

# THE ROLE OF ANTISEMITISM IN THE MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE BY EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ACTORS

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**COUNTER  
EXTREMISM  
PROJECT**

# ABOUT THIS STUDY

This report, *The Role of Antisemitism in the Mobilization to Violence by Extremist and Terrorist Actors*, examines how antisemitism is strategically utilized by extremist groups to incite violence, recruit, and foster ideological cohesion in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the United States. It was commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption,” in 2024.

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**The positions presented in this study reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily correspond with the positions of the German Federal Foreign Office.**

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For more information about the activities of the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Germany, please visit [www.counterextremism.com/german](http://www.counterextremism.com/german).

## About CEP

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The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) is a nonprofit and non-partisan international policy organization formed to combat the growing threat from extremist ideologies. CEP builds a more moderate and secure society by educating the public, policymakers, the private sector, and civil society actors about the threat of extremism. CEP also formulates programs to sever the financial, recruitment, and material support networks of extremist groups and their leaders. For more information about our activities please visit [counterextremism.com](http://counterextremism.com).

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- This report explores the role of antisemitism in mobilizing extremist and terrorist actors to violence, focusing on trends and patterns across France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the United States. It discusses antisemitic narratives, key antisemitic actors, transnational connections, dissemination strategies, and provides policy recommendations.
- Antisemitic narratives serve as tools to justify violence across ideological lines, framing Jewish communities and individuals as threats or scapegoats. Right-wing extremists propagate conspiracy theories like the “Great Replacement,” portraying Jews as orchestrating adverse societal change. Islamist extremists often conflate Jewish identity with global oppression, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Left-wing extremists link Jews to capitalism or imperialism, using antizionism to mask antisemitism. These narratives are adapted to local and geopolitical contexts, reinforcing the targeting of Jewish communities and individuals.
- The report documents a sharp increase in antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and ensuing war. Violent antisemitic rhetoric has spiked in demonstrations and online discourses. Islamist extremist networks, left-wing extremist actors and pro-Palestinian extremist groups have particularly amplified violent antisemitic sentiments under the guise of antizionist rhetoric, sometimes overlapping with traditional right-wing antisemitic themes.
- Transnational networks facilitate the spread of antisemitic narratives. Right-wing extremist groups connect online and through events and annual marches, while Islamist extremist groups leverage shared ideological or religious frameworks to justify violence. Left-wing extremist and pro-Palestinian extremist groups maintain operations across Europe and in the U.S., amplifying violent antisemitic narratives. Shared slogans, symbols, and coordinated protests underline their interconnectedness.
- In some countries, an increase in violent attacks against Jewish or Israeli targets has been documented.

- The report emphasizes that the concept of combatting *organized* antisemitism should be added to strategies that aim at targeting violence-oriented antisemitic actors. Such professional *organized* antisemitic actors often operate in (transnational) networks, utilizing online platforms and offline activities to propagate hate and justify or conduct violence.
- The report also calls attention to the role of states like the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in fostering violent antisemitism through proxies and propaganda.
- Policy recommendations include focusing on identifying and disrupting key antisemitic actors, enhancing data collection and analysis, and fostering international collaboration. The report also stresses the need for tailored preventative and educational initiatives and stricter online content regulation and enforcement to combat the spread of antisemitism and its violent manifestations.

# INTRODUCTION

This report examines how antisemitism is strategically utilized by extremist groups to incite violence, recruit and foster ideological cohesion in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the United States. Anchored in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition<sup>1</sup> of antisemitism, this study investigates in particular the antisemitic narratives propagated by right-wing, left-wing, and Islamist extremists.

Antisemitism has historically served as a central element of extremist ideologies. These narratives have evolved to incorporate contemporary geopolitical, societal, and technological developments, demonstrating their adaptability and resilience. The proliferation of antisemitism through digital dissemination, transnational extremist collaborations, and state-backed propaganda has further compounded its threat, necessitating innovative and coordinated counterstrategies.

Antisemitism remains a persistent problem across multiple countries and regions, with distinct manifestations shaped by specific historical, cultural, and political contexts. The shared patterns include the dissemination of conspiracy theories, targeting of Jewish communities, and the politicization of antisemitic narratives for extremist agendas. The conflict in the Middle East in general, and especially since October 7, 2023, has led to a significant increase in reported antisemitic incidents.

This report contributes to the policy discourse by offering an analysis of the intersection between antisemitism and violent extremism. Through its findings and recommendations, the study aims to support policymakers, practitioners, and researchers in developing targeted and effective interventions to mitigate the impact of antisemitism and foster resilience against its proliferation.

This report assesses:

- the country specific legal frameworks and statistics related to combating antisemitism;
- the role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence;
- the dissemination and recruiting strategies used by extremist and terrorist actors;
- the transnational connections and cross-ideological collaboration of key antisemitic actors;

- the influence of foreign state actors;
- institutional and societal responses;

This report then highlights good practices and provides policy recommendations on how to combat antisemitism and foster Jewish life more effectively.

## METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This study employs a multidisciplinary approach, integrating desk research, stakeholder interviews, and publicly available records and governmental data (open-source intelligence). Utilizing a standardized comparative research framework, the report ensures the systematic examination of localized dynamics in the five countries while maintaining an overarching transnational perspective. The research was conducted between August and November 2024.

### **Relevant differences between the researched countries:**

- The available data regarding antisemitic incidents varies significantly (quantity and quality)
- The presence of particular extremist groups varies significantly (potential perpetrators)
- The visible presence of Jews and Jewish institutions varies significantly (potential targets)

# FLASHLIGHT OVERVIEW — KEY THEMES AND TRENDS ACROSS THE FIVE COUNTRIES

**Antisemitic offenses:**

Reported antisemitic offenses rose in all jurisdictions at the center of this report, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the United States, with spikes following geopolitical events, especially the Hamas terror attack on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war.

**Violence and vandalism:**

Targeted violent antisemitic crimes have increased in some countries, including attacks on synagogues and desecration of Jewish cemeteries.

**Transnational connections:**

Transnational extremist networks are leveraging the conflict in the Middle East to spread hate and recruit supporters, with increased online activity observed.

**Foreign Influence:**

The Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly plays a role in fostering and conducting violent antisemitism in some countries.

**Shared narratives:**

Conspiracy theories about Jewish control of global systems. Holocaust denial and distortion. Antizionist rhetoric crossing into antisemitism.

**Cross-ideological collaboration:**

Occasional joint protests uniting right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremist actors.

**Propaganda dissemination:**

Social media and messaging platforms are primary tools for spreading antisemitic propaganda, conspiracy theories, and calls for violence. Street protests generate viral online content.

# MANIFESTATIONS OF VIOLENT ANTISEMITISM IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES

**France** experiences one of the highest rates of reported antisemitic incidents in Europe, with a notable focus on physical violence. Islamist extremism and antizionist rhetoric dominate. France has a prominent Islamist dimension, with networks like Hamas-linked supporters often fueling protests that turn antisemitic.

Antisemitism in **Germany** is shaped significantly by historical responsibility for the Holocaust, but new forms, including Islamist, left-wing and foreign ideology-based antisemitism, have become prominent. The rise in antisemitism is frequently tied to anti-Israel rhetoric and the influence of the Middle East conflict. Germany has seen a steady increase in antisemitic incidents, including six planned and two executed terrorist attacks in 2024. A wide range of extremist actors, including right-wing extremist groups, left-wing extremist groups, and Islamist extremist networks, actively propagate antisemitic narratives.

In **Hungary**, antisemitism is heavily linked to right-wing extremism, nationalism and anti-globalist rhetoric and is pervasive in the cultural and political space. Prominent Jewish figures like George Soros are targeted as symbols of Jewish influence. Hungarian statistics show few violent incidents.

Antisemitism in **Poland** is often tied to historical revisionism, historical grievances and nationalist movements. Holocaust denial or distortion is prominent, with debates on Poland's role during World War II fueling tensions. Fewer violent incidents are reported, but antisemitic rhetoric persists in public and political discourse.

Antisemitism in the **United States** is largely influenced by domestic right-wing extremism, conspiracy theories, and online hate speech. Violent attacks such as the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting in 2018 are rare but demonstrate the high potential for deadly antisemitic violence.

# HOW ANTISEMITIC NARRATIVES JUSTIFY VIOLENCE WITHIN EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES

Antisemitic narratives are integral to extremist ideologies, framing Jews as existential threats, scapegoats for societal grievances, or symbols of alleged oppression. These narratives and slogans have been strategically employed to rationalize violence against Jewish individuals, institutions, and symbols across right-wing, left-wing and Islamist ideologies in the five countries in this study. In the Germany chapter, the official statistical category “foreign-ideologies” is added, which refers to “non-religious foreign ideologies”, for example Turkish, Kurdish or Palestinian revolutionary, nationalist or socialist extremist or terrorist groups.<sup>2</sup>

The adaptation of historical antisemitic tropes to modern contexts demonstrates the enduring and versatile nature of these narratives and threats.

**Europol’s** Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) assesses ‘hatred for Jews’ and the belief in malevolent control by a ‘global elite, often perceived to be led by Jews’ as two narratives shared by extreme left-wing, right-wing and jihadist groups.<sup>3</sup>

The **German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution** states that antisemitism is an important element in various kinds of extremism.<sup>4</sup>

# COMMON THEMES ACROSS EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES ACROSS THE FIVE COUNTRIES

## 1. Scapegoating Jews for Societal Crises

Antisemitic actors consistently blame Jews for economic instability, political corruption, and cultural degradation.

- **Right-wing extremists:** Propagate theories like the “*Great Replacement*”, suggesting Jews orchestrate immigration to replace native populations.
- **Islamist extremists:** Frame Jews as oppressors responsible for Muslim suffering globally, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- **Left-wing extremists:** Connect Jews to global capitalism or imperialism, painting them as complicit in systemic oppression.
- This scapegoating is used to justify violent acts as a means of combating these perceived threats (self-defense).

## 2. Conspiratorial Framing of Jewish Influence

Antisemitic actors perpetuate long-standing conspiracy theories of Jewish dominance over media, finance, and politics.

- **Right-wing extremists, Islamist extremists and Left-wing extremists** share a **common** narrative of “Jewish global control”, which is used to argue for “liberation” from alleged Jewish oppression. The alleged manifestations of this alleged control are Western imperialism and Western modernity.
- This narrative is used to justify violent acts targeting Jewish individuals and institutions as alleged tools of this supposed control.

## 3. Historical Revisionism

Holocaust denial or distortion serves as a mechanism to diminish Jewish suffering, delegitimize Jewish identity, and justify hate.

- **Right-wing extremists:** Portray the Holocaust as exaggerated to downplay historical accountability.

- **Left-wing extremists:** Allege that Jewish victimhood in the Holocaust is exploited to justify Israeli policies, enabling hostility toward Jews under the guise of antizionism.

#### 4. Religious Justifications

Religious extremism, particularly in Islamist narratives, depicts Jews as enemies of faith.

- **Islamist extremists:** Use theological interpretations to rationalize violence against Jews as a religious duty. For instance, Islamist extremist and terrorist groups invoke anti-Israel narratives to conflate Jewishness with a fundamental opposition to Islam.


#### 5. Antizionist Rhetoric Crossing into Antisemitism

Anti-Israel rhetoric often blurs into antisemitism, portraying Jewish individuals and communities worldwide as extensions of Israeli policies.

- **Left-wing extremists:** Jews are labeled as illegitimate white colonizers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Slogans like “From the river to the sea” imply the erasure and eradication of Israel and its Jewish citizens.
- **Right-wing and Islamist extremists overlap:** Both groups exploit antizionist rhetoric to mask antisemitism, using anti-Israel sentiment to promote or justify attacks on Jewish targets globally.

### Antisemitism in Extremist and Conspiracy Narratives

This model is a simplification of complex realities. The actual connectivity between groups, milieus and ideologies to the mentioned conspiracy narratives varies e.g. between EU member states



# THE DISSEMINATION OF ANTISEMITIC NARRATIVES IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES

## Online Strategies:

1. **Social Media Platforms and Messenger Apps:** Extremist and terrorist groups utilize mainstream platforms like Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), messenger services like Telegram and WhatsApp to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, and coordinate actions.
2. **Imageboard Forums:** Platforms like 4chan and 8chan are used to create and share antisemitic memes and conspiracy theories. These sites act as echo chambers where narratives are developed and disseminated.
3. **Video Content:** Video-streaming platforms like YouTube and Odysee host videos ranging from hate sermons to propaganda disguised as documentaries, linking events like the COVID-19 pandemic or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to antisemitic conspiracies.
4. **Gaming Platforms:** Platforms like Steam are strategically used to desensitize and recruit younger target groups, cloaking antisemitic ideologies in seemingly harmless formats.

## Offline Strategies:

1. **Protests and Rallies:** Some demonstrations, especially those linked to anti-Israel or pro-Palestinian themes, incorporate overt antisemitic slogans, chants, and signs. Such events act as offline platforms for disseminating hate under the guise of political activism and produce viral content for dissemination online.
2. **Graffiti and Stickers:** Public spaces are marked with graffiti or stickers, serving as visible markers of hate and used for intimidation.
3. **Printed Materials:** Books, leaflets, and magazines that deny the Holocaust and promote conspiracy theories about Jewish control of global systems are distributed at events or sold online.

# SHARED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2023

## **Rise in Protest-Driven Antisemitism:**

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Protests in France and Germany targeted Jewish institutions or communities under the guise of criticizing Israel. These events, often organized by Islamist and left-wing extremist/foreign ideology groups, have been marked by explicitly antisemitic slogans, vandalism, and confrontations with police. Such protests have united different extremist ideologies, demonstrating a worrying convergence on antisemitic themes.

## **Heightened Security Measures:**

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Governments across Europe have responded to rising antisemitism by increasing funding for security at Jewish sites and intensifying law enforcement presence during protests or religious events. Germany's bans on Hamas and Samidoun illustrate a proactive stance against organizations linked to (the support of) antisemitic violence.

## **Increased Online Activity:**

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Online platforms remain a hub for antisemitic narratives, with extremist groups using social media platforms, messenger and streaming services to spread misinformation about the Israel-Palestine conflict. Calls for violence against Jews have been traced to coordinated online campaigns.

## **Persistent Transnational Collaboration:**

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Extremist groups leverage shared antisemitic narratives to foster transnational connections. Right-wing extremist networks in Europe, Islamist extremist organizations with Middle Eastern ties, and global anti-Israel movements often interact digitally and occasionally during international offline protests. Shared ideologies and networks enable right-wing extremist and Islamist extremist groups to exploit geopolitical tensions for their agendas.

# TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION AMONG KEY ANTISEMITIC ACTORS IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES

## **1. Right-wing Extremists:**

Many right-wing extremist groups are connected through national and transnational networks. These vary from hierarchical structures like Combat 18 or Hammerskins to more open networks like Active Clubs. In Hungary, Jobbik has promoted antisemitic rhetoric tied to Hungarian nationalism, often collaborating informally with right-wing extremist actors in Poland, such as the National Radical Camp (ONR). These movements share antisemitic narratives, including Holocaust denial and the myth of Jewish global control, fostering a network of ideological support across borders. Annual marches, combat sport and music events in different countries serve as regular physical meetings in addition to connections online.

## **2. Islamist Extremists**

Organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir and networks affiliated with ISIS leverage shared ideological frameworks to spread antisemitic propaganda. While Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in Germany and the United Kingdom, its influence persists and extends to other countries, including France and the United States. These groups promote narratives framing Jews as oppressors of Muslims, using these tropes to justify violence. ISIS propaganda and recruitment has included specific calls for attacks against Jewish communities globally, and their influence has been noted in terrorist cells and terror attacks in Germany.<sup>5</sup>

## **3. Pro-Palestinian Extremist Groups / Foreign Ideology**

Networks such as Masar Badil (The Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path) operate across France and Germany, the United States and beyond, advocating for the eradication of the state of Israel.<sup>6</sup> While promoting themselves as political actors, the rhetoric of these networks often crosses into overt antisemitism. Masar Badil has organized protests and events that bring together left-wing extremist and Islamist extremist actors, emphasizing themes that delegitimize Jewish self-determination through slogans like “from the river to the sea” and “we salute 7 October”. They are closely affiliated with the Samidoun network.

#### **4. Left-wing Extremists**

In countries like France, Germany, and the United States, left-wing extremist organizations often espouse antizionist rhetoric that overlaps with antisemitism. These groups focus on Israel's policies in the Middle East but frequently employ language and imagery that echo traditional antisemitic tropes, such as accusing Jews of global manipulation or financial domination. Left-wing extremist groups have also collaborated with Islamist organizations in protests against Israel. In France, left-wing extremist activists participated in protests alongside Islamist extremist groups, with some demonstrations turning violent and featuring antisemitic slogans.

#### **5. Overlap between violent extremism and organized crime**

In Germany, there are documented linkages between right-wing extremist groups and organized crime networks, primarily driven by mutual benefits and overlapping interests.<sup>7</sup> Some right-wing extremist organizations engage in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and extortion to fund their operations and expand their influence.<sup>8</sup> These groups are closely affiliated with legitimate businesses, particularly in the construction, security, and event industries, to launder money and establish economic power.

Connections between Islamist extremist networks and organized crime groups, particularly family-based criminal networks, have also been observed in Germany. Islamist extremists may collaborate with criminal clans for logistical support, including access to weapons, forged documents, and smuggling routes, which are essential for operational planning and financing. In turn, criminal networks may utilize the ideological cover provided by Islamist extremist groups to mask their activities or justify their actions under a religious guise.

#### **6. Foreign State Influence**

The Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran have reportedly supported the dissemination of antisemitic narratives in several of the researched countries. Iran has reportedly been hiring organized crime actors to attack Iranian dissidents and Jewish or Israeli targets in France and Germany.<sup>9</sup> For example, German authorities believe that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) used a Hells Angels member to orchestrate attacks on Jewish targets in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2022.<sup>10</sup> In May 2024, a Paris court detained and charged a couple on accusations that they were involved in Iranian plots to kill Israelis and Jews in France and Germany.<sup>11</sup>

# LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS BY COUNTRY

 **France:**

Strict hate crime laws with a zero-tolerance approach to antisemitic violence.

Dedicated government departments monitor and counter antisemitism, particularly in schools and public discourse.

 **Poland and Hungary:**

Both countries have weaker legal frameworks for prosecuting antisemitic incidents, with a focus on historical issues rather than contemporary antisemitism. Although Hungary deploys a strict official zero-tolerance policy towards antisemitism, enforcement is not sufficiently stringent.

 **Germany:**

Comprehensive legal framework criminalizing Holocaust denial, hate speech, and the use of Nazi symbols.

Extensive data collection mechanisms.

 **United States:**

Relies on free speech protections, making antisemitic hate speech regulation challenging. Responses focus on prosecuting violence.

# GOVERNMENT RESPONSE STRATEGIES BY COUNTRY

## **France:**

Strong focus on Holocaust education and rapid legal responses to hate crimes. The state closely monitors Islamist extremism. High-profile political figures publicly condemn antisemitism, emphasizing national unity.

## **Hungary:**

Government responses are inconsistent, with rhetoric often reinforcing antisemitic tropes. Few proactive measures are taken to address hate crimes. Civil society most active in combating antisemitism.

## **United States:**

A National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism aims to combat antisemitism. Civil society initiatives play a significant role in monitoring and addressing antisemitism. The State Department's Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism works with foreign envoys and government officials.

## **Germany:**

A Federal Commissioner and a National Strategy to combat antisemitism and foster Jewish life coordinate efforts at a national level. Legal bans on organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and Samidoun and strict regulation of Holocaust denial. 649 publicly funded projects in 2022 addressing diverse aspects of antisemitism.

## **Poland:**

Focuses more on cultural and historical initiatives, such as Holocaust remembrance events and memorials, but less on addressing contemporary antisemitism. Limited resources are allocated for monitoring and prosecuting antisemitic crimes.

## ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY BY COUNTRY

 In **France** and **Germany**, civil society organizations work closely with the government, are mostly funded by the government, and are important in amplifying efforts to educate and protect Jewish communities.

 In the **United States**, organizations like the ADL and local Jewish federations often act (financially) independently of the government.

 **Poland** and **Hungary** rely heavily on NGOs to collect data on and address antisemitism, with minimal state involvement or support.

# DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

The findings collected during our research into the role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors show significant commonalities as well as differences between the five countries. Those differences are due to different histories, demographics, and policies. For example, available data regarding antisemitic incidents varies significantly in quantity and quality. The presence of Jews and Jewish institutions (potential targets) also varies significantly, as does the presence of particular extremist groups (potential perpetrators).

Commonalities across the five countries include the propagation of the same or very similar antisemitic narratives, and the transnational connectivity within the different (violent) extremist and terrorist groups and networks. While hierarchical antisemitic organizations, as well as unaffiliated operators/attackers, continue to play a role, organized antisemitism today also manifests itself in flexible transnational interconnected groups and open networks.

## Separating Signal from Noise

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Combating violent antisemitism more effectively is a complex and challenging endeavor. There is a lack of universally accepted and legally binding definitions, despite the significant progress made with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)<sup>12</sup> working definition. This challenge is particularly relevant in the context of the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks and the subsequent war. Especially since the air campaign and the invasion of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), distinguishing support for antisemitic violence from legitimate human rights advocacy can be challenging. For instance, individuals may unwittingly engage in antisemitic activities by attending demonstrations or sharing online posts with slogans like “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free”, which are often used to justify or call for violence against Israelis and Jews. Others support such slogans very consciously. It can be challenging for policymakers to navigate these complexities and develop effective strategies and policies that differentiate between genuine human rights concerns and violence-oriented antisemitic intent.

A lack of universally accepted and legally binding definitions for the term terrorism between the United Nations member states has been compensated for by comprehensive international and national efforts to sanction key groups and individuals

who commit or support terrorist acts. A similar approach could be implemented in fighting organized violence-oriented<sup>13</sup> antisemitism.

## Focus on Identifying Organized Antisemitism

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If the national penal code allows for it, law enforcement will prosecute illegal antisemitic incidents. In most countries this is done in a “one by one” manner. The research for this report has shown, however, that *organized* antisemitic groups and networks are often behind the support or calls for violence. In other words, many (violence-oriented) antisemitic incidents are organized by a professional and hyperactive group of actors who often operate in an informal and transnational nature. Investigating and prosecuting them would require an investigative approach similar to that used to tackle organized crime.

There are clear differences between the phenomena of organized crime and organized antisemitism, e.g., the objective of organized crime groups to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.<sup>14</sup> However, the concept of applying different strategies to the inherent differences between general criminal activities and those orchestrated by organized criminal groups can be applied here.

### Conceptualizing General Antisemitism versus Organized Antisemitism

General Antisemitic Acts: Individual or informal group activities that are often more informal, localized, spontaneous and/or do not follow strategic objectives.

Organized Antisemitic Acts: Groups or networks who systematically promote hostility, prejudice, or discrimination against Jewish individuals and communities.

Their scope is larger, often transnational, with significant resources, networks and professionalism. These entities often operate with defined leadership, coordinated activities, and specific agendas aimed at propagating antisemitic ideologies and committing or instigating antisemitic crimes.

## Combating Transnational Organized Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Groups and Networks

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To develop an approach that focuses on (transnational) organized (violence-oriented) antisemitic groups and networks, a mapping of these key actors should take place. Such a mapping process can be started from two angles:

Angle 1: Identify violence-oriented groups that use antisemitism as a core component of their narratives and ideology. This approach will produce a list of extremist or terrorist groups with different ideological leanings, for example extreme-right, Islamist, extreme-left, conspiratorial/anti-government or other phenomena that do not fit neatly in existing categories, like revolutionary/ nationalist/foreign ideology groups (see above). This list, which will include nationally or locally well-known groups, can serve as a starting point for a deeper network analysis, exploring the broader support environment of each group.

Angle 2: Focus on actors who were organizing events, or producing/sharing content online, that was justifying or celebrating the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, during October 7 and 8, 2023. During these two days, Israel was still fighting Hamas terrorists inside the country and no major attacks were conducted by the IDF against targets in the Gaza Strip.<sup>15</sup> Justifying or celebrating the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, during October 7 and 8, 2023, required a clear ideological position and established operational capacities. These actors and their affiliates can be considered potential key organized antisemitic actors and should serve as a starting point for a deeper network analysis, exploring the broader support environment of each group.

An example that connects the two angles is the transnational Masar Badil network, which is associated with Hamas, the PFLP, its proxy Samidoun, as well as with dozens of other organizations offline and online.<sup>16</sup>

## Differentiating between Combatting General and Organized Antisemitism

General Antisemitic Crimes: Law enforcement strategies often focus on immediate response and detection through traditional investigative methods like forensic analysis or witness testimonies.

Organized Antisemitic Crimes: Recognizing organized efforts allows for more strategic interventions like monitoring and infiltrating antisemitic groups, legal actions against leaders or organizations, and international cooperation to cut off funding or propaganda networks.

By distinguishing between the types, resources can be better allocated where they are most needed.


Other strong signals for a network mapping and analysis would involve symbols and memes that can also be associated with the support of antisemitic violence.

For example, a red triangle was used by Hamas attackers in southern Israel on October 7, 2023, to mark targets.<sup>17</sup> Since then, red triangles have also been used to mark and threaten (pro-) Jewish or (pro-)Israeli individuals, bars, clubs, university staff and politicians.<sup>18</sup> Red triangles also marked out political prisoners in German concentration and extermination camps in WWII.<sup>19</sup>

A second relevant symbol that is very particular to October 7, 2023, and therefore can inform a risk-based approach are pictures or memes showing (motorized) paragliders. Hamas terrorists used motorized paragliders to cross into Israel and, for example, attack and kill participants of the Supernova music festival.<sup>20</sup>



The mayor of Berlin, Germany, and the head of Humboldt University Berlin, are being marked with Hamas triangles.



Groups that have used these symbols could potentially be considered key (violence-oriented) antisemitic actors. The relevance of these and other symbols might vary between countries. *Note: Some of these symbols are also legally considered to be indicating support of Hamas in several countries, such as Germany and Great Britain, and therefore their public display is illegal.*<sup>21</sup>


Prioritizing investigations into these key actors and networks of organized antisemitism can potentially significantly enhance the effectiveness of current strategies to combat antisemitism.

Reports investigating the financing of currently active (violence-oriented) antisemitic left-wing extremist and foreign ideology groups have not been found, demonstrating a clear knowledge gap. A “follow the money” approach, similar to structural investigations into organized crime, could be applied here<sup>22</sup> to increase the understanding of the underlying financial activities of such groups and networks. All relevant government agencies should be involved, in particular the criminal police (departments for politically/religiously motivated and for organized crime), the public prosecutor’s office, the tax authorities, domestic intelligence agencies, customs investigative authorities and the financial intelligence unit (FIU).

**Connecting the Silos**

A "Follow the Money" Strategy

**JOINT TAST FORCE**



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# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations outlined below emphasize a multi-faceted and systematic approach to combating antisemitism through legal, educational, and security frameworks.

## **1. Improve Collection and Data Sharing**

- Implement a framework to systematically record antisemitic incidents, ensuring consistency and comparability.
- Establish partnerships with Jewish communities and civil society organizations who also track antisemitic incidents.
- Consider that some forms of antisemitism, particularly from left-wing extremism or foreign ideologies, may currently not be fully captured in crime data.
- Ensure local law enforcement is trained to recognize and respond swiftly to antisemitic crimes.

## **2. Adjust Programs to Prevalent Ideological Motivations and Address Discrepancies**

- In some countries, and in particular since October 7, 2023, discrepancies exist between where government funded initiatives aim at preventing or countering antisemitism in a given phenomenon (e.g. right-wing extremism), and where a significant increase of antisemitic incidents has been reported (e.g. foreign ideologies).
- In such cases consider adjusting existing funding mechanisms, for example by expanding funding and programs focused on foreign ideologies and Israel-related antisemitism.

## **3. Enhance Funding for Community-Level Initiatives with Robust Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks**

- Support grassroots organizations working to combat antisemitism and foster Jewish life.
- Develop and mandate enhanced monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of publicly funded programs aimed at combating antisemitism to assess success, refine strategies and improve resource allocation.

#### **4. Develop Disruption-Oriented Approaches and Focus on Organized Antisemitism**

- Consider a key actor- and network-focused strategy to disrupt organized antisemitism, with a “follow the money” approach similar to investigations into organized crime. Organized antisemitism today also manifests itself in flexible transnational multi-connected networks rather than in hierarchical organizations.
- Create “Disrupting Organized Antisemitism” task forces at local, state, federal, and international (e.g., EU) levels, integrating law enforcement, tax authorities, intelligence agencies, and financial units to effectively disrupt professional antisemitic key actors and networks.
- Government bodies on all levels should establish procedures to ensure that no projects with antisemitic aims are receiving public funds or other kinds of support.
- Enhance data sharing and collaboration among EU member states, Europol and the United States to monitor transnational antisemitic networks.

#### **5. Ensure Security for Jewish Institutions**

- Strengthen measures to protect Jewish synagogues, schools, and cultural centers through enhanced surveillance, infrastructure, and police coordination, in particular during Jewish religious events, relevant historical dates and periods of geopolitical tension.

#### **6. Expand Educational and Preventive Programs**

- Continue, and if necessary update, Holocaust education and mandatory curricula on antisemitism.
- Increase funding for initiatives promoting awareness of modern antisemitism, focusing on its current manifestations and on the local and country context.

#### **6. Foster International Collaboration**

- Advocate for increased and coordinated efforts to address the transnational dimensions of antisemitism.
- Collaborate with international organizations and governments to disrupt transnational extremist antisemitic networks.

## **7. Enforce Online Regulation:**

- Pressure tech companies to further combat the spread of (violent) antisemitic content on social media, video, gaming and messaging platforms.
- In the EU: Enforce the implementation of the EU DSA and TCO.
- In the U.S.: Pass national legislation mandating the removal of violent antisemitic content within specified time frames and significant mandatory fines if no action is taken.

# COUNTRY CHAPTER SUMMARIES

**France** has reached an all-time peak in antisemitic incidents following 7 October. Repression of the offenders remains ineffective because the IHRA definition is still debated and antizionism remains, legally speaking, within the boundaries of freedom of speech. The extreme-right, which until 2000 was responsible for 90% of Anti-Jewish violence, is now a marginal player when it comes to physical violence against Jews. The main threat is Islamic terrorism, both imported and homegrown. Recruitment of extremists from all sides on social media increasingly involves young teenagers. Mainstream nationalist parties now claim to support Israel and the Jewish Community, but the extreme-left successfully used the situation in Gaza as a political weapon to broaden its electoral support in the 2024 elections.

**Germany** has implemented extensive legal frameworks, educational initiatives, and government and civil society collaborations to combat antisemitism. Recent years have seen significant increases in reported antisemitic incidents, however, with massive spikes following the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023. The events exacerbated antisemitic narratives, leading to violent acts, inflammatory demonstrations, and widespread use of slogans demonizing Israel and Jewish communities. Legal provisions of the German Criminal Code are pivotal in addressing hate speech, Holocaust denial, and the dissemination of unconstitutional symbols. However, gaps remain in tackling evolving antisemitic narratives that masquerade as critiques of Israeli policies. Transnational dynamics play a crucial role in amplifying antisemitic rhetoric and activities in Germany. Right-wing extremist groups maintain alliances with European counterparts, while Islamist networks leverage global connections for propaganda and funding. Left-wing extremist actors foster antizionist rhetoric that often blurs into antisemitism.

**Hungary** introduced a zero-tolerance policy towards antisemitism in 2013 and adopted the IHRA definition in 2019. In 2024, it introduced a National Strategy Against Antisemitism. The legal framework is effective, especially on Holocaust denial, but contains unclear provisions. Explicit antisemitism among public figures has declined, though coded language and conspiracy theories are commonly used. Hate crime statistics remain unreliable due to underreporting and lack of disaggregated data, while civil society offers more accurate collection, the recorded incidents are mostly of hate speech with only a few violent incidents per year. Despite the zero-tolerance policy and a pro-Israel stance, the government's anti-immigration and anti-West rhetoric based on conspiracy theories inadvertently reinforces antisemitic sentiments, while also fueling intolerance and xenophobia in general. Government

support for Jewish organizations focuses on Synagogues, creating dependencies, while non-religious Jewish civil society is largely ignored.

**Poland** is a country with numerous places of Holocaust remembrance — including museums, graves and public structures — reflecting one of Europe’s largest pre-war Jewish communities. It is also home to a small but growing Jewish community that is not as visible in everyday life compared to other minorities. The persistent and pervasive cultural aggression against Jews remains important for its symbolic, verbal and propagandistic effect on political discourse. It has taken root across the internet and social media spaces and has tangible and violent manifestations affecting graves, monuments, places of memorialization, and public life.

Pure antisemitism is not the Number One issue on the far-right. This milieu is more concerned with targeting other more visible minorities like Muslims, Africans, Queer people or even workers from Latin America. However, the small Jewish community experiences hate and this situation often fuels behaviors like racist mobilizations and conspiracy theories popularized during pandemic. The problem has become even more precarious since October 7, 2023, and a dangerous political situation is beginning to bubble under the surface, one that is connected to geopolitical realities in the Middle East and Ukraine, and influenced by malign actors both at home and abroad and involving groups from across the political spectrum.

In the **United States**, reported antisemitic hate crimes have grown by 316.7% from 2014 to 2023: The three most common crimes were destruction/damage/vandalism of property, intimidation, and simple assault. Antisemitic incidents have also grown significantly, by 825%, from 912 in 2014 to 7,523 in 2023. Key antisemitic narratives that have been linked to acts of violence in the U.S. include the great replacement and white genocide conspiracy theories, the accusation that Jews are the “Synagogue of Satan,” and the idea that Jews wield a disproportionately large amount of power in government and society. Violence and acts of intimidation have also occurred when American Jews have been targeted as revenge for the actions of the Israeli government. Antisemitism is a key component of extreme right recruitment, and antisemitic narratives are spread on a wide variety of social media and online platforms, ranging from mainstream sites to alt-tech platforms, frequently with little moderation.

# COUNTRY CHAPTERS

## France

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*Dr. Jean-Yves Camus*

### Legal and statistical country context

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism is not incorporated into French legislation<sup>23</sup>, although the French Parliament adopted it as a non-binding resolution and President Macron endorsed it in 2019. State agencies including DILCRAH (délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la haine anti-LGBT) use it, but they are not Police agencies and have no power to sanction. Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution stipulates that citizens are equal before the Law, without distinction of origin, race or religion<sup>24</sup>. Antisemitism is sanctioned as a specific form of racism targeting Jews. When the IHRA definition was discussed in Parliament, some Human Rights NGOs aligned with the Left protested on the ground that the resolution was aimed at restraining the right to criticize Israel<sup>25</sup>.

In 1972 the French Parliament passed legislation known as "Loi Pleven"<sup>26</sup> which was incorporated into the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press. It sanctions racist and antisemitic slander as well as inciting to Racial hatred. In 1990, the "Loi Gaysot" made it a criminal offense to deny the Nazi genocide of the Jews<sup>27</sup>. There have been several attempts from legislators to make antizionism a criminal offense, to no avail so far<sup>28</sup>.

The "Lellouche Act" of 2003 imposes tougher penalties for racist, antisemitic and xenophobic offenses. It introduces the aggravating circumstance of racism or antisemitism which has the effect of toughening the penalty. Another law passed in 2004 (Loi Perben) expands the list of offenses to which the aggravating circumstance of racism or antisemitism can be added, and it extends the deadline for filing a complaint from three months to one year. A law passed in July 2004 on electronic and audiovisual communications strengthened existing means to fight racism and antisemitism in the media.

The Ministry of the Interior keeps track of those antisemitic incidents the plaintiff has reported to the Police with the intent of suing the perpetrator. If one reports an incident but does not file a complaint, or decides not to report, the incident is not included in the statistics. The Service de protection de la communauté juive (SPCJ) keeps separate statistics with the same methodology, so that the data from both sources really match. Those statistics are included in the Annual Report of the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme (CNCDH)<sup>29</sup>, an official body appointed by the Prime Minister. A thorough explanation of the data collecting process has been submitted by France to the OSCE<sup>30</sup>, also showing that specialized police officers (and judges) are now trained to fill complaints and check data, which results in more comprehensive data collection and a better understanding of what constitutes antisemitism. See also graphic 1 in the 2023 SPCJ Report, with figures from 2012-2023<sup>31</sup>.

Discrepancies between figures from the government and SPCJ on the one side, and reports from Jewish NGOs who include in their statistics those incidents that have been reported to them, do exist. The Bureau national de vigilance contre l'antisémitisme (BNVCA), the major NGO in this space, keeps track of those incidents that are reported to their telephone hotline<sup>32</sup>. There are no figures from BNVCA for the last years, but some of their reporting includes a possible ideological bias. For example after 7 October, it contended that “[i]n 100% of the cases we handle, the perpetrator is from the Maghreb or is a Muslim”.<sup>33</sup> Ethnic statistics are forbidden in France, so that is a claim that cannot be grounded on evidence.

### **Developments since October 7, 2023**

According to the Ministry of the Interior, there were 887 antisemitic incidents in the first half of 2024, an increase of 192%<sup>34</sup> when compared to the first half of 2023. Among those incidents, 563 were physical attacks. On 8 November 2023, the Ministry reported that 1159 attacks had been registered after 7 October, which is three times the figure for the whole of 2022<sup>35</sup>. In May 2024, CRIF reported a 1000% increase after 7 October<sup>36</sup>. According to the Ministry of Education, post 7 October saw an increase in the number of antisemitic incidents in schools, up to 1670, including acts of violence<sup>37</sup>. The Ministry says the situation in Gaza accounts for part of this increase.

### **Key Antisemitic Narratives**

7 October did not change anything with respect to the rhetoric and activities of radical Islam. Its willingness and capacity to hit French targets, among them, Jewish targets, remains intact. Three terror attacks were foiled during the 2024 Olympic Games, including one aimed at Jewish and Israeli interests<sup>38</sup>. The antisemitic nar-

ative resembles that of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which theologically renders legitimate any action against the Jews because they are part of the “front of Jews and crusaders” which is allegedly at war with Islam. What is new, because it belongs to the domain of party politics, is the growing acceptability, especially on the far-Left, of the narrative devised by the Muslim Brotherhood/Salafi, which portray the French State as intrinsically hostile to Muslims (by imposing secularism) while it is accused of bowing to the demands from the Jewish community. This narrative portrays the Jewish institutions as relays of the “extreme-right government in Israel” and exonerates Hamas (and Hezbollah) from being terrorist entities.

The extreme-right and the radical right have historically rallied under the slogan of “France to the French”. It fought the “Jewish peril” and believed in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. It denounced the Jews as a “State within the State”, weakening the national spirit, undermining everything French and plotting against the country. After 1945 this narrative focused on denouncing “Zionism” and in some instances, included Holocaust-denial. The legislation against antisemitism and Holocaust-denial obliged the radical right to use coded language against the Jews, who were labeled “Zionists” on the ground that the overwhelming majority of French Jews support the existence of Israel.

On the opposite, neo-Fascists and National-Revolutionaries support the “Axis of Resistance” (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas). They demonstrate on the streets with the slogan “In Paris like in Gaza, Intifada!”<sup>39</sup>. This scene comprises about 2,000 militants<sup>40</sup>.

The extreme-left is historically prejudiced against the Jews because of their supposed responsibility in the rise of Capitalism. It is hostile to Israel, because it associates the Jews with Imperialism and the manipulation of politics through the alleged power of the „Jewish lobby “. It smears Israeli “colonization”. The divide is between those who support a two-states solution and those in favor of a one-state solution which would grant allegedly equal status to Jews and Arabs alike, thus putting an end to Israel as a Jewish State. The extreme-left promotes the narrative that Israel is an Apartheid state<sup>41</sup>. It is the spearhead of the pro-Palestine movement since October 7. It pretends that Israeli actions in Gaza are a “genocide” and Jewish organizations are accomplices. Some prominent figures on the Radical Left <sup>42</sup> refuse to call Hamas a terrorist movement, labeling it a „Resistance movement. The slogan „from the river to the sea” is a constant feature during extreme-left demonstrations for Gaza.

