Mali was a pilot country of the International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity-Building Clearinghouse Mechanism, an online database under the GCTF to identify and de-conflict gaps in counterterrorism and CVE programming. A year later in February 2019, the Ministry of Religious Affairs launched a new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy that focuses not only on working with religious associations to maintain a secular state, but also improving governance, reinforcing security, promoting development, and increasing communication with local citizens in central Mali to provide greater transparency regarding the government’s actions. However, the Ministry of Religious Affairs lacks the necessary resources and effective interagency communication to fully implement these stabilizing measures. (Sources: [U.S. Department of State](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [U.S. Department of State](#))

On February 10, 2020, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita confirmed that the Malian government had opened communication with the armed groups. The government had previously been hesitant to initiate dialogue with armed groups, but, given the ongoing violence in the country, Keita asserted that it is an option that had to be explored. (Source: [Al Jazeera](#))

Despite Keita’s efforts to mitigate ongoing insurgent violence, on August 18, 2020, Malian soldiers ambushed Bamako, the West African country’s capital, and arrested the president. The opposition, which calls themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), and their spokesman, Colonel Ismael Wague, claimed the group is “not keen on power, but we are keen on the stability of the country.” CNSP seeks to organize a general election that will provide Mali with stronger institutions. Later that day, Keita delivered a brief address from the military base in Kati. Keita announced that he would not only resign, but that he would also dissolve Parliament. Keita was released on August 27, 2020. Since May 2020, Malian citizens have protested Keita and his party as a constitutional court overturned results from a contentious parliamentary election that allowed for Keita’s party to occupy the majority of seats. Since the contested ruling, Malian streets have been embroiled in protests as disgruntled citizens demanded new leadership to counter the growing threat of extremism and economic instability. (Sources: [Washington Post](#), [CNN](#), [Reuters](#), [Washington Post](#), [Al Jazeera](#))

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Following the release of Keita, leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) quickly imposed economic sanctions on Mali. The sanctions were lifted on October 6, 2020, following the junta’s nomination of retired Colonel Bah Ndaw as interim president, and Moctar Ouane—a civilian per the conditions imposed by ECOWAS—as prime minister of the transition government. The government was expected to hold an election in 18 months. However, on May 25, 2021, Ndaw and Ouane were arrested and subsequently ousted from their positions by junta leader Colonel Assimi Goïta, who claimed that the two men had failed in their duties of returning the country back to democratic rule. Following the coup, Goïta was named interim president on June 7, 2021, appointing Choguel Kokalla Maïga as Mali’s prime minister hours later. (Sources: [Associated Press](#), [Reuters](#), [Jerusalem Post](#), [BBC News](#), [Reuters](#))

Until 2022, Mali continued to rely heavily on the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and French forces to help marginally stabilize and secure the country’s northern regions. Terrorist groups, particularly ISIS, increased their attacks on all 2015 Algiers Accord signatories, including the rebel/separatist Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), the pro-government Plateforme coalition, and the jihadist groups with which were once briefly allied with groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Murabitun, and Ansar al-Din. Terrorism, insecurity, and lack of accountability or effective governance resulted in a significant increase in intercommunal violence, particularly in central Mali. The conflict area has moved farther south than at any time since the 2012 triple crisis of the political insurgency, military coup, and terrorist assault on the country. Security in the center of the country rapidly deteriorated in 2018 as terrorists took advantage of long-standing intercommunal and ethnic tensions to significantly increase violence against civilians. MINUSMA maintained its northern presence in 2018 and continued its work with the Malian government and various militia groups to facilitate redeployment of government administrators and security forces to the north. (Sources: [U.S. Department of State](#), [UNHCR](#), [Associated Press](#), [United Nations](#), [Al Jazeera](#))

Mali’s junta governments in the early 2020s became increasingly hostile to foreign intervention given the lack of progress in countering extremist groups in the country. By 2022, French troops fully withdrew from the country. On December 11, 2023, the United Nations ended its 10-year peacekeeping mission in Mali. The departure was in response to the coup government’s request, as the regime claimed in June that the peacekeeping mission was inadequate in effectively combatting violent extremism in the region. Following the announcement of MINUSMA’s planned withdrawal, Germany—which will completely militarily withdraw from Mali by May 2024—announced that it would speed up the process of withdrawing its estimated 1,000 troops from the Sahelian country. (Sources: [Associated Press](#), [United Nations](#), [Al Jazeera](#))

The announcement of MINUSMA’s withdrawal led to the resurgence of tensions between government forces and separatist groups hoping to fill the security vacuum left by the United Nations. The ruling junta subsequently terminated the 2015 Algiers Accord peace deal on January 26, 2024. The junta claimed the signatories violated the agreement through acts of hostility. Mali’s coup government further distanced itself from regional decision-making bodies, including ECOWAS. On January 28, 2024, when the coup government, along with the junta regimes of Burkina Faso and Niger, announced they were leaving the regional bloc. The three Sahelian states claimed ECOWAS was under the direct influence of foreign powers and has increasingly become a threat to the region’s interest. Additionally, they claimed that the regional bloc has been inadequate when combating pervasive issues such as terrorism and insecurity. On February 15, 2024, the three junta governments announced the official formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) confederation. Initially established as a pact in September 2023, the AES signals further fragmentation of the region among those allied with the west and those aligned with Russia. Further details on how the confederation will cooperate along political, economic, and military lines to combat the Islamist insurgency that has plagued the region for more than a decade were not revealed. (Sources: [Defense Post](#), [Reuters](#), [Human Rights Watch](#))

### *Russian Cooperation with Mali*

Ahead of the November 2022 end of France’s Operation Barkhane, Mali’s transitional government announced on September 26, 2021, that Mali would partner with the Russian Wagner Group to combat Islamist jihadist movements across the country. In the \$10.8 million a month deal, Mali will allegedly hire 1,000 Wagner Group mercenaries to combat AQIM and JNIM fighters. Upon the announcement of Mali’s suspected deal with the Russian private military company, the United Kingdom along with other international actors voiced concerns that Russia could potentially support efforts to keep Mali’s junta in power. According to the BBC, the Wagner Group has been accused of giving Russia control over mineral resources in areas where they operate. Additionally, a January 2021 U.N. report found that Russian mercenaries and allied government troops committed “indiscriminate killings, occupation of schools and looting.” If the deal moves forward, other countries have threatened to withdraw military and political support from Mali. Accusations of indiscriminate killings were placed on the Wagner Group by the United Nations and the United States in April 2022, following reports that more than 300 people were killed following a counterterrorism operation in central Mali’s Moura area. The Malian army launched the operation from March 23 until March 31, 2022, and according to the army, an estimated 300 were killed and 51 others were arrested in the “terrorist fiefdom.” However, media sources have reported that dozens of people, including civilians, were killed in the attacks, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to report that Mali’s counterterrorism efforts had “disastrous consequences for the civilian population.” (Sources: [SOFREP](#), [Guardian](#), [Voice of America](#), [Associated Press](#), [Reuters](#))

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By November 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry released a statement claiming Wagner “has been finally disbanded” with many of their soldiers being transferred to other units under the discretion of the Defense Ministry. It is uncertain if Wagner forces were to complete their mandates in Africa, but later that month, the Defense Ministry launched a recruitment campaign for the “Africa Corps,”—Russia’s armed wing in Africa, further cementing the Kremlin’s military footprint on the continent. The name of the unit reportedly refers to the Afrika Korps who were the German battalions that fought in North Africa during WWII. It is reported that 1,000 Wagner/Africa Corps troops remain in Mali as of February 2024. (Sources: [Le Monde](#), [ABC News](#), [New York Times](#), [Le Monde](#), [Newsweek](#), [Armed Conflict Location and Event Database](#), [Middle East Media Research Institute](#), [Times](#), [East African](#))

In the years since Wagner’s deployment, Mali has seen an increasing number of civilian-targeted attacks carried out by the Malian armed forces and foreign military personnel likely belonging to Russian units now called the Africa Corps. In the latest civilian-targeting attack, on January 26, 2024, Malian armed forces accompanied by “foreign military personnel”—likely troops from the Wagner Group—carried out summary executions in Welingara village, central Nara. Around 25 civilians were killed in the executions. The United Nations further corroborated two other events where Malian armed forces and allied foreign military personnel killed another 31 civilians. Malian authorities have reportedly not launched any investigations into the killings. (Source: [Guardian](#))

## **International Counter-Extremism**

### *International Counterterrorism and Counter-Extremism*

Mali is part of a number of international initiatives working to counter terrorism and extremism in West Africa. In February 2014, Mali and four other West African countries—Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso—agreed to form an organization called the G5 Sahel. The group aims to strengthen regional cooperation on development and security. In announcing the group’s formation, the Heads of State formally reiterated their “strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms.” The countries formally agreed to set up a joint counterterrorism force in February 2017. (Sources: [Primature](#), [BBC](#), [Africanews](#))

Since its formation, the G5 Sahel has worked to coordinate with foreign forces undertaking counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts in the region. Among other entities, the G5 Sahel has met with the European Union, whose EU Sahel Regional Action Plan works to prevent and combat extremism and radicalization in the West African region. (Sources: [Reuters](#), [European Union](#))