### **Justifications of Violence through Antisemitic Narratives**

Several murders took place which were not terrorist-related, but whose perpetrators were got an aggravated sentence because of their antisemitic motives.

On **April 4, 2017** in Paris, Sarah Halimi, a medical doctor and retired director of a Haredi kindergarten, is killed by his neighbor Kobili Traoré, from Mali, who shouts “Allahu Akbar”, also calling the victim a “Sheitan”. Traoré, a heavy drugs addict, was declared insane at the time he killed the victim. He is now in a psychiatric facility.

On **March 23, 2018** in Paris, 85 years-old Mireille Knoll was stabbed to death in her flat. The perpetrators are not a Muslim neighbor of the victim and not a homeless person from Lithuania. Both of them were, in 2021, respectively sentenced to life without parole and to 15 years. The aggravating circumstance of antisemitism was recognized by the Court, the Muslim perpetrator being openly hostile to the Jews.

On **March 19, 2012** in Toulouse, Mohamad Merah kills 4 Jews including children at the Orthodox Secondary School Ozar Hatorah. Merah pledged allegiance to AQ. He is killed by Special Forces on March 22.

#### **Terrorist attacks:**

On **September 19 2012** in Sarcelles, a grenade is thrown into a Jewish supermarket. One customer is lightly injured. The perpetrators two converts to Islam who were jailed for criminal offenses. Both belonged to what is known as the “Cannes-Torcy cell”, some members of which fought with AQ in Syria. Sydney was killed by police in a stand-off. Bailly was sentenced to 28 years in prison.

On **January 9 J 2015**, Amédy Coulibaly, who pledged allegiance to ISIS, kills 4 Jewish customers of a kosher supermarket in Paris after holding them hostages. Several are wounded. Coulibaly, a French citizen from Mali, had a criminal background. He was killed by Special Forces.

On **February 3 2015 in Nice**, 3 soldiers who stand guard outside the Jewish Community Center are attacked with a knife by Moussa Coulibaly, a lone attacker who tells the Police he hates the Jews. The man comes from Senegal and has a criminal past; He was sentenced to 30 years.

On **January 11 2016 in Marseille**, a Jewish teacher is attacked with a machete by a 15-years old Turkish youngster of Kurdish origin who claims allegiance to ISIS. The teacher is not hurt. The perpetrator is the only juvenile who, to this day, has stood trial for terrorism. He was sentenced to 7 years.

On **19 October 2023** in Strasbourg, a 15 years-old Chechen teenager is arrested just outside the Main Synagogue, holding a 12-centimeter knife. He is known to the Police for petty crime and to the Security Services for suspicious Jihadi messages on Snapchat. He is now in a rehabilitation center for juveniles.

On **August 24, 2024**, in La Grande Motte near Montpellier, 33 years-old El Hussein Khenfri, an Algerian citizen, sets the synagogue afire. Little damage, one lightly wounded policeman. The perpetrator, who acted with a Palestinian flag around his waist, is a petty criminal who has radicalized against the Jews following October 7, 2023. He is non-affiliated and currently awaiting trial.

### **Variations and Common Themes of Antisemitic Narratives across different Extremist Ideologies**

On the extreme and radical right, some activists do not use the antisemitic narrative. They do not want to take sides in the Israel/Palestine conflict, mostly for tactical reasons. Identitarians think the main enemy is Islam and Muslim immigration and that the Jews are not a threat and could even become sympathetic to an agenda of compulsory repatriation of migrants<sup>43</sup>. The scene is now divided between “antizionist” and “anti-Islam”. Among “antizionists”, the most hardline Integralist Catholics cling to pre-Vatican II theology and vilify the Jews as the killers of Christ, as a people of Satanic essence. White Supremacists say Jews are “the seeds of Satan” who do not belong to the White race. They speak of them as non-humans and use code words such as “golems” and “snorkys” to describe them<sup>44</sup>.

The extreme-left avoids reference to race and religion. It focuses on denouncing Israeli imperialism, colonialism and “occupation”. It calls for a “boycott” of Israeli goods and shops who distribute them (i.e. the Boycott Divestment Sanctions (BDS) movement)<sup>45</sup>. It says that Israel is committing a crime against the Palestinian, akin to the genocide of the Jews.

The narrative of the Islamic Jihadis is that of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. There are Muslim clerics who use antisemitic narratives in their sermons and on their social media. They preach depreciating sections of the Quran dealing with the Jews, sometimes with references to the war in Palestine. Those clerics are Sunni, as the Shia minority is very small and maintains a low profile. They serve mosques catering to the needs of the wider Muslim community in their city, and thus reach a mainstream audience. They might influence some of their worshipers towards violent behavior. Such imams avoid easy classification as either Salafi, Tablighi or Brotherhood: they rather convey an arch-conservative, literalist vision of Islam which appeals to a poorly educated youth in search for Muslim “purity”<sup>46</sup>, or to youth on the fringe of delinquency. Those imams who are deported or sentenced for antisemitism play the card of being your “good neighbor”, so that locally elected officials do not report them and sometimes have good relations with them. A new and important point is that several imams who have been sentenced or have been raided by the police received public support from the extreme-left on the grounds that their civil

rights have been violated and that the action of the State against them was part of an “institutionally Islamophobic” policy.<sup>47</sup>

The National Rally and Reconquête have taken pro-Israel stands and are now despised by Radical Nationalists as “traitors”. National-Revolutionary groups in contrast support the “Axis of Resistance and call for the end of the “Zionist entity”.

### **Extremist Collaborations Across Ideologies**

There was trans-ideological cooperation on the common ground of antisemitism, among French Holocaust deniers, who came both from Fascism and the Pacifist wing of the Socialist Party before 1940. At the end of the 1970s extreme-Leftists belonging to the Rätekommunismus faction became Holocaust-deniers. Their narrative was that National-Socialism being just another form of Capitalism and the rationale of Capitalism being to exploit the workers to the maximum, it was not logical for the Nazis to kill Jewish inmates. Another argument which was shared with extreme-Right deniers is that the Jews and Israel have blackmailed Germany and the world, asking for the creation of Israel as compensation for the Holocaust and extorting money.

Trans-ideological cooperation took place in 2000-2012, when a well-known French comedian of African descent became widely popular among the youth, especially those of immigrant origin, by claiming that the Jews control business, the media, politics and the economy, and they are so perverse that they have enacted legislation in order to silence those who dare criticize them. Therefore, the Jews, he said, should be referred to as “the community that does not exist”.

There is no common political platform but pro-Palestine demonstrations are a mix of people who rally under the slogans of “genocide in Gaza” and “from the river to the sea” and are both Leftists and non-affiliated Muslims, most of them young, with a significant number of them wearing a keffiyeh, the hijab or an abaya.

### **The Role of Antisemitic Narratives in Recruitment**

Antisemitism has always been the main reason why militants have joined some of the Neo-Fascist and National-Revolutionary groups on the extreme-Right, among others the now banned *Oeuvre française*<sup>48</sup>. Some icons of the extreme-Right such as the late François Duprat (1940-1978) are still revered because of their early and uncompromising support for both antisemitism, Holocaust-denial and support for both the PLO, the Baath party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)<sup>49</sup>. On the opposite, Royalist movements such as *Action française*<sup>50</sup> have now undertaken a new reading of Maurras’ writings and action, and they take distance from his

antisemitism. As a consequence, a few local branches (in Rennes and Nantes) have left and continue with their own more Radical ideology, while other defectors have joined the National-Revolutionaries.

Rabid antisemitism is on the rise on social media of the extreme-Right however, especially after 7 October. This is especially true on Telegram, YouTube, Tinyurl and Odyssee, which are tools for recruitment. Those social media disseminate various Conspiracy theories according to which the Jews/“Zionists” are controlling the world or are plotting against the non-Jews (the derogatory term “goyim” is very often used). After 7 October, accusations of genocide and ritual murder have become more frequent, as well as attacks on the supposedly Messianic ideology of the Israeli Government who is accused of using the Hamas attacks in order to definitively crush Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries in order to build “Greater Israel” and ultimately rebuild the third Temple in Jerusalem<sup>51</sup>. The question is: does rabid antisemitism on social media help existing groups to recruit, or does it feed the hatred of lone wolves, accelerationists and neo-Nazis who want to stay away from any group and eventually plan their own attacks?

The role of antisemitic narratives in recruitment on the extreme-Left is difficult to assess in terms of registered members. However, it is certain that extreme-Left demonstrations for Gaza and Palestine have attracted young people, especially with an immigrant/Muslim background, because established political parties from this part of the political spectrum have condoned the slogans of “genocide in Gaza”, “from the river to the sea” or “Netanyahu murderer, Macron accomplice”. Slogans that were used on the fringe of politics before 7 October are now used by such parties in the National Assembly and the European Parliament, thus mainstreaming antisemitism and potentially attracting both militants and voters.

The number of Islamic radicals is growing among the under-18s. Minister Othmane Nasrou warned that 21% of those indicted for Terrorism in January-June 2024 were teenagers<sup>52</sup>. There is a strong likelihood that this is a consequence of strident antisemitism on social media after 7 October.

### **The Dissemination of Antisemitic Narratives**

There are fewer and fewer newspapers, except on the extreme-Left, which now influences politics through registered political parties and is the third force in elections. The extreme-Left is represented in Parliament at the National and European level. During public demonstrations, it uses antizionist slogans<sup>53</sup>, widely reported by the mainstream media. It is even powerful at elite schools where in 2024 Jewish students were banned from attending a debate on Palestine on the ground of their religion<sup>54</sup>. Another fighting ground is the Feminist movement. In November

2023, Jewish feminists who demonstrated against sexual violence committed by Hamas were kicked out from the annual Paris demonstration against violence on women, by a group of pro-Palestine and extreme-Left militants who denied the legitimacy of their presence<sup>55</sup>.

An April 2024 survey of post 7 October antisemitism by pollster IFOP, showed that online discussions originating from both extreme-Right and extreme-Left militants focus on what they see as an unfair definition of antizionism as a form of Antisemitism<sup>56</sup>. In other words, they do not accept the IHRA definition which they believe is a political weapon against the “legitimate” right to stand against Zionism. The social media of the Neo-Nazi, Neo-Fascist Extreme Right supports Palestine and Gaza, the rest focuses primarily on remigration (deportation of foreigners) and violence from illegal aliens on women and French “native” youth. There are a few terrorist attempts from White Supremacists/ Accelerationists at targeting Jewish institutions<sup>57</sup>, In November 2023, the Interior Minister said 40 terror attacks from the Islamist were foiled by the secret services, against 13 from extreme-Right.<sup>58</sup>

The strategy of Radical Islamists is to recruit young people whose age is as low as 14 years old, mostly on social media, including TikTok and Telegram encrypted channels<sup>59</sup>. Most Islamists self-radicalize by watching videos on ISIS/AQ channels. Another mode of recruitment is the taking-over of a mosque by Salafis. In 2023, Among the 2018 mosques in France, 119 were under Salafi control. Between 2017 and 2022, 718 mosques were closed on the ground of incitement to Jihad or discriminatory talk about women and Jews.<sup>60</sup>

### **Antisemitic Key Actors**

The key players are the extreme-Left and Radical Islamists. When an MP from the extreme-Left uses the code word “Celestial dragons” to speak of the Jews, when he accuses Israel of having made false claims of atrocities perpetrated on October 7<sup>61</sup>, Antisemitism is indeed, if not intentional, underlying. Pro-Palestine NGOs who stand for a one-state solution fuel Antisemitism because such a State would deprive the Jews from their right to self-determination. Those who support a Palestinian State „from the river to the sea“ fuel Antisemitism, because such a State would mean the end of Israel<sup>62</sup>.

The Antizionist extreme-Right is a marginal force: in the 2024 election to the European Parliament the most Extreme Right list<sup>63</sup> received 4120 votes.

The only actors who openly justify Anti-Jewish violence are Islamic Jihadis. Claiming support for Palestine was voiced by Mohammed Merah after he attacked the Jewish

school in Toulouse, in 2012. Chérif Kouachi, one of the terrorists involved in the 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo, had planned to attack Jewish shops and synagogues<sup>64</sup>.

The extreme-Left makes it clear that it does not condone violence against the Jews. That does not mean its inflammatory rhetoric cannot fuel violence.

The extreme-Right seldom attack the pro-Palestine demonstrations, neither do they attack Jews physically but online hate speech is a huge phenomenon on X and Telegram.

### **Financial Strategies Applied by the Identified Key Actors**

The extreme-Left gets financial support from dedicated militants and registered parties get State funding<sup>65</sup>. Parties seating in the national or European Parliament get specific funding for their parliamentary activities. So, the issue of funding is only relevant for extra-Parliamentary groups and terrorist networks.

Far-Right media and groups now regularly publish investigative stories about what they say is funding of the extreme-Left by local and State authorities through subsidies granted to progressive NGOs working on social, gender or immigration issues<sup>66</sup>. Such funding is legal. Public funding can only be suspended or stopped when a group or NGO does not abide by the "Anti-Separatism" law of August 24, 2021,<sup>67</sup> which makes it mandatory to accept the Constitution and increases control over foreign-funded NGOs.

The financing of radical Islam is difficult to expose and furthermore, the border between being Islamist and being radical is hard to define. Conservative lawmakers sometimes question the financing by the EU of NGOs they say are close to terrorist entities, but they do not substantiate their point. In several instances the label "Islamist" is certainly adequate, but that of being radical with ties to terrorism is not proven. The controversy focuses on those NGOs fighting Islamophobia (a debatable concept) or sending humanitarian aid to Muslims countries/minorities. The financing of radical Islam by crime, including massive drugs dealing and the possibility that some of the financial revenue from the Halal market is used to fund Islamist (not necessarily violent) activity, is a possibility. The involvement of some terrorists in petty drugs dealing is established<sup>68</sup>.

### **The Transnational Dimension of Key Antisemitic Actors**

Historically, the extreme-Left is Internationalist and keeps transnational connections. The Communist International and the various Trotskyite Internationals allowed French groups to stay in contact with like-minded parties abroad, including

in the Middle- East. International contacts also take place within the factions in the European Parliament. The paradox on the extreme-Right is that French MEPs who are pro-Israel now belong to factions whose other members are downright hostile to Israel. The Islamist Radical movement is international in the sense that the Kuran and the Sunna are given to the World Umma and have prominence over any sense of belonging to a nation-state. In France, Islamic radicals come from many backgrounds. African Islam, in particular, is a topic worthy of further exploration.

The transnational narrative on the extreme-Left is that Israel is a racist, illegitimate, colonial state of Apartheid, oppressing the Palestinians while committing genocide in Gaza. The extreme-Left challenges the very concept of Zionism. It does not think Zionism is the legitimate national movement of the Jewish people which is entitled to its own nation-state. Its belief is that Zionism, being born in 19th century Europe, is a copy of European colonialism and is condoned by Europeans in order to escape their guilt of being responsible for the Holocaust (also known as the “Shoah”). Living in the diaspora is, according to the extreme-Left, the natural condition of the Jews. Such a vision, although it comes from secular, if not anti-religious Leftists, is a remnant of the pre-Vatican II Catholic theology of the “wandering Jew”.

There is a disturbing alignment between extreme-Left (and extreme-Right) stereotypes and Christian pre-1945 theology: the stereotype of the Israeli/Jew as promoting genocide is a remnant of the old-time slandering accusations of ritual murder. On the extreme-Right, the international narrative is that Israel is a genocidal, illegitimate “Zionist entity”. What deserves attention is that some extreme-Right militants praise Hezbollah and the Palestinian “resistance” while they stand for compulsory repatriation of non-European immigrants, especially Muslims. In a sense, fighting Arab/Muslim immigration and supporting the Axis of the Resistance is logical. It means that Islam does not belong to Europe but is “useful at home” in the global fight against Zionism and its Western allies. The same radical Rightists believe Islam is worthy of praise because it is the only monotheist religion which is not corrupted by “modern values”.

Cross-border activities of the extreme-Right do not focus on antisemitic narratives but on supporting anti-migrant demonstrations and violence, such as the UK riots in 2024. We know a few examples of transnational activities which involve antisemitism, such as traveling to attend commemorations abroad especially in Central Europe, or organizing skinhead concerts and mixed martial arts (MMA) tournaments. On the extreme-Left, the media have reported<sup>69</sup> foreign participation in demonstrations of the Black Bloc. Such was the case in in the Paris Labour day demonstration on 1 May 2024, which was also in support of the “Resistance”. Violence targeted the police, banks, shops, not Jewish property.

## **Role of Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other States**

The Russian Federation does not openly support any of the identified groups, but has, even before the war in Ukraine, maintained contacts, through its Embassy in France, with groups close to the extreme-Right<sup>70</sup>, although the policy of the Russian Federation, was to push Russian interests across the political spectrum. The mainstream Conservative Right was quite open to good relations with Moscow. The National Rally was seen as a possible ally but Putin accepted a meeting with Marine Le Pen in March 2017<sup>71</sup>—that is, only after the conservative Right had lost its chances to win the Presidency<sup>72</sup>.

Foreign countries substantially fund Muslim NGOs and mosques because French State subsidies to religions are not legal, unless it means preserving religious property dating before 1905, the date of the law on the separation of Church and State, which did not apply to Islam. That does not mean foreign countries directly promote antisemitic narratives, unless one (reasonably) considers that disseminating Salafi or Muslim Brotherhood-oriented books and religious education textbooks contributes to spreading antisemitism. In 2021 the State contacted the Qatari authorities and asked them to stop supporting radical schools, mosques and NGOs.<sup>73</sup> Saudi financing of Salafi/Wahabi charities and mosques is a proven fact<sup>74</sup> but is less significant here. Some media from Muslim countries, whether online or on Pay TV/Satellite are accused of fueling antisemitic and anti-Israeli prejudices<sup>75</sup>. Those who deny this say those media express legitimate concern about “Islamophobia” and only report the events in Gaza, with no minced words about the Israeli “crimes”<sup>76</sup>, but with no intent of inciting to hatred against Jews. President Macron decided to put an end to the appointment of foreign imams from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey who until now were serving their respective communities<sup>77</sup>.

The case of Iran is very specific because the Shia community is small and diverse. Hezbollah has followers among those Shia originating from Lebanon and West Africa. However, those people keep a low profile because France does not list the political wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. There are Shia mosques which organize tours of Iranian holy shrines but it is impossible to know if that in fact entails funding from the host country<sup>78</sup>. A wave of Iran-sponsored terror attacks occurred in 1985-86, staged by Iran<sup>79</sup>, but that was in the specific context of French supporting Iraq in the war against Iran. During the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran held conferences on Holocaust-denial and invited French Antisemites<sup>80</sup>.

After October 7, concerning and sometimes bizarre incidents have taken place in Paris. On 26 October 2023, dozens of blue Stars of David were painted on buildings with no Jewish population. This was investigated as a possible antisemitic act. The

inquiry found that this was a disinformation action staged by FSB through a Moldovan businessman who claimed he wanted to show solidarity with the Jews<sup>81</sup>. In May 2024, red hands were painted on the wall of the Shoah Memorial in Paris. As red hands are a symbol used by the pro-Palestine movement to imply that Israel has blood on its hands, the matter was investigated as an antisemitic act. Three extreme-Right activists from Bulgaria were arrested<sup>82</sup>. There is a possibility that this was a Russia-masterminded operation<sup>83</sup>.

## **Governmental Actions against Antisemitism**

Combating antisemitism is the duty of the DILCRAH, while CNCDH is tasked with reporting on antisemitism and racism, including shaping policy recommendations. The Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah (FMS)<sup>84</sup> is tasked, since 2000, with supporting cultural, educational and research programs dealing with Jewish life and memory. Its funding come from the Compensation Fund for Victims of Spoliation (spoliation by the Vichy Regime) with an initial endowment of 393 million euros.

## **Non-Governmental Bodies with a Mandate to Foster Jewish life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

“Antiracist” NGOs have often tasked themselves with fighting antisemitism but, since the start of the 2000 Intifada, have been divided on the issue of what is antisemitism and what is “acceptable” antizionism. LICRA (Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme) adopts the IHRA definition. MRAP (Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples,) and LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme) reject the IHRA definition as being too broad. Those NGOs continue to file complaints in cases of antisemitism. A new very active NGO has emerged, more conservative politically, called the Organisation Juive Européenne (OJE)<sup>85</sup> which specialize in cases of antizionism/antisemitism using the IHRA definition. Political representation, including fighting antisemitism in courts, is the duty of CRIF, which promotes the IHRA definition and has no cooperation with both the political extremes. Religious activity is since 1807 the preserve of Consistoire central de France<sup>86</sup>, The Jewish schools as well as cultural projects are overseen by Fonds social juif unifié (FSJU)<sup>87</sup>, which is aligned with CRIF on antisemitism issues. A new trend is that the Lubavitch movement is the target of an antisemitic smear campaign by extreme-Right conspiracy theorists who claim the Chabad movement is in fact the (hidden) heart or core of the “Jewish conspiracy”.

## **Inspiring Practices to Foster Jewish life and/or combat antisemitism**

The best practice to combat antisemitism is to enforce existing legislation and ensure judges sentence the perpetrators. In this sense, the situation is far from ideal.

By mid-November 2023, the authorities reported 1518 attacks after 7 October, but only 330 police inquiries and 30 sentences<sup>88</sup>. Some politicians have asked for a ban on extreme-Left parties. Given their level of support, that would be counter-productive and most probably un-constitutional<sup>89</sup>. A few politicians want to ask foreigners who apply for French citizenship to pledge under oath that they recognize the existence of Israel<sup>90</sup>. This is unrealistic in the French context. Making the IHRA definition a Law would be very positive, but there is no cross-partisan consensus.

## Germany

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### *Alexander Ritzmann*

Over the last years, various governments in Germany have passed legislation, created specialized government positions and funded numerous non-governmental initiatives to foster Jewish life and combat antisemitism. Similar to other countries, the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, however, marked a significant turning point, triggering waves of antisemitic incidents and demonstrations in Germany. The attack and the following war emboldened extremist narratives and led to a massive increase in public expressions of hostility toward Israel and Jewish communities. This escalation was evident through a surge in anti-Israel demonstrations, particularly in Berlin, where pro-Palestinian protests often included explicit support for Hamas, antisemitic chants, and open hostility toward media representatives covering the events. Many of these demonstrations featured slogans such as “Yalla Intifada” and “From the river to the sea” both of which are widely recognized by experts as calls for violence against Israel or the denial of its right to exist as a state. The events following October 7, 2023, also highlight the deep entrenchment of antisemitic narratives extremist groups and have led to a series of (mostly foiled or failed) terrorist attacks against Jewish or Israeli targets in the country.

### **Legal and statistical country context<sup>91</sup>**

The legal frameworks address antisemitic behavior through specific provisions in the German criminal code. It also addresses “secondary antisemitism,” which may manifest as Holocaust denial or minimizing Jewish suffering, as well as “new antisemitism” often linked to anti-Israel sentiments that cross into discriminatory or delegitimizing rhetoric against Jewish people.

Some of the most relevant criminal code sections are:

- **Section 130**, which criminalizes incitement to hatred against segments of the population, including Jewish communities, and the denial or trivialization of the Holocaust.<sup>92</sup>
- **Section 86a** prohibits the dissemination and use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations, including Nazi symbols, which have been historically tied to antisemitic ideologies.<sup>93</sup>
- **Sections 185-189** cover offenses such as insult, defamation, and disparagement, including offenses with antisemitic motivations or targeting the memory of Holocaust victims.<sup>94</sup>

- **Section 46 (2)** Antisemitic motivations can be aggravating circumstances of the respective offense and therefore increase the sentence accordingly<sup>95</sup>

**Section 3** of the Act Governing Private Associations allows for the dissolution of associations, **Section 14** bans of the operation of mostly foreign associations.<sup>96</sup>


The most relevant non-legally binding definition of antisemitism for the German governments on the federal and state level is the working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

### Statistics

Antisemitic incidents and crimes are systematically collected and processed through a collaborative framework involving federal and state institutions. Reported antisemitic incidents are categorized within the politically motivated crimes (PMK) framework, which is managed by the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt/ BKA).<sup>97</sup> The PMK framework includes subcategories for hate crimes motivated by antisemitism. Civil society organizations (CSO)s, such as the Research and Information Center Antisemitism Berlin (RIAS) are also documenting antisemitic incidents.<sup>98</sup>

### Annual Reported Antisemitic Incidents in Germany (2014–2023)

Over the past decade, Germany has experienced a significant rise in reported antisemitic incidents, encompassing both non-violent and violent offenses.



Graph: Statista<sup>99</sup> — Overall incidents in blue, violent incidents in gray.

From 2022 to 2023, the number of cases of antisemitic offenses increased by 95.53%. Out of 148 violent crimes that were reported, 91 were bodily injuries were registered.<sup>100</sup>

All German police crime statistics are based on entry-only data. There is no dataset available showing how many of the reported incidents lead to prosecutions or court sentences. The figures for 2023 are provisional and subject to change as further data becomes available.

While government data offers a legally grounded and systematic statistical assessment of antisemitic crimes, civil society data can provide a broader, community-informed perspective that often captures unreported and non-criminal manifestations of antisemitism. At the same time, the numbers of police crime statistics can underrepresent incidents due to reporting thresholds. However, interestingly in the case of antisemitic incidents, the number of incidents in the PMK statistic is actually higher than that of RIAS. This might be due to the fact that RIAS and associated CSOs are not yet present in all the 16 German federal states.<sup>101</sup>

### **Developments since October 7, 2023**

Between October 7, 2023, and the end of 2023, RIAS documented 415 antisemitic gatherings across Germany.<sup>102</sup> Berlin police recorded 339 pro-Palestinian demonstrations during the same timeline, with 93 events prohibited due to their inflammatory content or potential for violence.<sup>103</sup> According to the German federal government, around 1,600 antisemitic offenses were recorded by the police in 2023 up to the beginning of October.

According to PMK data as of October 4, 2024,<sup>104</sup> 3,464 offenses were classified this year as antisemitically motivated, predominantly in the category PMK -foreign ideology (non-Islamist foreign extremism)<sup>105</sup>- (2,123) and PMK -religious ideology- (774), but also from PMK -right-wing extremism (322) and PMK -left-wing extremism (87). Most frequent antisemitic incidents were damage to property and incitement to hatred.

### **Bans on Hamas and Samidoun**

On November 2, 2023, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community issued a ban on the activities of the terrorist organization Hamas and the transnational organization Samidoun (Palestinian Solidarity Network) within Germany.<sup>106</sup> The ban also extended to the sub-organization Samidoun Deutschland, which operated under the names “HIRAK — Palestinian Youth Mobilization Jugendbewegung (Germany)” and “Hirak e.V.”. In these last two cases, these German associations were dissolved by the ban.

## Security Enhancements

The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community coordinated measures with the federal state level interior ministries of Germany to protect Jewish communities and institutions.<sup>107</sup>

## Policy Statements

The German Bundestag passed a legally non-binding resolution on November 7, 2024, titled “Never Again is Now: Protecting, Preserving and Strengthening Jewish Life in Germany.”<sup>108</sup> As a key point, government bodies on all levels are asked to ensure that no projects with antisemitic aims are being funded. This resolution has faced criticism from some legal experts and civil society groups, who express concerns that it could infringe upon free expression and negatively impact civil society.<sup>109</sup>

## Key Antisemitic Narratives

### Historical Antisemitic Narratives in Germany<sup>110</sup>:

- **Conspiracy Theories About Jewish Influence:** Historically, antisemitic narratives often focused on the alleged control of global financial systems, media, and politics by Jews.
- **Holocaust Denial, Trivialization and Relativization:** Despite Germany’s stringent legal measures against Holocaust denial, certain extremist groups persist in promoting Holocaust denial or minimization. This narrative is often coupled with secondary antisemitism, which involves blaming Jews for “exploiting” the memory of the Holocaust for political or financial gain.
- **“Jews as the Other” and Racist Tropes:** Traditional stereotypes, such as Jews being greedy, deceitful, or untrustworthy, continue to circulate among extremist circles and beyond. These age-old antisemitic stereotypes have been repurposed in modern contexts to suit various agendas, including anti-globalization and anti-immigration narratives.

### Main Antisemitic Narratives and Slogans Over the Past Decade in Germany<sup>111</sup>:

1. **Extreme-Right Populism and Antisemitism:** Right-wing extremist groups have used antisemitic rhetoric to bolster nationalist narratives, positioning Jews as threats to German identity, culture, or sovereignty. This has been observed in slogans advocating for racial purity or blaming Jews for economic and social issues.
2. **“Great Replacement Theory” Narrative:** This conspiracy theory, popularized by right-wing extremist groups, claims that Jews are steering efforts to “replace”


native populations in Europe through immigration policies. This narrative plays into broader xenophobic, racist, and antisemitic ideologies.

3. **Antizionism Crossing into Antisemitism:** While criticism of Israeli government policies is not necessarily antisemitic, certain groups and networks within the extreme-right, extreme-left, foreign (non-Islamist) extremism as well as Islamist extremist milieus are using antizionism to promote broader antisemitic sentiments. Antizionist rhetoric has been employed to deny the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, equating Zionism with colonialism, apartheid, or imperialism, thus turning political opposition into a vehicle for broader antisemitic attacks.
4. **COVID-19-Related Conspiracy Theories:** During the COVID-19 pandemic, conspiracy theories blaming Jews for orchestrating or profiting from the crisis gained traction. Claims that the pandemic was a tool for Jewish control or that Jews were involved in vaccine-related conspiracies were disseminated by various extremists and extremist groups in Germany.

### Antisemitic sentiments in Germany

Antisemitic sentiments surveyed<sup>112</sup>:

- “Even today, the influence of the Jews is still too great.
- The Jews work more than other people with evil tricks to achieve what they want.
- The Jews simply have something special and peculiar about them and don’t really fit in with us.”



### **Antisemitic Narratives Since October 7, 2023:**

Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the following war, there has also been an increase in antisemitic rhetoric tied to the conflict. Extremist groups have used the escalation to further demonize Israel and, by extension, Jewish communities in Germany.<sup>113</sup> This has included online hate speech, public demonstrations with antisemitic slogans, and physical attacks against Jewish symbols and institutions. Pro-Palestinian protests have sometimes crossed into antisemitism by targeting Jewish symbols and conflating Jews globally with the actions of the Israeli government.<sup>114</sup> The dissemination of antizionist slogans equating Zionism with colonialism, apartheid, or imperialism, has significantly increased.<sup>115</sup>

### **Justifications of Violence through Antisemitic Narratives**

Antisemitic narratives and slogans are used to justify violence by dehumanizing Jewish individuals and communities, promoting conspiracy theories, and framing Jewish people as the cause of societal or political grievances.<sup>116</sup>

Below are some examples illustrating how these narratives have been employed to incite violence in Germany:

#### **1. Islamist Extremist Attacks**

- Islamist extremists in Germany have framed Jews as aggressors, oppressors or threats to Muslims worldwide.<sup>117</sup>
- Between October 13, 2023, and October 20, 2024, at least fourteen Islamist terrorist attacks were planned in Germany.<sup>118</sup> Most had a connection to the so-called “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). Seven of those fourteen attacks were (also) directed against Jewish or Israeli targets.<sup>119</sup> Two attacks were executed. In August 2024, a Syrian national killed three visitors, and injured eight, at a street festival in Solingen. ISIS claimed the attack as revenge for Muslims in Gaza and all over the world.<sup>120</sup> In September 2024, an Austrian citizen fired a rifle at the Israeli consulate buildings in Munich, Germany, and was killed in a shootout with police. The consulate was closed that day in remembrance of the murder of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics in Munich.<sup>121</sup>

#### **2. Right-wing Extremist Attacks**

- Right-wing extremists claim that Jews were behind the supposed “replacement” of the German population with immigrants and that they are responsible for various societal ills.<sup>122</sup> Violence is framed as self-defense.

- The attacker in the Halle synagogue shooting (2019) believed these antisemitic conspiracy theories.<sup>123</sup> The attacker livestreamed his assault, during which he used antisemitic language and aimed to massacre Jews at the synagogue during Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish religious calendar. When he was unable to gain entry to the synagogue, he randomly killed two people and injured two more.

### **3. Pro-Palestinian and/or pro Hamas Demonstrations**

- During certain pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Germany, antizionist rhetoric has escalated into antisemitic violence.<sup>124</sup> Slogans such as “Death to Israel” and “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” have been chanted, crossing from political criticism into incitement against Jews as a collective group.<sup>125</sup>
- In some cases, this rhetoric has led to physical attacks on Jewish institutions and symbols, including vandalism of synagogues and assaults on individuals identified as Jewish.<sup>126</sup> The conflation of anti-Israel sentiment with antisemitic rhetoric provides a pretext for violent acts against Jewish targets. For example, since October 7, 2024, the Berlin police has opened 6,200 investigations into antisemitic incidents or antisemitic incitement to hatred, 1,300 of those are violent acts. Of those 1,300, most are related to resisting arrests or attacks against police officers at demonstrations.<sup>127</sup>

In February 2024, a politically active Jewish student was violently attacked by another student in Berlin.<sup>128</sup> In May 2024, a Jewish Ukrainian refugee who was wearing a Tallit (Jewish prayer shawl) was violently attacked in Berlin by a stranger who was shouting “Free Palestine”.<sup>129</sup> In November 2024, the police chief of Berlin advised Jews to be careful and vigilant in certain parts of the city.<sup>130</sup> “There are, unfortunately, neighborhoods in Berlin with a majority of residents from Arab backgrounds where there is open sympathy for terrorist organizations and very blatant antisemitism”.<sup>131</sup>

### **4. Pro-Palestinian and/or pro Hamas protests at Universities**

- Since October 7, 2023, student protests at German universities have occasionally escalated into confrontations involving violence. While the majority of demonstrations were peaceful, certain incidents involved aggressive actions by protesters, including vandalism, resistance to police intervention, and physical altercations with counter-demonstrators. Following a strategy of provocation and escalation, the resulting extensive media coverage could have inflated the actual size and impact of these key actors.

- A survey<sup>132</sup> conducted in December 2023 by the University Konstanz, Germany, found that among their students, general antisemitism is significantly less widespread than in the general population (8% to 18%). However, regarding the question if Israel's military response is justified, student support was lower than that of the general population (27 % vs. 36 %). 12% of students found that the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, was part of the legitimate fight for the liberation of the Palestinians.
- Reportedly, the vast majority of participants of a “Pro-Palestine” protest camp at the Free University (FU) in Berlin in May 2024, which was cleared by the police, were not FU students.<sup>133</sup>
- Masar Badil is reportedly recruiting students at universities in Germany.<sup>134</sup>
- Experts interviewed for this report mentioned that at demonstrations, public gatherings, university occupations as well as on social media platforms, known long-term extremist actors are visible. As one expert put it: “familiar faces, everywhere”.<sup>135</sup> Based on the research for this chapter, a majority of antisemitic incidents at universities are organized and orchestrated by a small but experienced, hyper-active and well-networked group of actors.

### **Variations and Common Themes of Antisemitic Narratives Across Different Extremist Ideologies**

Antisemitic narratives and slogans vary across different extremist ideologies in Germany, each adapting antisemitic themes to fit their unique agendas and goals. While the specific expressions differ, common themes often underpin these narratives, allowing for antisemitic rhetoric to act as a (potentially) unifying element across disparate groups.

#### **Common Themes and Motifs Across Ideologies** (Right-Wing Extremism, Left-Wing Extremism, Islamist Extremism, Foreign Ideologies)<sup>136</sup>

1. **Anti-Western Sentiment:** The portrayal of Jews as symbols or agents of Western imperialism and moral corruption (sometimes termed by these actors simply as “modernity”) is used as a justification for antisemitism.<sup>137</sup>
2. **Conspiratorial Framing and Projection of Power and Control:** All three extremist ideologies utilize conspiracy theories to frame Jews as controlling or manipulating events, institutions, or governments to their advantage. Antisemitic narratives frequently revolve around the idea that Jews have disproportionate power, which must be countered through violence, exclusion, or discrimination.<sup>138</sup>

3. **Dehumanization and Demonization:** Jews are depicted as subhuman, corrupting influences, or “enemies within,” serving to justify discrimination and violence.<sup>139</sup>
4. **Scapegoating:** Jewish people are often scapegoated for broader societal issues, whether economic crises, immigration, or political unrest, shifting blame away from underlying causes or structural issues.<sup>140</sup>
5. **Historical Revisionism and Denial:** Both right-wing and Islamist extremists employ historical revisionism, denying or distorting events like the Holocaust to delegitimize Jewish suffering and justify continued hostility.<sup>141</sup>

### Extremist Collaborations Across Ideologies

Some extremist groups are following a “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” approach, collaborating with extremists they disagree vehemently on how societies should be governed. For example, collaborations between Islamist groups affiliated with Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) or Salafist networks and left-wing extremist “anti-imperialist” or Trotskyist groups and networks are well-documented, before and after October 7, 2023.<sup>142</sup>



*Demonstration in March 2024 in Berlin under the name “Global South Resists” to end “colonialism, racism and white supremacy”. Palestinian and communist flags are shown. A sign in the background reads “long live (the Palestinian) resistance”. Credit: Christophe Gateau/dpa.*

The right-wing extremist milieu is divided in their reaction to the Hamas attacks and the resulting war. Some are also following the same “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy and (claim to) support the Palestinian cause. Many other right-wing extremist groups, however, claim to be neutral; stating that this war is not their war, thereby promoting “the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy” approach.



*Demonstration of German extreme-right party "Der III. Weg". The banner states "Israel is our downfall", the Palestinian flag and the flag of the German Empire are shown. October 2023, YouTube screenshot.*

## The Role of Antisemitic Narratives in Recruitment

Antisemitic narratives play a significant role in the recruitment of new members and supporters across various extremist milieus in Germany. These narratives provide a unifying cause, create scapegoats for societal issues, and foster a sense of purpose or grievance within these groups. Due to the relatively strict legal framework in Germany regarding antisemitism, most extremist groups use secondary antisemitism like antizionism or anti-Globalism as key narratives.<sup>143</sup>

## The Dissemination of Antisemitic Narratives

### 1. Online Platforms and Digital Strategies

- **Social Media Platforms and Messaging Apps:** Extremist groups heavily utilize platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter/X, Instagram, as well as smaller platforms like Gab and 8chan.<sup>144</sup> Additionally, messaging apps such as Telegram and WhatsApp are key tools for spreading antisemitic content.<sup>145</sup> Telegram, in particular, has become a hub for sharing propaganda due to its minimal content moderation, channel features, as well as lack of cooperation with law enforcement authorities, making it difficult for authorities to disrupt extremist or terrorist activities. This appears to have changed after the arrest of the Telegram founder in France in September 2024.<sup>146</sup>
- These platforms and apps are used to share videos, memes, and textual propaganda that often blend antisemitic tropes with conspiracy theories, nationalism, or extremist ideologies.<sup>147</sup> Instagram is used to disseminate visually appealing antisemitic content, often through memes, images, and videos that target younger audiences and promote extremist ideologies.<sup>148</sup>
- **Narrative Propagation via Video Content:** Videos are a key tool for extremist recruitment and radicalization, with YouTube channels, TikTok and live-streaming platforms used to spread antisemitic rhetoric.<sup>149</sup> Video content

often includes “documentaries,” propaganda speeches, and hate sermons targeting Jewish communities and linking global events (e.g., COVID-19 or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) to antisemitic conspiracy theories.<sup>150</sup>

- **Games, Memes and “Humor”:** Extremist groups use games<sup>151</sup>, memes and “humorous” content as a strategic tool for mainstreaming antisemitism, particularly targeting younger audiences. This form of propaganda cloaks hateful messages in seemingly benign or satirical images and text to desensitize users and spread their ideology widely, including on gaming platforms.<sup>152</sup>

## 2. Offline Dissemination Strategies

- **Rallies and Public Demonstrations:** Protests, particularly those with anti-Israel or “pro-Palestinian” themes, have been used by Islamist groups, right- and left-wing extremist groups and networks to disseminate antisemitic narratives under the guise of political activism. Antisemitic chants, slogans, and signs are often visible during these gatherings, especially during times of heightened international tension related to Israel.<sup>153</sup>
- **Stickers, Graffiti, and Leaflets:** Extremist groups frequently disseminate antisemitic messages through street-level propaganda. This includes placing stickers with hateful slogans, defacing public spaces with antisemitic graffiti, and distributing leaflets in areas with Jewish community centers or Jewish events.<sup>154</sup> These acts serve to intimidate and target Jewish individuals while visibly spreading hate messages to a wider audience.
- **Books, Pamphlets, and Publications:** Extremist groups produce and distribute books and printed materials that promote antisemitic conspiracy theories, including historical revisionism, Holocaust denial, and narratives alleging Jewish control over media, finance, or politics.<sup>155</sup> These materials are sold online, distributed at extremist events, or circulated among members and supporters.