On May 15, 2022, Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel in protest of being rejected as head of the five-nation military force. Mali’s junta, which came to power in an August 2020 coup, also claimed that the lack of progress in the fight against militants linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS precipitated the decision to leave the G5. The move led to international criticism, with the United Nations top political official for Africa, Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobe, calling the decision “unfortunate and regrettable.” (Sources: [Associated Press](#), [Reuters](#), [Reuters](#))

Mali is also part of ECOWAS, and has benefitted from ECOWAS membership, particularly via its 2013 military intervention. According to ECOWAS’s General Officer, religious extremism is a contributing factor to terrorism and the threat of terrorism in West Africa. Other factors the Officer links with terrorism are “poverty, poor governance, conflicts, political instability, corruption, weak government institutions, easy access to small arms, [and] violence.” (Sources: [Diplomatie](#), [Global Center](#))

### *Combating Terrorist Financing*

To combat the threat of terrorism financing, Mali holds membership in the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). Established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), GIABA works to “strengthen... the capacity of member states towards the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist financing in the region.” Mali is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and has participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. As the U.S. Department of State has noted, Mali has volunteered to act as a pilot country for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, an effort designed to support local communities and help them resist violent extremism. (Sources: [Primature](#), [U.S. Department of State](#), [GIABA](#))

## **Public Opinion**

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## *Mali: Extremism and Terrorism*

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### *Islamic Extremism and Armed Insurgencies*

According to a 2018 poll by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 88 percent of Malians interviewed claim to fear terrorist attacks. Additionally, 59 percent of interviewees claim that MINUSMA does not adequately protect the population from armed groups and terrorists and over 57 percent of interviewees believe that soldiers involved in Operation Barkhane are “in cahoots with armed groups.” Furthermore, given the increasing number of insurgent attacks, more than 65 percent of interviewees claim to favor government negotiations with jihadist leaders to prevent future turmoil. (Source: [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung](#))

### *The Northern Rebellion and Military Activity*

According to a poll by ORB International conducted in late 2012, 78 percent of Malians supported an international intervention in northern Mali to quash the rebellion. In the region closest to the northern conflict, that number was higher, with 89 percent supporting an international intervention. At the time, the Malians polled lacked confidence in their own military, with 61 percent believing that the nation’s military should not attempt to retake the north until it was stronger. Immediately following France’s intervention, a poll conducted by Al Jazeera showed that 96 percent of the Malian respondents polled were supportive of the intervention. (Sources: [ORB International](#), [Gallup](#), [Al Jazeera](#))

According to an August/September 2014 poll, 39.9 percent of Malians believed that the fight against armed militias in the north should be a priority of the government. By that time, however, surveys showed that other issues—including youth unemployment and government corruption—ranked higher on citizens’ priorities. Malians in 2014 were also significantly more confident in their country’s military capabilities, with 58 percent believing that the military was capable of securing the country, including the northern region. After France’s intervention, 56 percent of Malians appreciated France’s efforts in the country through Operations Serval and Barkhane. A total of 71.9 percent of Malians believed in 2014 that armed forces and MINUSMA were sufficient to ensure the security of Mali going forward, although the country had a mixed response to the ongoing presence of MINUSMA forces on Malian territory. A poll of Malians conducted in October 2015 showed that 67 percent of the population was dissatisfied with MINUSMA’s work, compared to 29 percent who were satisfied. (Sources: [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung](#), [GISSE](#))

By 2015, pollsters could reach the northern Malian regions of Gao, Kidal, and Menaka. Polls published in January/February 2015 revealed that 25.32 percent of Malians in those areas believed that the fight against armed militias should be one of the government’s main priorities. This came in contrast with 52.60 percent of those polled, who believed that negotiating with the armed militias should be one of the government’s main priorities. (Source: [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung](#))

By October 2015, a slight majority of Malians polled—54.3 percent compared to 44.6 percent—believed that Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita had done a good job managing the northern conflict. A larger majority—67.3 percent—was satisfied with France’s efforts in Mali, compared to 32 percent who were dissatisfied. While this figure appears to indicate broad support for France’s activity in Mali, it is worth noting that the figure is significantly lower than it was at the start of the conflict, when over 90 percent of the Malian public supported France’s intervention in the country. (Source: [GISSE](#))

After the November 2015 Bamako attack, roughly 35 percent of those polled in an online survey believed that Malian security forces were failing, and 31.29 percent indicated that the West treated the attack as trivial. Twenty one percent believed that the hotel attack was a response to a June 2015 peace deal signed between the Malian government and insurgents. (Source: [aBamako.com](#))