### Antisemitic Key Actors

Below is an overview of current key antisemitic actors in Germany.

#### Right-wing extremist Groups

- **Die Heimat (formerly the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD))**

Though diminished in influence, “Die Heimat” continues to promote neo-Nazi and antisemitic ideology.<sup>156</sup> The group propagates antisemitic conspiracy theories that blame Jews for political, social, and economic crises. The NPD

still plays a central role in maintaining and spreading neo-Nazi antisemitism in Germany, linking historic antisemitic rhetoric to contemporary issues like globalization and immigration.

- **Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path)**

Known for its nationalist and antisemitic rhetoric, Der Dritte Weg actively organizes public marches and disseminates propaganda targeting Jewish communities.<sup>157</sup> The group appeals to younger generations, utilizing modern communication tools, including social media, to spread antisemitic ideology.

### Left-wing extremist Groups

The left-wing extremist scene is divided concerning its stance to the Middle East conflict. Most autonomous left-wing extremists hold pro-Israel views, while left-wing extremists from the anti-imperialist and dogmatic scene are pro-Palestinian.<sup>158</sup>

- **Samidoun and Masar Badil** (The Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path)

The transnational Samidoun network (banned in Germany since November 2023 and affiliated with the terrorist organization Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)<sup>159</sup>, as well as the associated transnational **Masar Badil**<sup>160</sup> network, recruit with these narratives. They have links to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Houthis.

### BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) —

- The transnational BDS movement, which is linked to secular Palestinian extremism (Samidoun and Masar Badil network) as well as to Hamas.<sup>161</sup>
- Relevant key actors from Turkish left-wing extremist milieu include the **Revolutionary People's — Liberation Party Front** (DHKP-C) and its associated organizations and **Young Struggle** (YS), the youth organization of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLCP).<sup>162</sup>

### Islamist Extremist Groups

- **ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)**<sup>163</sup>

A transnational jihadist-terrorist group known for its violence, including targeting Jewish individuals and promoting antisemitic propaganda as part of its broader ideology. ISIS uses digital platforms, online propaganda videos, and encrypted communications to recruit followers and promote violence against Jewish communities, framing them as enemies in their broader religious and political agenda. ISIS's influence within Germany's Islamist extremist scene, particularly among vulnerable or radicalized individuals, contributes to acts of terrorism, antisemitic violence, and the promotion of antisemitic narratives

within broader jihadist ideology (see above). Before the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and the following war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not play a significant role in ISIS ideology and propaganda.

- **Hamas**

Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including Germany, employs antisemitism as a central element in its propaganda and recruitment strategies. It perpetuates conspiracies portraying Jews as enemies of Islam and humanity, often framing their struggle as a divine mandate against the “Zionist entity.”<sup>164</sup> By using religious and historical antisemitic tropes, Hamas fosters a narrative that dehumanizes Jewish people and portrays its actions as part of a broader resistance against alleged global Jewish domination.

- **Hizb ut-Tahrir**

This transnational Islamist organization, banned in Germany,<sup>165</sup> promotes antisemitic ideologies under the guise of opposing Zionism and Western influence.<sup>166</sup> They use online propaganda, religious sermons, and community outreach targeting Muslim youth. Hizb ut-Tahrir uses religious and ideological narratives to incite antisemitism, contributing to radicalization within Muslim communities. Reportedly affiliated organizations in Germany are “**Muslim Interaktiv**”, “**Realität Islam**” and “**Generation Islam**”.<sup>167</sup>

## **Overlap between Violent Extremism and Organized Crime in Germany**

There are documented linkages between right-wing extremist groups and organized crime networks, primarily driven by mutual benefits and overlapping interests.<sup>168</sup> Some right-wing extremist organizations engage in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and extortion to fund their operations and expand their influence.<sup>169</sup> These groups are closely affiliated with legitimate businesses, particularly in the construction, security, and event industries, to launder money and establish economic power.<sup>170</sup>

Connections between Islamist extremist networks and organized crime groups, particularly family-based criminal networks, have been observed.<sup>171</sup> Islamist extremists may collaborate with criminal clans for logistical support, including access to weapons, forged documents, and smuggling routes, which are essential for operational planning and financing. In turn, criminal networks may utilize the ideological cover provided by Islamist groups to mask their activities or justify their actions under a religious guise.<sup>172</sup>

Iran has reportedly been hiring organized crime actors to attack Iranian dissidents and Jewish or Israeli targets in Germany.<sup>173</sup> For example, German authorities believe that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was using a Hells Angels member to orchestrate attacks on Jewish targets in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2022.<sup>174</sup> In November that the same year, shots were fired at the Old Synagogue in Essen, and a Molotov cocktail thrown at a Jewish school next to the synagogue in Bochum.<sup>175</sup> In May 2024, a Paris court detained and charged a couple on accusations that they were involved in Iranian plots to kill Israelis and Jews in Germany and France.<sup>176</sup>

## The Transnational Dimension of Key Antisemitic Actors in Germany

Antisemitic key actors in Germany often operate within transnational networks that potentially amplify their ideological reach, propaganda, and operational capabilities. These connections are facilitated also through shared antisemitic narratives.

### 1. Right-wing extremist Groups

#### Die Heimat (formerly National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD)

- **Transnational Alliances:** Die Heimat maintains relationships with far-right parties and organizations across Europe, rooted in shared nationalist and xenophobic ideologies, including antisemitism.
- **Collaborations:** The group has engaged with entities such as France's Rassemblement National (National Rally) and Hungary's Jobbik party. These collaborations involve joint conferences, strategic exchanges, and mutual support within European forums.<sup>177</sup>

#### Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path)

- **Transnational Networks:** Der Dritte Weg actively seeks connections with like-minded organizations abroad. It has established contacts with neo-Nazi and far-right groups in Sweden, Ukraine, and Italy.<sup>178</sup>

**Joint Activities:** Participation in transnational events and marches provides platforms to promote their antisemitic and nationalist ideologies.<sup>179</sup>

### 2. Left-wing extremist Groups

#### Samidoun Network

- **Global Operations:** Samidoun is a transnational network supporting Palestinian prisoners and engaging in anti-Israel activities. Banned in Germany since November 2023,<sup>180</sup> it has connections in the U.S., Canada, and various European countries.<sup>181</sup>

- **Coordinated Campaigns:** Organizes transnational demonstrations and advocacy efforts that often employ antisemitic rhetoric under the guise of political activism.<sup>182</sup>

#### **Masar Badil (The Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement)**

- **Transnational Activities:** Operates transnationally with presence in Europe, North America, and the Middle East, aiming to unite Palestinian factions through revolutionary (i.e. violent) means against Israel.<sup>183</sup>
- **Transnational Events:** Hosts global conferences promoting anti-Israel narratives, facilitating networking among extremist groups.<sup>184</sup>

#### **Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement**

- **Transnational Coordination:** Operates through a network of affiliated organizations worldwide, coordinating campaigns and protests.

#### **Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C)**

- **Transnational Networks:** Maintains connections with other leftist extremist organizations, engaging in fundraising, propaganda, and recruitment across borders.<sup>185</sup>

#### **Young Struggle (YS)**

- **Transnational Engagement:** Operates among the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in Europe, participating in transnational leftist networks.<sup>186</sup>

### **3. Islamist Extremist Groups**

#### **Hamas**

- **Transnational Support Networks:** Operates transnationally through fundraising, propaganda, and political support, receiving aid from countries like Iran.

#### **Hizb ut-Tahrir (and Affiliated Organizations)**

- **Transnational Coordination:** Active in many countries across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, coordinating propaganda and recruitment.

#### **Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**

- Conducts terrorist activities worldwide, with a history of targeting Jewish individuals and institutions.

### **Financial Strategies Applied by the Identified Key Actors in Germany**

The financial strategies of antisemitic extremist groups in Germany are diverse, reflecting the range of their ideological affiliations and operational goals. These

groups employ both legal and illegal means to raise funds, which they then use to support their activities, including the dissemination of propaganda, recruitment, and sometimes violence.

## 1. Right-wing extremist Groups

### Legal Fundraising Activities<sup>187</sup>

- **Merchandise Sales:** Right-wing extremist groups generate funds through the sale of branded merchandise, including clothing, music, and literature.
- **Events and Festivals:** Music festivals, rallies, and events are organized to attract supporters and raise funds through entrance fees, donations, and sales of propaganda materials.
- **Membership Fees, Donations and Paying for Content Online:** Membership dues and private donations, often solicited through extreme-right networks and supporters, provide a steady source of funding. Some key actors offer private access or premier content via payment at video platforms like YouTube.

**Illegal Financial Activities:** key right-wing extremist actors in Germany have been involved in the trafficking of illegal drugs, forced prostitution, extortion, fraud and money laundering.<sup>188</sup> Linkages with local and transnational outlaw motorcycle gangs have been well documented.<sup>189</sup>

## 2. Left-wing Extremist Groups

### Legal Fundraising Activities<sup>190</sup>

- **Crowdfunding Campaigns:** Left-wing extremist groups use crowdfunding platforms to raise money for political campaigns, legal defenses, and protests. While much of this is legitimate, it can sometimes finance antisemitic actions disguised as political protests.
- **Donations from Support Networks:** Left-wing extremist organizations often receive donations from sympathizers, political allies, or related transnational movements.

**Illegal financial activities:** Antisemitic left-wing terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction (RAF) financed their activities mainly through bank robberies donations and received military training from Palestinian groups.<sup>191</sup> The RAF officially dissolved in 1998,<sup>192</sup> yet members tried to rob an armored security van in 2016.<sup>193</sup> Reports investigating the financing of currently active (violence-oriented) left-wing extremist groups have not been found.

### 3. Islamist Extremist Groups

#### Legal Fundraising Activities<sup>194</sup>

- **Charity Fronts and Donations:** Some Islamist groups collect money through charities that are either linked to extremist causes or are used as fronts to funnel funds to antisemitic activities. These donations often come from sympathetic individuals within Germany and abroad.
- **Community Events and Religious Institutions:** Funds raised through religious gatherings, sermons, and community events can be directed towards spreading antisemitic narratives or supporting radicalization efforts.

#### Illegal Financial Activities

Islamist groups engaged in illegal activities, such as fraud, to finance their operations.<sup>195</sup>

Linkages to organized crime are being discussed above and below in this chapter.

#### Role of Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran or other States

Both the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been implicated in supporting various extremist groups in Germany, particularly those with antisemitic ideologies.<sup>196</sup> Their support manifests through financial assistance, propaganda dissemination, and fostering ideological alignments.

#### Russian Federation

Russia has been linked to supporting right-wing extremist groups in Europe, including Germany. This includes financial assistance and the spread of disinformation through media and social media channels.<sup>197</sup> Russia has been implicated in spreading antisemitic narratives through disinformation campaigns as part of broader efforts to destabilize the European Union and sow discord within Western democracies. Russian media outlets and state-backed online platforms have been known to amplify conspiracy theories that target Jews, such as narratives about Jewish control of Western governments and financial institutions. These narratives are disseminated through social media, often targeting right-wing extremist circles in Germany to increase polarization and societal division.<sup>198</sup>

#### Islamic Republic of Iran

Organizations such as Hezbollah, the Islamic Centre Hamburg (IZH), and various cultural associations linked to Iranian influence have been involved in promoting antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments.<sup>199</sup> The IZH was banned, among other issues, for “spreading aggressive antisemitism” in and their connections to Hezbollah in July 2024.<sup>200</sup> Hezbollah was banned from operating in Germany in 2020.<sup>201</sup>

## **Governmental Actions against Antisemitism**

Several governmental bodies have been established with a mandate to combat antisemitism and foster Jewish life. These bodies operate at both the federal and the federal state levels and engage in a range of activities designed to monitor antisemitic threats, support Jewish communities, and promote public awareness about antisemitism.

Below is a selection of key governmental actions and their objectives, strategies, and activities:

### **Federal Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight Against Antisemitism**

- The Federal Commissioner is tasked with coordinating government policies and initiatives to combat antisemitism and promote Jewish life in Germany.<sup>202</sup> The Commissioner advises the government on policies to combat antisemitism, works with other government agencies and civil society organizations, and supports educational initiatives to raise awareness about antisemitism and the Holocaust. The office also engages in dialogue with Jewish communities and provides recommendations on enhancing security measures for Jewish institutions across the country.

### **Federal Strategy against Antisemitism**

- At the end of 2022, the Federal Government adopted the comprehensive National Strategy against Antisemitism and for Jewish Life.<sup>203</sup> This is the first strategy of the Federal Government that deals exclusively with combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life. It takes a holistic approach including researching, preventing and combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life as a cross-sectional task that cuts across political fields and levels. It builds on the “Cabinet Committee on Combating right-wing extremism and racism” from 2020.<sup>204</sup>

### **Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (Ämter für Verfassungsschutz)**

- Germany’s domestic intelligence agencies are tasked with monitoring threats to the constitutional order, including antisemitism.<sup>205</sup> They gather intelligence, including open-source intelligence and conduct surveillance under specific legal mandates on extremist groups that promote antisemitism. They publish annual reports on extremist activities and share findings to inform policy responses. The federal domestic intelligence agency publishes also publishes a bi-annual “Situation Report Antisemitism.”<sup>206</sup>

### **Independent Expert Group on Antisemitism (Unabhängiger Expertenkreis Antisemitismus)**

- This expert panel, appointed by the federal government, provides independent analysis and recommendations on combating antisemitism in Germany.<sup>207</sup> It plays an advisory role, informing government policies and public debates on issues related to antisemitism and Jewish life. The group conducts studies, issues reports, and makes policy recommendations on how to combat antisemitism more effectively. It works with civil society, academia, and governmental bodies to gather data, assess trends, and develop evidence-based strategies.

### **State-Level Commissioners and Task Forces**

- Many German states (Länder) have appointed their own commissioners or established task forces dedicated to combat antisemitism and promoting Jewish life within their jurisdictions.<sup>208</sup> These state bodies focus on developing tailored responses to antisemitism at the state level, engaging with local Jewish communities, supporting educational initiatives, and collaborating with law enforcement to address hate crimes. They often work in tandem with federal initiatives and contribute to nationwide efforts through information-sharing and coordinated actions.

Several states have established antisemitism commissioners at their respective public prosecutor's offices and police departments to facilitate prosecutions.<sup>209</sup>

### **Public funding of projects and initiatives**

- In 2022, a total of 649 projects and initiatives on the prevention and combating of antisemitism were funded by the federal and state governments.<sup>210</sup> Most of them focused on promoting democracy and preventing right-wing extremism. 30% (190) dealt with Islamist-motivated antisemitism, 35 projects address Israel-related antisemitism and the Middle East conflict.
- As part of the federal "Live Democracy!" funding mechanism, a competence network focusing on antisemitism has been established. Five nationwide organizations with many years of experience in antisemitism prevention, antisemitism-critical educational work and counselling work together in this network.<sup>211</sup>

### **Research into antisemitism**

- The Federal Government supports research into antisemitism. As part of the funding guideline "Current Dynamics and Challenges of antisemitism", a total of around 12 million euros will be available for research until 2025. The findings are intended to contribute to a deeper understanding and effective combating of the phenomenon.<sup>212</sup>

### **Support and criminal incident reporting websites**

- The “Hilfe-Info” (Help-Info) website allows users to report a crime or to find various kinds of support (e.g. psychological or financial).<sup>213</sup>

### **Non-Governmental Bodies with a Mandate to Foster Jewish Life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

A significant number of NGOs are dedicated to combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life. These organizations play a vital role by working in close cooperation with governmental bodies, civil society, and transnational partners to promote tolerance, provide education, and offer support to affected communities. For example:

#### **Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland)**

- The Central Council is the main representative body of Jewish communities in Germany.<sup>214</sup> Its primary aim is to advocate for the interests and safety of Jewish citizens, combat antisemitism, and promote Jewish life and culture in Germany. The Council engages in political advocacy, works with governmental agencies on security measures for Jewish institutions, and offers educational initiatives on Jewish history, culture, and religious practices. It also organizes interfaith dialogue events and serves as a voice for the Jewish community on matters related to antisemitism and discrimination.

#### **Research and Information Center Antisemitism Berlin (RIAS)**

- RIAS documents antisemitic incidents in Berlin and beyond, providing data and analysis to raise public awareness and inform policy responses.<sup>215</sup> RIAS offers a reporting hotline for individuals to report antisemitic incidents, which are then analyzed and compiled into reports that inform government bodies and public discourse. The organization conducts research to better understand trends in antisemitism and hosts educational workshops to empower civil society to confront antisemitic hate.

#### **Amadeu Antonio Foundation**

- This foundation was established to promote a democratic civil society and combat racism, antisemitism, and other forms of discrimination.<sup>216</sup> The foundation runs various educational campaigns and programs to raise awareness about antisemitism, including workshops for schools and community groups. It monitors and documents antisemitic incidents, providing support to victims and advocating for stronger policies against hate crimes. The foundation also focuses on countering online hate speech and disinformation.

#### **Jewish Forum for Democracy and Against Antisemitism (JFDA)**

- The JFDA aims to combat antisemitism and promote democracy through public education and advocacy.<sup>217</sup> This organization provides training sessions on antisemitism for educators and civil servants, engages in public awareness campaigns, and collaborates with other NGOs to promote tolerance.

JFDA also documents antisemitic incidents and contributes to national and transnational policy discussions on combating hate.

### **Inspiring Practices to Foster Jewish Life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

Below is a selection of notable examples of helpful practices for combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life in Germany.

#### **- Holocaust Education and Commemoration Initiatives**

- Holocaust education is mandatory in German schools, ensuring that every student learns about the atrocities committed during the Nazi era.<sup>218</sup> The curricula include visits to concentration camp memorials and historical museums.

#### **- Security Measures for Jewish Institutions**

- The German government allocates significant resources to protect Jewish synagogues, schools, and community centers.<sup>219</sup> This includes funding for security infrastructure such as surveillance cameras, guards, and protective barriers. Jewish organizations, such as the Central Council of Jews in Germany, collaborate closely with the police and local authorities to implement and oversee security measures.

#### **- Interfaith Dialogue Programs**

- Organizations such as the Jewish Forum for Democracy and Against Antisemitism (JFDA) organize interfaith workshops and events to build connections between diverse communities.<sup>220</sup>

#### **- Promoting Jewish Culture and Heritage**

- Government support for Jewish cultural events and institutions, such as the Jewish Museum Berlin, helps showcase the rich history and contemporary life of Jews in Germany.<sup>221</sup> Jewish community organizations hold festivals, public lectures, and cultural days to promote Jewish life and traditions.

#### **- Policy statements**

- On November 7, 2024, the German Bundestag passed the legally non-binding resolution "Never Again is Now: Protecting, Preserving and Strengthening Jewish Life in Germany."<sup>222</sup> There, government bodies on all levels are asked to develop (budgetary) measures to ensure that no projects with antisemitic aims are being funded. In 2019, the Bundestag had passed a similar resolution confronting the BDS movement, also asking all government bodies to not financially support organizations that question Israel's right to exist.<sup>223</sup>

## Hungary

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### *Bulcsú Hunyadi*

#### Legal and Statistical Country Context

In Government Decision 1039/2019, the Hungarian government adopted the promotion of the application of the International Holocaust Remembrance Association's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in 2019.<sup>224</sup> The National Strategy Against Antisemitism, which is a report on the current situation, was adopted in 2024, and supports and encourages local governments, institutions, and social and sports organizations to adopt and apply the IHRA working definition.<sup>225</sup>

Hate speech is regulated by four sections of the Hungarian Criminal Code<sup>226</sup>:

1. Incitement Against a Community (Article 332), with a distinction between incitement to hatred and incitement to violence (although the definitions within the legislation are unclear<sup>227</sup>);
2. Open Denial of Nazi Crimes and Communist Crimes (Article 333);
3. Blasphemy of National Symbol (not relevant in this particular context) (Article 334);
4. Use of Symbols of Totalitarianism (Article 335).

Hate crimes are regulated by Article 216 of the Hungarian Criminal Code: Violence against a member of a community (*sui generis provision*). A so-called base or malicious motive is a qualifying circumstance in the case of homicide, assault, violation of personal freedom, defamation, unlawful detention, and insulting a subordinate. This comprises crimes based on bias, including acts motivated by racial hatred.<sup>228</sup>

Police collect data on hate speech and hate crimes, but there is no publicly available data disaggregated by minority groups. All cases are combined under general categories.<sup>229</sup> In 2018, fields for motivation based on bias and protected characteristic were added, yet categorizing hate crimes remains at the respective authorities' discretion. If bias isn't recognized or the perpetrator is unknown, hate crimes may go unrecorded.<sup>230</sup> Aggregated protected characteristics, such as 'religion,' prevent insights into the specific background of the recorded crimes. But even this aggregated data is only available through Freedom of Information requests. Protocols<sup>231</sup> and training for law enforcement on hate crime detection exist.<sup>232</sup> Since 2013, the

Action and Protection Foundation/Brussels Institute (TEV), collects data on antisemitic incidents based on the OSCE/ODIHR definition, including data from social media and citizen reports.<sup>233</sup>

*Police data on religiously motivated hate crimes in Hungary between 2019 and 2023. Source: Hungarian National Police Headquarters, obtained by the Working Group Against Hate Crimes through a Freedom of Information request:*

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Violence Against a Member of a Community</b>	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Open Denial of Nazi Crimes and Communist Crimes</b>	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Homicide</b>	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

*Data on antisemitic hate crimes and hate incidents in Hungary between 2015 and 2023. Source: Annual reports, Action and Protection League (TEV):234*

Year	Attack	Vandalism	Threat	Hate speech	Discrimination	Total
2015	2	5	2	43	0	52
2016	0	10	1	37	0	48
2017	0	13	0	24	0	37
2018	3	10	0	19	0	32
2019	1	6	1	27	0	35
2020	0	6	1	22	1	30
2021	1	5	2	29	0	37
2022	1	12	4	25	3	45
2023	1	26	19	82	0	128

A 2021 poll of 16 European countries found Hungary to be the third most anti-Semitic country after Poland and Greece, with 42% of its population moderately or strongly antisemitic and 17% latently antisemitic.<sup>235</sup> However, both Hungarian police and TEV data support the general perception<sup>236</sup> that antisemitism in Hungary is primarily verbal, with 95% of incidents being hate speech or vandalism, and only few physical attacks since 2013. The 2024 report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) also notes that 94% of Hungarian Jews encounter antisemitism, mainly online, with physical violence being a relatively rare occurrence.<sup>237</sup> Experts caution that while violence is low, underlying antisemitic sentiments remain strong, warn-

ing of a potential surge.<sup>238</sup> Despite Hungary's general reputation for being a safe country for Jews, widespread xenophobic and racist narratives foster insecurity within the Jewish community.<sup>239</sup>

TEV's broader data collection and authorities' misclassification contribute to discrepancies.<sup>240</sup> Low trust in law enforcement leads to high latency. A 2017 survey found that many Jewish victims of antisemitic incidents do not press charges.<sup>241</sup>

### **Developments since October 7, 2023**

On 13 October 2023, Prime Minister Orbán stated Hungary would ban pro-terrorist demonstrations, citing security concerns. Police subsequently banned expressions of solidarity with Palestine, including peace demonstrations<sup>242</sup>, which was later upheld by the courts.<sup>243</sup> 2024 data on antisemitic hate crimes is not yet available.

### **Key Antisemitic Narratives**

The main antisemitic narratives prevalent in Hungary include conspiracy theories, traditional antisemitic prejudices, Holocaust denial, and religious anti-Judaism,<sup>244</sup> appealing differently across groups. Holocaust denial is common on the far right, while conspiratorial and Israel-related antisemitism are more widespread.<sup>245</sup>

Key conspiracy narratives<sup>246</sup> allege a secret Jewish influence over Hungary, politics, finance, global institutions, and the media, or claim that Jews have an agenda to weaken nation-states and the white Christian West.<sup>247</sup> Common themes include Freemasonry, George Soros, the Bilderberg Group, the Rothschilds, the World Economic Forum, WHO, "Judeo-Communism,"<sup>248</sup> and "Judeo-Liberalism." Historical traumas<sup>249</sup> like the "stab-in-the-back" myth from the 1920s fuel such beliefs,<sup>250</sup> alongside conspiracies about migration, COVID-19,<sup>251</sup> and Ukraine (e.g., Zelenskyy's Jewish heritage, the Great Replacement<sup>252</sup>, the New World Order<sup>253</sup>, or the Great Reset<sup>254</sup> theories)<sup>255</sup>, as well as claims that Jews/Israel aim to "occupy" Hungary or turn it into a "second Palestine."<sup>256</sup> Narratives claim Jews use minorities, like Roma ("biological weapons"<sup>257</sup>) or LGBTQ people ("homopropagandists"<sup>258</sup>) to gain control. Anti-elite and anti-globalist theories, e.g. about "evil Brussels" or reptilians, also reinforce antisemitism.<sup>259</sup>

*The ratio of Hungarians who agree or neither agree nor disagree with statements measuring conspiratorial antisemitism. Source: Kovács, Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”, 2021:260*

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world	21%	18%	20%	15%	11%	15%
Jews have too much influence in this country	17%	21%	22%	20%	14%	7%

Classic prejudices depict Jews as evil, greedy, deceitful, disloyal, and “alien.”<sup>261</sup>

*The ratio of Hungarians who agree or neither agree nor disagree with statements relating to classic prejudices. Source: Kovács, Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”, 2021:262*

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
It’s always better to be a little cautious with Jews	19%	20%	24%	18%	14%	5%
Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals	13%	14%	27%	19%	15%	12%
The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population	15%	18%	25%	21%	12%	10%
Jews will never be able to fully integrate into the society	14%	16%	22%	20%	21%	6%

Israel-related antisemitism has surged since October 7<sup>263</sup>, delegitimizing Israel as a Nazi, apartheid, terrorist, or colonialist state, distorting Hamas attacks, alleging Israeli genocide, and blaming Jews for Israel’s actions.

*The ratio of Hungarians who agree or neither agree nor disagree with statements measuring antisemitic hostility against Israel. Source: Kovács, Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”, 2021:264*

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
When I think of Israel’s politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews	11%	15%	27%	17%	11%	18%
Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians	14%	17%	26%	16%	8%	19%
The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel	9%	15%	28%	14%	8%	25%
Because of Israel’s politics, I dislike Jews more and more	8%	13%	24%	23%	20%	14%

Holocaust narratives, including denial, distortion, blaming Jews, or positive assessments, are prevalent but less visible.<sup>265</sup>

*The ratio of Hungarians who agree or neither agree nor disagree with statements measuring secondary antisemitism. Source: Kovács, Fischer, “Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe”, 2021:266*

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed	9%	12%	20%	18%	23%	18%
Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later	6%	10%	20%	22%	34%	8%
Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them	14%	17%	22%	18%	20%	9%

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda	19%	19%	23%	19%	14%	5%
Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust	20%	21%	24%	18%	10%	7%
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes	20%	19%	22%	18%	15%	7%

Religion-based narratives, like blood libel and decicide, persist but are less common.<sup>267</sup>

*The ratio of Hungarians who agree or neither agree nor disagree with statements related to religion-based antisemitism. Source: Kovács, Fischer, "Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe", 2021:268*

Statement	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews	14%	12%	24%	16%	23%	12%
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God	8%	11%	20%	18%	32%	10%

In Hungary, while antisemitic violence is rare, certain narratives can incite and justify aggression by framing Jews as an existential threat to Hungary, Europe, and white Christian civilization. This perceived threat is often expressed in conspiracy theories:

- **Physical threat:** Claims that Jews aim to displace or eliminate white Christian populations, akin to the Great Replacement theory.
- **Political threat:** Allegations of Jewish treason, ideological corruption (e.g., communism, liberalism), or oppression via political control, as seen in COVID-19 and New World Order conspiracies.

- **Cultural threat:** Beliefs that Jews oppose Christianity and promote “deviant” ideas, undermining traditional values and “normality”.
- **Economic threat:** Fears of Jewish attempts to dominate Hungarian/World economy.
- **Personal and social threat:** Jews are portrayed as “alien”, evil and disloyal.

While it’s mainly the far right that uses these narratives, claiming to defend the “white race”, the government’s anti-immigration, anti-establishment and anti-Western rhetoric also plays on these sentiments, despite its official zero-tolerance policy towards antisemitism announced in 2013.<sup>269</sup>

At a recent protest, a far-right leader claimed “extreme liberals” were importing “human garbage” from Asia and Africa to eradicate the European white race and Christian civilization.<sup>270</sup> Online comments echo these sentiments: “The Jewish com-mies want the end of the white man,” and Jews allegedly “unleashed this man-eating horde” “to wipe out (...) Western Europe.”<sup>271</sup>

### Justifications of Violence through Antisemitic Narratives

The Hungarian far right echoes some Israel-focused, left-wing antisemitic narratives, as seen on far-right sites like Szent Korona Rádió and kuruc.info, where terms like “genocide” surged after October 7, 2023.<sup>272</sup> Right-wing antisemitic criticism of Israel is rooted in anti-Jewish racism, traditional prejudices, Holocaust denial, and religious anti-Judaism, while left-wing antisemitism towards Israel centers on alleged exploitation and solidarity with the oppressed. Conspiracy theories about Jewish domination can play into left-wing themes of oppression.

Three young men, aged 21,<sup>273</sup> 23<sup>274</sup>, and a minor<sup>275</sup>, all radicalized online, have been arrested in the last three years for preparing a terrorist act and supporting the Islamic State (ISIS). The 23-year-old even seemed to have “administrator access” to an ISIS propaganda channel. A 16-year-old, who was particularly interested in Hitler and Nazism, but at the same time viewed videos linked to ISIS, was arrested in October 2022 for planning to massacre his Jewish, black, Asian and Roma classmates.<sup>276</sup>

### Extremist Collaborations Across Ideologies

Although the presence of Islamist actors is rare in Hungary, some Islamist antisemitic narratives, like Holocaust denial, conspiracy theories of Jewish global influence and alleged Israeli-Western alliance to oppress peoples, mirror far-right themes. Both ideologies focus on Jews, equate them with Israel, and use anti-Israel rhetoric as a cover for antisemitism. Left-wing and Islamist narratives criticize Israel’s treatment

of Palestinians, viewing it as illegitimate and oppressive, tied to U.S. support, which they say justifies Hamas's terrorist actions.

### **Variations and Common Themes of Antisemitic Narratives across different Extremist Ideologies**

In Hungary, the far right is the primary source of antisemitic narratives,<sup>277</sup> driven by fears of national and white racial extinction and alleged Jewish control. Rooted in anti-Jewish racism and traditional stereotypes, Holocaust denial, and religious antisemitism, these views often invoke the supposed political, economic, and cultural dominance of Jews. By adopting left-wing Israel-critical narratives, the far-right uses the current conflict to incite hate against Jews, blaming them for Israel's actions. Left-wing antisemitism, though less prominent, centers on criticism of Israel's treatment of Palestinians, often framing it as oppression, colonization or genocide, which for some justifies Hamas' terror. Interviewees differed on the extent and even existence of left-wing antisemitism in Hungary, with some seeing only criticism of Israel without crossing the line into antisemitism.<sup>278</sup> All contacts interviewed for this report agreed that left-wing criticism of Israel in Hungary is less severe than in Western Europe.<sup>279</sup>

### **The Role of Antisemitic Narratives in Recruitment**

Antisemitism is not central to far-right recruitment in Hungary, but coded language (e.g., "pig-headed lords," "globalist-capitalist super-rich") and conspiracy theories play a key role, reinforcing recruits' racial biases<sup>280</sup> and anti-Jewish prejudices by exploiting economic and social grievances.<sup>281</sup>

Under the slogan "revolt against the modern world",<sup>282</sup> far-right groups claim to defend "normality" (nation, race, Christianity, traditions) against modernity's "threats" (immigration, globalism, "LGBTQP lobby"), often implying hidden Jewish influence. This is reflected in the slogan of Legio Hungaria, a leading group: "Sport is always defense of the homeland".<sup>283</sup>

Left-wing and Islamist extremism are marginal in Hungary. Left-wing antisemitic narratives lack traction due to the population's pro-Israel stance, evidenced by 73% saying in October 2023 that Israel is fighting a legitimate battle of self-defense against attacks<sup>284</sup>, the government's zero-tolerance policy, its vocal support for Israel and bans on pro-Palestinian demonstrations. Another factor may be the government's propaganda machine, which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to stigmatize and defame those who dissent from the government line. This combination may discourage any form of questioning of the government's policy towards Israel or

criticism of Israel, even if not in an antisemitic way, for fear of being stigmatized as an antisemite.

## The Dissemination of Antisemitic Narratives

To defend “normality” and fight against “modernity”, both of which include elements that are codes for antisemitic sentiments, like the white race, Christianity, and globalism, far-right extremists call for the training of body and mind.<sup>285</sup>

Key offline activities to disseminate antisemitic narratives include:

- Physical exercise, combat sports, military training, historical hikes<sup>286</sup>
- Rallies and meetings, especially with symbolic figures and international partners, the biggest of which is the annual Day of Honor rally<sup>287</sup>
- Lectures, discussions, book presentations for ideological education and guidance
- Camps, either closed to members or open, mainly for children and youth
- Cultural events like festivals, traditional fairs, concerts
- Books, print magazines<sup>288</sup>
- Stickers, graffiti



*“Stinking Jew” graffiti on a government billboard depicting George Soros in 2017.<sup>289</sup>*

The primary platform for antisemitic narratives is the online sphere, including social media platforms.<sup>290</sup> far-right news portals,<sup>291</sup> vlogs and podcasts,<sup>292</sup> and gaming platforms.<sup>293</sup> The most popular are László Toroczkai’s videos, where the president of the Our Homeland party explains political issues through sensationalism and conspiracy theories, reaching hundreds of thousands.<sup>294</sup>

Cover image of László Toroczka's video entitled "One hand in control of the new (Covid) world order?"<sup>295</sup>



Since 7 October 2023, left-wing groups, foreign students and Palestinians in Hungary have organized or attempted five protests (three banned, two occurred), and disrupted an Israel conference,<sup>296</sup> with "Free Palestine" and accusations of genocide against Israel as common themes.

### Antisemitic Key Actors

The primary antisemitic actors in Hungary are far-right actors,<sup>297</sup> like the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM), Legio Hungaria (LH), Army of Outlaws (BS), Hungarian Self-Defense Movement (MÖM), and the Our Homeland Movement Party (MHM).<sup>298</sup> These groups emerged since the 2000s and draw on nationalist and fascist ideologies. HVIM has around 1,000 members,<sup>299</sup> advocates for traditionalism and "militant Christianity," and rejects the "equality of races" and the "world-dominating aspirations of Jewry."<sup>300</sup> LH, also with about 1,000 members<sup>301</sup>, emphasizes physical combat and Nazi-influenced ideas, like white supremacy. Although LH is not considered an Active Club<sup>302</sup> (AC) by the AC network,<sup>303</sup> it resembles many elements of ACs and is "the closest in Hungary"<sup>304</sup> to the AC's "3.0" strategy.<sup>305</sup> As the Pennsylvania AC put it: LH "is leading the way for nationalism 3.0 in Hungary and they fully embody the active club lifestyle".<sup>306</sup> Similar in ideology, BS, with about 400 members,<sup>307</sup> focuses on physical training and intimidation of the Roma in particular, while MÖM, with a few hundred members,<sup>308</sup> centers on social activism and intimidation. MHM, represented both in the Hungarian and European parliament, focuses on anti-minority and anti-establishment and anti-West rhetoric, centered

around conspiracy theories. Other actors include individuals, smaller groups, bands, music labels, clothing brands, far-right religious actors, mainly active on Telegram.

Left-wing antisemitic actors include only a few small and marginal groups, like the Hungarian Anarchist Community<sup>309</sup> or Varjú Kollektíva,<sup>310</sup> and the Communist Fáklya Mozgalom.<sup>311</sup> While there is no sign of Islamist actors in the public sphere, one expert interviewed believes that some of an Islamist nature may be present.<sup>312</sup>

Although not Islamist, Muslim or Islam-related antisemitic actors are present through Palestinians living in Hungary and pro-Palestinian foreigners studying in Hungary.

Although not extremist, conspiracy theory platforms, like Hihetetlen Magazin, Rejtélyek Szigete, and Titkok Szigete, greatly contribute to the spread of antisemitic narratives.<sup>313</sup>

The Hungarian government adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards antisemitism, yet its anti-Western, anti-Brussels, anti-immigration, and anti-LGBTQ rhetoric, based on conspiracy narratives, echoes antisemitic narratives.<sup>314315</sup> For example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly mentioned the central element of the Great Replacement Theory, the “population exchange,” which, according to him, “is taking place in Europe partly so that speculators like George Soros can make a lot of money by destroying the continent”.<sup>316</sup> In 2022, he said, “Part of the picture of the coming decade of war is the renewed wave of suicide in the Western world. I see the great European population exchange program, which seeks to replace the missing European Christian children with adults and migrants from other civilizations, as one such suicide attempt.”<sup>317</sup> In 2023, he said that “the leadership we have in Brussels is doing the bidding of a globalist elite.”<sup>318</sup> Furthermore, the government’s hostile rhetoric towards political opponents and critics, NGOs, “Brussels”, minority groups, especially LGBTIQ+ people, migrants, and asylum seekers, creates a climate of intolerance, which indirectly fuels antisemitism, which cannot be separated from prejudice and xenophobia in general.<sup>319</sup>

All key far-right actors identified promote the idea of an existential threat to Hungary and European white, Christian civilization posed by “globalist elites,” often using coded antisemitic language. They avoid direct antisemitic speech but employ narratives like the Great Replacement and New World Order theories. In an October 2024 vlog, HVIM co-leader Gábor Barcsa-Turner rejected “Jewish world domination,” and György Budaházy, a senior activist, approved of Israel’s existence, because “it’s much better than living scattered around everyone else’s neck.”<sup>320</sup> At an anti-migrant rally, BS leader Tyirityán described migration as a “military operation” aiming to “eradicate the European race.”<sup>321</sup>

Left-wing groups, such as the Fáklya movement, label Israel as imperialist and colonialist, accusing it of genocide and “ethnic cleansing” and claiming Hamas attacks aimed at “liberation.”<sup>322</sup> The anarchist Varjú Kollektíva similarly terms Israel’s actions as apartheid and genocide, comparing the situation in Gaza to the Holocaust.<sup>323</sup>

### **Extremist Collaborations Across Ideologies**

Far-right groups spreading antisemitic narratives in Hungary show strong cooperation despite some differences in ideology, goals, and tactics. The main driver of their alliance is national, racial and cultural self-defense, which clearly builds on antisemitism, as they view Jews as orchestrators of perceived threats. Commemorations of Nazi or Hungarian events and personalities provide collaboration opportunities, often involving Holocaust denial or distortion.

There is no collaboration between Hungary’s far right, left-wing, and Islamist milieus due to mutual hostility.<sup>324</sup> The far right fiercely oppose Muslim immigration, making Islamist cooperation unlikely. However, the recent conflict in Gaza has intensified antisemitic narratives across the far right, echoing left-wing criticisms of Israel.<sup>325</sup> Additionally, left-wing antisemitic actors and Palestinian groups, like the Association of Palestinians Living in Hungary, have coordinated events, as seen in the Varjú Kollektíva demonstration in February 2024.<sup>326</sup>

### **Financial Strategies Applied by the Identified Key Actors**

Currently, no recent investigative research details the finances of far-right groups in Hungary.<sup>327</sup> A 2014 investigation by atlatzo.hu<sup>328</sup> revealed that a network of NGOs around the then far-right Jobbik party, including HVIM, received funds from public sources, including municipalities, state media and parliament, as well as business enterprises, without publishing financial statements. Jobbik supported HVIM through various channels. Since Jobbik moved away from the far right, the Our Homeland Party, represented in the Hungarian and European parliaments, is now likely a primary funder, cooperating closely with most far-right organizations.

Funding sources for these groups allegedly<sup>329</sup> include leaders’ personal incomes (e.g., as entrepreneurs, personal trainers, security guards), membership fees, subscription fees, advertising, nationalist merchandise sales,<sup>330</sup> event participation fees, fundraising, income from associated businesses (e.g., clothing brands, music labels, publishing houses), and personal income tax donation.<sup>331</sup> In some cases, state funding can even play a role, as was the case with a far-right festival in 2019, whose support was withdrawn after the news broke.<sup>332</sup> Expenses focus on communications (e.g., creating and publishing content), event organization (e.g., camps, hiking tours, discussions), travel, uniforms, venue rental, court fees and fines.

## The Transnational Dimension of Key Antisemitic Actors

Since the early 1990s, Hungarian far-right groups have established ties with international neo-Nazi movements, evidenced by foreign participation in Hungary's annual Day of Honor rallies. These ties intensified after 2015, with immigration perceived as a threat to white, Christian Europe, uniting far-right groups across the West, even in countries that have historical rivalries with Hungary such as Ukraine. Cooperation centered on opposition to immigration formalized in 2019 in Bulgaria through the Fortress Europe Alliance.<sup>333</sup>

Commemorating Nazi events and figures, such as rallies in Budapest, Sofia (Lukov March), and Dresden (commemorating the Allied bombing), or Hungarian organizations' participation in the annual Polish Independence March<sup>334</sup> further strengthens these ties. Sports, e.g., hiking, work-out, mixed martial arts (MMA) tournaments, like the European Fight Night, also serve as international platforms for cooperation. Other important platforms include meetings and conferences, training camps, concerts and festivals, and joint statements.

Our Homeland party, represented in the European Parliament, and Legio Hungaria are particularly active, linking with far-right groups in various countries<sup>335</sup>.

Left-wing antisemitic actors participate in international cooperation to a lesser degree.<sup>336</sup>

Shared antisemitic narratives connecting right-wing groups internationally include the "Great Replacement" and "New World Order" theories, portraying immigration and globalist elite control as existential threats orchestrated by Jews. These narratives call for defending "white, Christian civilization" against perceived enemies like immigrants, LGBTQI "ideology," and liberal elites. This seems to have gained new momentum after October 7, 2023.<sup>337</sup>

At a closed-door Day of Honor event in 2019, Marceau Allouis from France's Front de Défense blamed "international Jewry" for orchestrating immigration and police brutality against Yellow Vest protesters. A Hungarian speaker from the Magyarok Nemzeti Mozgalom warned of the "dark tide unleashed by the Zionist plot" threatening "white Europe."<sup>338</sup> During the event in 2020, a speaker from Die Rechte referenced Jewish surnames like Rothschild and Goldman and Sachs, implying Jewish control, and praised Hitler as the "greatest German statesman."<sup>339</sup>

Left-wing antisemitic narratives that have international traction focus on Israel's alleged genocide and oppression of Palestinians, viewing Israel as a colonialist, apartheid state.

## Role of Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran or other States

The Kremlin significantly influences European far-right groups to destabilize the EU and NATO. Hungarian groups like Legio Hungaria maintain ties with organizations linked to the Russian Imperialist Movement (RIM), including the Nordic Resistance Movement, Germany's Der III. Weg, and Bulgaria's National Union.<sup>340</sup>

Russia also supports Hungary's far-right through disinformation campaigns. Key far-right sites and Telegram channels disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives, often from Kremlin-organized sources, often promoting conspiracy theories about immigration.

An EU investigation into the news portal Voice of Europe revealed Russian influence in the Budapest-based Visegrad Post (VP), likely funded by Russia. VP's founder, Ferenc Almássy, and contributor Nicolas de Lamberterie, both based in Budapest and with ties to Our Homeland Party politicians, frequently appeared as experts in government-organized media.<sup>341</sup> Almássy, also a regular contributor to the weekly Demokrata, interviewed French far-right heavyweights like Jean-Marie Le Pen<sup>342</sup>, Marine Le Pen<sup>343</sup>, Marion Maréchal<sup>344</sup> and Éric Zemmour<sup>345</sup>, framing French politics from a far-right perspective.

The Kremlin's "active measures" strategy often supports fringe movements that align with its goals to destabilize the West.<sup>346</sup> The further an organization is from mainstream politics, the easier it is for Russia to influence it.<sup>347</sup> The Hungarian far right shares ideological values (e.g., ultra-conservatism, anti-liberalism, nationalism) and geopolitical positions (e.g., anti-US, anti-EU, anti-NATO) with the Kremlin, making it receptive to Kremlin narratives.<sup>348</sup> Distrust of Western media also leads many in the far right to deliberately spread pro-Kremlin content.<sup>349</sup>

Russian influence attempts on Hungarian far-right groups began as early as the mid-1990s and strengthened post-2010.<sup>350</sup> A 2017 Political Capital study revealed connections between almost all Hungarian far-right paramilitary groups and Russia. The most evident example was the now disbanded Hungarian National Front (MNA) that had connections with Russian military intelligence.<sup>351</sup> Additionally, far-right media, including kuruc.info and Szent Korona Rádió, adopted pro-Kremlin narratives, with some sites hosted on Russian servers.<sup>352</sup> MNA's former website, Hidfo.ru, even implemented active measures.<sup>353</sup>

Nevertheless, the most prominent case was the former far-right party Jobbik's close Kremlin ties, exemplified by party members observing "referendums" in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,<sup>354</sup> and former MEP Béla Kovács being convicted of espionage for Russia.<sup>355</sup> Jobbik's ties to Russia also included financial assistance in its early years.<sup>356</sup>

Although currently unproven, past Russian ties and support, coupled with EU-wide reports of Russian links to far-right groups, suggest it remains possible in Hungary. This is supported by connections between Hungarian groups and Russia-linked foreign actors like James Dowson and Nick Griffin (Knights Templar International)<sup>357</sup>, the Nordic Resistance Movement and Der III. Weg <sup>358</sup>.

Jobbik also forged ties with Iran in the 2000s due to shared anti-American and anti-Israel stances, supported by personal networks of Jobbik politicians and Iranian-born Hungarian businessmen. Institutional ties were established after Jobbik entered the Hungarian parliament in 2010 with visits and support for Iran's nuclear program, but no confirmed financial support.<sup>359</sup> However, the 2015 migration crisis and Jobbik's shift to moderate conservatism led to the distancing from Iran. While some far-right figures still align with Iran's anti-Israel and anti-US views, no formal ties remain.

### **Governmental Actions against Antisemitism**

In Hungary, no specific government body addresses antisemitism or Jewish life directly,<sup>360</sup> though "Jewish affairs" fall under Vince Szalay-Bobrovniczky, Deputy State Secretary for Civil and Social Relations at the Prime Minister's Office. The state recognizes Jews as a religious minority, working primarily with the three established Jewish religious institutions, which receive most Jewish community funding, even though the majority of Hungarian Jews are not religious.

In 2013, the government declared a zero-tolerance policy towards antisemitism,<sup>361</sup> and a 2019 government decision, endorsing the IHRA antisemitism definition, considered promoting Jewish history and traditions a priority for reducing antisemitism.<sup>362</sup> The 2024 National Strategy against Antisemitism, which is more a descriptive report of the current situation than a strategic document, addresses law enforcement, Jewish religious and civil organizations, cultural initiatives, education, and Holocaust remembrance.<sup>363</sup>

Besides subsidies to religious institutions, which include compensation, like perpetual allowances, and support for public functions, state funding for Jewish NGOs, cultural events, museums, religious tourism, and renovation of cultural heritage and community sites is overseen by Jewish umbrella organizations.<sup>364</sup> Jewish culture is included in education as part of Hungarian and European history.<sup>365</sup>

However, an interviewee noted a lack of comprehensive government approach against antisemitism, as the current one focuses primarily on law enforcement and has little emphasis on the educational, cultural, social and political fields, and low support for the non-religious Jewish civil society.<sup>366</sup> Major cultural events

alone may not be effective in combating antisemitism and even risk reinforcing Jews' perceived "otherness" and privileged status, if not embedded in a broader, integrated approach.

### **Non-Governmental Bodies with a Mandate to Foster Jewish Life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

The three main Jewish religious institutions are the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ, Neology), the Hungarian Unified Jewish Congregation (EMIH, Status Quo Ante), which is close to the government, and the Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Community of Hungary (MAOIH, Orthodox), with two smaller progressive communities, Sim Shalom and Bet Orim, and the Hungarian Jewish Prayer Association (ZSIMA). In 2023, MAZSIHISZ had the most personal-income-tax donors<sup>367</sup> (12,629), five times more than EMIH.<sup>368</sup>

Jewish civil society groups focus on youth programs,<sup>369</sup> Holocaust remembrance,<sup>370</sup> culture,<sup>371</sup> and education.<sup>372</sup> The Jewish Community Forum Association connects 20 Jewish NGOs, while the Action and Protection Foundation (TEV), founded by EMIH, emphasizes education, research, and legal advocacy. In 2023, key Jewish organizations received HUF 1,079.5 million, with half allocated to TEV alone. The Hungarian Jewish Heritage Public Foundation (MAZSÖK) manages HUF 200 million in annual grants for Jewish life, but funding is limited, the application process complex, selection focuses on administration over social impact, and the decision-making body is dominated by the main Jewish organization.<sup>373</sup>

Funding from the state creates dependencies, influencing Jewish organizations' autonomy.<sup>374</sup> Non-Jewish pro-Jewish groups include Faith Church<sup>375</sup> and the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship.<sup>376</sup> Non-Jewish civil organizations fighting antisemitism consist mainly of anti-racist and human rights groups.

### **Inspiring Practices to Foster Jewish life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

Good practices include increasing openness and critical thinking, enhancing relations and mutual understanding between Jews and non-Jews, and strengthening Jewish community and identity.<sup>377</sup> Educational initiatives are essential, with organizations like the Haver Foundation helping to establish connections and present Jews as integral to Hungarian society rather than solely Holocaust victims.<sup>378</sup>

Another potentially effective approach is historian Krisztián Ungváry's 2021 counter-narrative project,<sup>379</sup> which counters extremist views of the effort of Nazi German and Hungarian troops to break out of Soviet-besieged Budapest in February 1945 by providing accurate historical perspectives.<sup>380</sup> Renovating Jewish memorial sites

with government funding supports Jewish culture, though this should be part of a broader strategy.<sup>381</sup>

According to one interviewee, the government's zero-tolerance policy has reduced overt antisemitism, especially by public figures (e.g. politicians, activists) through stronger law enforcement, because potential perpetrators are almost certain to be convicted. This is particularly also true for Holocaust denial. According to the interviewee, even "metaphorical" antisemitism has begun to be convicted through the involvement of linguists.<sup>382</sup> However, some interviewees questioned the effectiveness of banning, arguing that it only hides the problem, and called for a more comprehensive approach. Indeed, research shows that overt antisemitism by average users on Facebook and in online comment sections is still widespread.<sup>383</sup>

Jewish organization's participation in drafting the National Core Curriculum ensured better representation of Jewish coexistence, history and culture in 2012.<sup>384</sup> However, support for this approach reportedly decreased during the 2020 curriculum revision, as evidenced by the rejection of Jewish organizations' involvement, although no Jewish content was removed from the curriculum.<sup>385</sup>

## Poland

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### *Jakub Woroncow and Jacek Purski*

Between 2013-2023, Poland's political system saw a shift of governance by the Civic Platform and Polish People's Party to eight years under the Law and Justice (PiS) party (2015 to 2023), and then to the coalition government formed in 2023 by former governors of the Left and Polska 2050 parties. The rise of the far-right is a phenomenon characteristic of the second decade of Polish political life after 2010.

Antisemitism and racism in general are an integral part of the country's traditional political discourse. These phenomena used to be ignored by the political mainstream but were weaponized in the last several electoral campaigns. Since 2010, every 11th November, what began as the All Polish Youth and National Radical Camp and later became the Ruch Narodowy Independence March, is organized in Warsaw. This event can be seen as the biggest national and international far-right gathering in Europe.<sup>386</sup>

The Jewish community in Poland is small, with 17,156 people in Poland identifying as Jewish. Of those, 9,650 identify as both Polish and Jewish. In 2020, after the Pittsburgh synagogue attack in the U.S., the Chief Rabbi of Poland said that violence against Jews in Poland belongs to the past.<sup>387</sup> Neither Jewish people nor synagogues have been subjected to direct physical violence in recent years (although the Chief Rabbi was himself attacked by a neo-fascist on 27th May 2006).<sup>388</sup> The most important acts of antisemitism, including those that received international media attention, were verbal incidents or public hate speech like the burning of an effigy of an Orthodox Jew during an anti-refugee march in 2015, and the verbal attack against Holocaust survivor Marian Turcki by Krzysztof Bosak<sup>389</sup>. Bosak had previously claimed that Turcki's statement "Do not remain indifferent when any minority is discriminated against, because the essence of democracy is that the majority governs, but democracy also means that the rights of minorities must be protected at the same time" was political and anti-governmental<sup>390</sup>.

The whole period has been characterized by the ruling party's attempts at historical revisionism,<sup>391</sup> including legal and propaganda action against Holocaust historians — especially Jan Grabowski<sup>392</sup> and Barbara Engelking.<sup>393</sup> Antisemitism is an intellectual and quasi-journalistic trend within the far-right and an element of the rhetoric used in political campaigns, alongside and akin to anti-immigrant and anti-LGBT rhetoric.

## Legal and Statistical Country Context

Poland does not have a legal definition of antisemitism, but this does not mean the law fails to address the issue. Antisemitism is recognized as a form of racism or religious discrimination, both of which are prohibited under § 119 of the Criminal Code: “Anyone who uses violence or makes an unlawful threat against a person or a group of people on the basis of national, ethnic, political, or religious grounds, or due to a lack of religious belief, is subject to imprisonment for between three months and five years”<sup>394</sup>. Poland adopted the IHRA definition in 2016, but it is recognized as a working definition, not a legal one<sup>395</sup>.

Antisemitism is prosecuted under Articles 119, 256, and 257 of the Criminal Code. Article 256 states: “Anyone who publicly promotes a fascist or other totalitarian system of government, or incites hatred based on national, ethnic, racial, or religious differences, or for being non-religious, is subject to a fine, restriction of liberty, or imprisonment for up to two years.”<sup>396</sup> Article 257 states: “Anyone who publicly insults a group of people or an individual based on national, ethnic, racial, or religious affiliation, or for being non-religious, or who breaches another individual’s personal inviolability for these reasons, is subject to imprisonment for up to three years”<sup>397</sup>. Additionally, Polish labor law prohibits ethnic and religious discrimination.

The Institute of National Remembrance is required to take action in cases of Holocaust denial and the denial of any war crimes committed by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalists, or state organs between 1944 and 1989<sup>398</sup>. However, the law does not address crimes committed by Polish military organizations during World War II and the early post-war years.

According to OSCE reports on Hate crimes, the scale of antisemitism grew in 2016-2019, but the numbers do not seem to be comprehensive. In 2020 only 13 incidents were recorded, far lower than in the preceding and proceeding years.<sup>399</sup>

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Incidents	39	50	103	78	197	136	13	89	87

The same data report records the following number of violent incidents, indicating a possible period of rising antisemitism: 1 in 2015, 3 in 2016, 2 in 2017 and 4 in 2019.

## Developments since October 7, 2023

The numbers of incidents do not show serious differences. There have been no legal developments regarding antisemitism since October 7, 2023.

## Key Antisemitic Narratives

Antisemitism exists in Poland both as a political movement and as a widely held socio-political viewpoint. Not all antisemites associate themselves with overt anti-Jewish actions, and antisemitism is also used as a political tool by groups that officially deny having antisemitic motives or agendas, claiming that antizionism is not antisemitism. Poland has a small Jewish community today but a rich history of Jewish life in its past. As Alina Cała notes, the history of World War II and the Holocaust continues to shape Polish discourse on Jews. While Poles were never deeply familiar with the volkist or national socialist ideologies, before the war, they were influenced by Catholic anti-Jewish propaganda, state propaganda, and the National Democratic movement.<sup>400</sup>

Although Nazism discredited antisemitism as a foundational political concept, this does not mean that antisemitism disappeared after the war. Prejudices remained strong, and anti-Jewish violence continued to occur, which today is a highly controversial topic that sparks attacks on scholars researching the Holocaust or Polish-Jewish history. In this context, the term “anti-Polonism” is often used to describe perceived anti-Polish sentiment. Anti-Polonism refers to actions or attitudes against Poles or Polishness, though the term is not well-defined and is frequently associated with Catholicism.<sup>401</sup>

Among the prominent narratives, we can point to the following: a belief in the existence of a secretive Jewish lobby; the perception that Jews create a negative image of Poland and Poles; the conviction that Jews do not show sufficient gratitude toward Poles; the view of Jews as foreign agents; blaming Jews for their own misfortunes; describing Jews as world rulers; calls to fight against Jewry; portraying Jewry as a source of disease and corruption; the belief that Jews profit from the suffering of others; and calls to learn from Jews.<sup>402</sup>

The long-running social campaign Stop 447 was based on the sentiment that Jews are attempting to reclaim property belonging to their ancestors, which is now held by Polish citizens or institutions<sup>403</sup>. So-called antizionism is present primarily among left-wing and right-wing radicals. In this context, Israel is depicted as a fascist state, and Zionism is portrayed as a fascist, racist, or colonialist doctrine<sup>404</sup>. While the far-right openly expresses hatred toward Jews, left-wing radicals who support an anti-Jewish agenda claim that their stance is against Zionism as a political project, not against Jews as a people or a religion.

Due to the weakness of the leftist movement in Poland, instances of left-wing and radical left-wing antisemitism have been relatively rare. However, sharp debates were sparked by articles written by Israeli and Jewish activists of the New Left, which

were published in radical left-wing magazines between 2005 and 2008.<sup>405</sup> These authors used language borrowed from Arab (and Soviet) “antizionists”, criticizing “Israel’s racist and imperialist policies” or referencing the “American-Israeli lobby”.

October 7, 2023, however, marks the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Polish antisemitism, bringing issues related to Palestine to the forefront of political discourse, where hatred is directed not only towards the Jewish-Polish diaspora but also towards Jews in Israel, and justifies itself by fighting against ‘imperialism, globalism, and colonial racism’. While the radical left is predominantly behind the street demonstrations and occupations of the universities since then, the far-right has some involvement too. Grzegorz Braun of Konfederacja doused a menorah in the Polish parliament on December 12, 2023 and attacked one member of Jewish community<sup>406</sup>. In the early hours of 1st May 2024, a neo-Nazi teenager threw a Molotov cocktail, probably the most dangerous incident.<sup>407</sup>

### **Justifications of Violence through Antisemitic Narratives**

In 2016 during the 82th anniversary of the establishment of the National Radical Camp (ONR), Jacek Międlar delivered a sermon during mass in which he said the following: “Zero tolerance for cowardice, zero tolerance for Jewish passivity leading to enslavement. Zero tolerance for Poland and Europe being consumed by malignant cancer. This cancer requires chemotherapy”<sup>408</sup>. During the march following the mass, the ONR brigade chanted “in the trees, instead of leaves, there will be Zionists hanging”.<sup>409</sup>

Piotr Rybak came to Oświęcim for the 74th anniversary of the Liberation of Auschwitz and organized a counter demonstration in which he said ‘Are we an independent country? It’s time to fight against Jewry and free Poland from it! Where are those governing this country? At the trough! And this must be changed. May God bless my homeland! Hail, Poles!’<sup>410</sup>

Anti-Jewish violence in Poland is rare, largely because the Jewish community is small and well-assimilated into society. However, Jews are still inimically targeted, not only on ethnic or religious grounds but also through conspiracy theories. Anti-Jewish hatred remains present. After the infamous menorah incident, Grzegorz Braun said, *“There can be no place for acts of racist, tribal, savage, Talmudic worship within the premises of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. As I understand it, ignorance speaks through those gathered here. You are unaware of the content and message of this act, innocently referred to as the holiday of Hanukkah”*.<sup>411</sup>

On July 18, 2021, in Głogów, during an anti-vaccine march, demonstrators wearing nationalist symbols shouted *“Today every Pole can see, Jews are behind the pandemic”*. Some participants attacked a police car, and two were arrested.<sup>412</sup>

On June 12, 2024, a group of protesters supporting an academic boycott at the University of Warsaw attacked Pałac Kazimierzowski (Casimir Palace), which houses the rector’s office. Five university security staff were beaten, one was injured, and protesters damaged windows and gutters. The protest, which started peacefully, accused the rector and the university of supporting genocide in Gaza.<sup>413</sup>

### **Variations and Common Themes of Antisemitic Narratives across different Extremist Ideologies**

Antisemitism is an integral part of far-right, neo-fascist and white supremacist rhetoric. It does not appear very often in similar form on the radical left which prefers to present its position on Israel as antizionist, anti-imperialist and anti-globalist. The Polish far-right mixes such rhetoric with nationalism, racism and Holocaust distortion or even denial, which is rejected by the far-left. It should be also noted that some groups often remain silent on historical questions like the Holocaust and in cases when the anti-Jewish rhetoric of their opponents is exposed.

Poland also sees a range of pro-Palestinian activities, the most vocal of which comes from a Polish member of the European Palestinian Council for Political Relations. In his various speeches, he spreads anti-Israel rhetoric, denies Hamas war crimes and crimes against humanity, and fuses these with more traditional Polish antisemitic narratives about Jewish claims on pre-war property and Holocaust denial. He considers European Jews to be descendants of the Khazars, who do not have the right to a homeland in Israel, and falsely claims that Israel bombs positions where Hamas hostages are kept — identifying their locations using chips under their skin.<sup>414</sup>

### **Extremist Collaborations Across Ideologies**

Protests were joined by members of various migrant communities, including individuals of Palestinian origin who operate with the pro-Hamas European Palestinian Council for Political Relations (EUPAC) and the pro-Hezbollah Global Campaign to Return to Palestine.<sup>415</sup> Members of both groups spoke at rallies in Wrocław and Krakow, visited occupations in universities, and spoke to the media about Palestinian affairs<sup>416</sup>. One of the EUPAC consultants is also a left-wing lawyer and former Polish MP<sup>417</sup>.

## **The Role of Antisemitic Narratives in Recruitment**

As former Falanga (right-wing extremist group) member explained in an interview: "I was browsing websites like 'Stop Syjonizmowi (pol. Stop Zionism)'. That Jews control the world and want to eliminate us. Then I talked about it with the guys, and we got worked up together. Some of them were completely out there. One of us claimed that Jews are poisoning the water and dropping chemicals from airplanes".<sup>418</sup> Antisemitism is often a first step toward accepting more extremist positions.

## **The Dissemination of Antisemitic Narratives**

Internet and social media have been the main tool of communication with the sympathizers by the extremist circles. Facebook profiles run by nationalists connected to the Independence March and Ruch Narodowy had numerous followers, even bigger than profiles of the parliamentary parties. They were also active on X (formerly known as Twitter). During the pandemic, the Internet became even more important. The radical right activists also ran Internet TV channels like WRealu24, EmisjaTV or Media Narodowe. Wojciech Olszański, former actor and Nationalist activist had a YouTube channel NPTV known for the possibility to contact with them via mobile phone. The Channel was known as a pathostreaming (online obscene and vulgar content) place where especially Olszański used hate speech, vulgar language and death threats<sup>419</sup>.

After October 7, 2023, due to changing trends in social media use, Instagram and Telegram that have become the main channel of social communication used by anti-Israeli activists. Campuses of universities in Warsaw, Cracov and Wrocław were occupied and the occupiers called the universities to stop any cooperation with Israeli institutions and companies. Small street protests took place in other cities too <sup>420</sup>.

Stickers and memes are one of the most popular ways to spread political positions. Marches are organized in Warsaw against Israeli military operations in Gaza<sup>421</sup> but Anti-Jewish hate speech is used by various occasions like the National Radical Camp (ONR) gatherings, Independence March, counter-actions against memorial events for the pogrom in Jedwabne in 1941 or even the day commemorating the liberation of Auschwitz.

## **Antisemitic Key Actors**

Poland has a long tradition of radical right-wing ideologies since 1989 and an even longer tradition of antisemitism that was an important part of Communist discourse after 1968<sup>422</sup>. The history of left-wing antisemitism is very short, and it was a marginal intellectual movement before 2023. Islamist extremism is a marginal trend run by individuals who do not operate in formal organizations or long-term

networks. That is why the key actors are connected almost exclusively with the far-right. Antisemitism is influenced by a number of book authors and publishers: Magna Polonia, Capital Book and 3DOM publishing house. The last one was detained for selling Holocaust denial books written by Dariusz Ratajczak.<sup>423</sup>

The most important neo-fascist groups that spread antisemitic messages in the last decade were the National Radical Camp (ONR), National Rebirth of Poland<sup>424</sup>, Camp of the Great Poland, Falanga, Niklot Association, Autonomie Nationalists<sup>425</sup> and various Neo-Nazi clandestine groups<sup>426</sup>. This milieu is less active in the last few years than it was before 2019. During the pandemic, the new Kamrat Movement appeared as an effect of the crossing of paths between marginal nationalist activists, who were active mainly as social media conspiracy theorists, and the anti-vaccine movement. The Kamrat movement is led by former actor Wojciech Olszański who supports violence, promotes a pro-Kremlin agenda and often uses anti-Jewish hate-speech. Olszański was arrested four times in two years and sentenced two times, once for the defaming of Jewish people.<sup>427</sup>

Other important figures known from street activities in the last decade are Robert Bąkiewicz, leader of the Mazovian ONR brigade between 2016 and 2018, and Roty Niepodległości who has led since 2019. Bąkiewicz was strongly involved in the Stop 447 campaign. Piotr Rybak, Jacek Międlar and Roman Zieliński were leaders of a far-right milieu in Lower Silesia known for openly antisemitic messaging, more radical than the discourse of the Independence March.<sup>428</sup>

Piotr Rybak and Jacek Międlar are active in Wrocław. Both are supported by Roman Zieliński. Rybak is a businessman and political far-right activist known for the public burning of an effigy of an Orthodox Jew and a banner on his hotel which read 'Polish House: Jews, Communists and all thieves and traitors of Poland are not welcome'.<sup>429</sup> Międlar was a catholic priest who was radicalized and became involved in nationalist activism before finally leaving the church. He is the author of the book 'My Struggle for Truth'. Zieliński (who passed away in 2020) was a nationalist, the leader of the Śląsk Wrocław football hooligan syndicate and the author of the book 'How I Fell in Love with Adolf Hitler'.

### **Financial Strategies Applied by the Identified Key Actors**

The far-right is concentrated on various issues including anti-EU, anti-LGBTQ+, anti-abortion and anti-immigrant activities in which standing against the Jewish community is not the top priority, but antisemitism is always present in the discourse, especially on occasions such as the Jedwabne pogrom anniversary.<sup>430</sup> Antisemitism and hate in general are a business that finances itself through the production and sale of book editions, newspapers and magazines.<sup>431</sup> There is no available data that

show numbers of sales, but the radical right internet bookstore Magna Polonia has 147 books for sale under the category “Jews and Judaism”.

In recent years, crowdfunding has become popular among both right-wing and left-wing radicals. Grzegorz Braun is active on the Polish crowdfunding portal zrzutka.pl<sup>432</sup> which helped him every time he was fined financially by the parliament. The media and political projects led by Robert Bąkiewicz and his followers received public funds from various state institutions and ministries under the previous government led by the law and justice party (PiS).<sup>433</sup>

The Patriotic Fund was established in 2021 at the initiative of PiS Minister of Culture, Piotr Gliński, with the purpose of supporting organizations that carried out projects promoting conservative and national values. The influx of funds began when Bąkiewicz grew closer to PiS politicians. The Independence Guards, a militia led by Bąkiewicz received 384,300 PLN to build fundraising infrastructure and an additional 299,100 PLN for “supporting volunteer activities in civic organizations.” The Independence March Association, in which Bąkiewicz was active, received a grant from the National Freedom Institute amounting to 198,172.30 PLN for the “National Media/Warsaw — civic local project”. Bąkiewicz established a new militia the National Guard in response to a call by Jarosław Kaczyński, who, during the 2020 Women’s Strike protests, urged the defense of churches<sup>434</sup>.

The Guard was registered in Otwock, in a villa purchased with funds received from the Patriotic Fund. The National Guard was awarded 1,700,000 PLN for the project “security and professionalism during the organization and conduct of patriotic and religious events — a necessary condition for preserving cultural identity.” With this money, the nationalists purchased the villa. An additional 450,000 PLN from the Patriotic Fund was granted for the modernization of the property and support for refugees<sup>435</sup>.

In 2022, the Guard received 264,000 PLN from the Prime Minister’s Office and 10,000 PLN from the National Freedom Institute to aid Ukrainian refugees. The sum awarded to the Guard was the largest grant given by the Prime Minister for assistance to Ukraine. In total, various organizations led by Bąkiewicz had received 14,000,000 PLN<sup>436</sup>.

### **The Transnational Dimension of Key Antisemitic Actors**

The Polish extremist scene became part of international networks in the 1990s and continues this tradition until today<sup>437</sup>. Cross-border connections are dominated by political and activist contacts. Polish Holocaust deniers and revisionists are marginal figures who are isolated from the international milieu. The last ten years

have seen the intensification of such contacts, but topics like the European Union, migration and LGBTQ+ rights have predominated over traditional antisemitism<sup>438</sup>. October 7, 2023, did not mobilize Polish right-wing extremists to increase their international activities. It is rather the left-wing and pro-Palestinian movement that became more active in the occupations of university campuses and street protests, reflecting global trends.

Antisemitism as a concept connects the far-right in Poland to its international contacts. There have been no strong connections between the Polish nationalist far-right with western right-wing populist parties, but there were strong ties with the British National Party, Forza Nuova, Ľudová strana — Naše Slovensko, Jobbik and HVIM.<sup>439</sup> Other grounds for their contact is the white power movement, which is antisemitic in its ideology. In such cases the message was entirely different: so-called antizionism is present in the propaganda of the Polish far-right, but less than in the rest of the western world due to the specific Polish historical context,<sup>440</sup> in which Jews were seen as part of a historical past or diaspora rather than an independent nation living in the Middle East. Contacts with pro-Hamas and pro-Hezbollah international groups are kept by individuals and Polish extremists have to cooperate with them to find any way to such networks.

The chapter of the National Rebirth of Poland (NOP) in the UK was active in protests against Shomrim, which are volunteer Jewish civilian patrols. These protests took place on 4th July 2015 and during these a London-based organizer burned an Israeli flag<sup>441</sup>. The protest was organized by the British far-right but Poles attended and caught attention. The NOP leader who was based in Poland claimed that Shomrim is illegal armed militia that causes danger to citizens and tourists and stands above the state police.<sup>442</sup>

The Polish national and post-war rhetorical tradition is being instrumentalized by the transnational pro-Palestinian movement. For many years, Gaza has been compared to the Warsaw Ghetto, but in the context of October 7, 2023, professor Haidar Eid from Al-Aksa University in Gaza compared Hamas terrorism to the Warsaw Uprising (1944),<sup>443</sup> which is an important part of Polish collective memory that affects discourse in Poland. During the 'Days of Resistance' at the occupied Jagiellonian University, an Australian activist gave a lecture about the concept of resistance in which he compared Polish and Jewish anti-Nazi resistance to the Palestinian terror group's activity<sup>444</sup>.

### **Role of Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran or other States**

In 2015 the Russian government declared support for Palestinian independence.<sup>445</sup> Pro-Kremlin circles in Poland including both populist like Konfederacja and extreme

right like Falanga, Obóz Wielkiej Polski or Kamrat Movement are anti-Jewish. Such groups are both pro-Russian and anti-Israeli Leonid Sviridov, a Russian journalist expelled from Poland and Czechia on suspicion of espionage, was responsible for arranging meetings between Polish publicists and Marija Zakharova, a spokesperson of Russian foreign ministry.<sup>446</sup> Sviridov was in contact with Grzegorz Braun.<sup>447</sup> Bartosz Bekier, the former leader of Falanga visited Russia, Syria and Iran.<sup>448</sup> In general, the pro-Kremlin far-right network of various nationalist individuals has contacts to embassy of Iran and some of its members traveled there invited by the Iranian government.<sup>449</sup>

After the Russian invasion against Ukraine in 2022, the Ukropolin and New Jerusalem conspiracy theories became popular in Poland. The first is supported by Grzegorz Braun and his followers. Both are inspired by the Judeopolonia theory. Judeopolonia, popularized as a provocation in 1981, claimed that Jews are planning to create a new state in Lublin. Ukropolin states that such a state would be Jewish-Ukrainian, while the New Jerusalem theory holds that the Jews of Israel are going to be displaced to Ukraine while some Ukrainians would be resettled in Poland.<sup>450</sup>

Braun belongs to the contact network of Leonid Sviridov, a journalist suspected of espionage activities.<sup>451</sup> Bartosz Bekier was also in contact with Sviridov and during the last years became one of the leading pro-Kremlin activists in Poland. Nabil Al-Malazi, a Polish Syrian, is also active among those networks. He establishes connections between the Polish far-right and organizations based in Syria, supports Hezbollah and cooperates with Wojciech Olszański,<sup>452</sup> In this case a businessman with contacts in the Middle East publicly supports political leader who openly calls to violence.

### **Governmental Actions against Antisemitism**

According to Polish law, law enforcement is primarily tasked with combating antisemitism. Both the police and the Prosecutor's Office are allowed to take action. The Office of the Ombudsman safeguards the freedoms and human and civil rights. The Office also monitors and takes appropriate action if it is found that a violation of the law and principles of social coexistence and social justice has occurred due to deliberate action or omission by an authority, organization, or institution obligated to observe and uphold human and civil freedoms.

In 2023 the Prime Minister established the Ministry of Equality that replaced the Government Plenipotentiary for Equality. The Ministry is obligated among others to monitor good practices and solutions of inequality and to establish working groups for various cases connected with equality and inequality.

## **Non-Governmental Bodies with a Mandate to Foster Jewish life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

The Polish Jewish community is small, and the fight against antisemitism is part of broader anti-racist and anti-discrimination activities. The Jewish Association Czulent is an independent, non-profit advocacy organization with the status of a non-governmental organization for national minorities. The association brings together experts from the Jewish community in Poland. As part of its activities, the association collaborates with national and international institutions, including those with a global reach. It is a member of the International Council of Jewish Women (ICJW), the Equal Opportunities Coalition, and ENCATE (European Network Countering Antisemitism Through Education).

## **Inspiring Practices to Foster Jewish Life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

Poland has many memorials related to the Holocaust, where many groups and individuals are active. There are many initiatives like Jewish cultural events, protection of graves and memorial sites, educational projects, visits to Auschwitz Memorial by students, anniversaries of the uprising in the Ghetto. Inspiring practices have local character but current efforts might be more successful and effective with country or Europe-wide support.

- The Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum offers educational programs to youth, schools, students, teachers, educators and even lawyers, police officers, diplomats and state officials<sup>453</sup>. It also organizes conferences and postgraduate studies.
- The Institute of Social Safety organizes training and consultancy in the areas of providing security, preventing and countering radicalization, including radicalization motivated by antisemitism<sup>454</sup>. The trainings are organized for teachers, law enforcement, security and staff in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum.
- The mission of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews is to “protect memory and create a future” which means that the museum has many educational programs for youth, seniors, immigrants, minorities, schools, kindergartens and families<sup>455</sup>.
- The Jewish Association Czulent is a leading group that combats antisemitism by monitoring antisemitism online<sup>456</sup>, analyzing experiences of victims of hate crimes<sup>457</sup> and takes action on integrating migrant minorities on a municipal level.<sup>458</sup>

## United States

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### *Joshua Fisher-Birch*

The United States, and more specifically, New York state, has the largest Jewish population outside of Israel.<sup>459</sup> Antisemitic hate crimes in the U.S. have grown significantly since 2014. Reported incidents for 2023 were 316.7% higher than in 2014, with the top three crime incidents for each year consistently being destruction/damage/vandalism of property, followed by intimidation and simple assault. For most of the early 21st century, multiple terrorist attacks and violent plots against Jews in the U.S. have come from individual white supremacist actors who have little to no direct links to established groups.<sup>460</sup>

In the late 2010s and early 2020s, several antisemitic narratives, chiefly the great replacement conspiracy theory, have been reinterpreted and shared by mainstream actors.<sup>461</sup> These modified conspiracy theories, meant to appeal to individuals who do not view themselves as antisemitic, often do not overtly mention Jews and instead substitute “Jews” with the left, “globalists,” “the elite,” etc.<sup>462</sup> Some conspiracy theories, including the great replacement narrative, have been gaining popularity among mainstream American audiences.<sup>463</sup>

It is important to note that while individuals, movements, and groups may spread propaganda in hopes of specifically promoting antisemitic violence, those directly targeted might not be Jews but those deemed as secondary enemies or people mistaken for Jews. Antisemitic conspiracy theories weaken trust in democracy and institutions, which can lead to violence when people feel that they cannot hold their leaders accountable.<sup>464</sup>

### **Legal and Statistical Country Context**

Legal definitions of antisemitism vary in the U.S. The White House’s May 2023 National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism provides a non-binding definition of antisemitism as:

“A stereotypical and negative perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred of Jews. It is prejudice, bias, hostility, discrimination, or violence against Jews for being Jews or Jewish institutions or property for being Jewish or perceived as Jewish. Antisemitism can manifest as a form of racial, religious, national origin, and/or ethnic discrimination, bias, or hatred; or, a combination thereof. However, antisemitism is not simply a form of prejudice

or hate. It is also a pernicious conspiracy theory that often features myths about Jewish power and control.<sup>465</sup>

The State Department uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism.<sup>466</sup> Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted or noted the importance of the IHRA definition.<sup>467</sup>

Antisemitism, including Holocaust denial and hate speech, is legal and protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution if it is not associated with criminal acts. At the federal level, hate crimes are criminal acts that are motivated in whole or in part by a victim's characteristics protected under the law, including race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability.<sup>468</sup> At the state level, 44 states and the District of Columbia have hate crime laws that apply to crimes motivated by race, religion, or ethnicity, and 21 states and the District of Columbia have criminalized impeding religious worship. Antisemitic hate crimes are classified as "anti-Jewish" by the Department of Justice.<sup>469</sup>

Eight federal agencies that support and fund national, state, and local social, commercial, and educational programs also adhere to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on "shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics," which includes antisemitism and other types of discrimination.<sup>470</sup>

Hate crime data is voluntarily reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by local, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations. Reporting is mandatory for Federal agencies. In 2023, 16,009 different U.S. law enforcement agencies reported hate crime statistics, comprising 83.5% of all law enforcement agencies in the country. This was down from a high of 88.9% of all U.S. law enforcement agencies reporting such crimes in 2017.<sup>471</sup> The FBI reported that for 2023, 95.2% of the population was covered by law enforcement agencies that reported hate crime statistics.<sup>472</sup> Data on the prosecution and sentencing of individuals is often unavailable. In addition, it is important to emphasize that it is likely that many hate crimes are unreported to law enforcement.<sup>473</sup>

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a non-profit civil rights advocacy group, collects and manages data on antisemitic incidents and crimes. The group has published an annual audit of antisemitic incidents since 1979, which includes incidents voluntarily reported by individuals, law enforcement, media organizations, and other non-profit groups. Data collected includes criminal and non-criminal acts, including actions without a known perpetrator and online harassment. The most recent audit of 2023 data was released in April 2024.<sup>474</sup>

Between 2014 and 2023, the FBI recorded 10,125 anti-Jewish hate crimes, comprising 59.2% of all religiously motivated hate crimes and 11.6% of all hate crimes overall. Jews are 2.4% of the population of the U.S.<sup>475</sup> The 1,951 recorded anti-Jewish hate crimes in 2023, the highest in the set, were 316.70% higher than in 2014, the smallest number in the set. Recorded anti-Jewish hate crimes increased by 55.2% from 2022 to 2023. For all years between 2014 and 2023, the three most common crimes were destruction/damage/vandalism of property (60%), intimidation (27%), and simple assault (7%).<sup>476</sup> Eleven murders were recorded in 2018, six in 2019, 1 in 2020, and 2 in 2021.<sup>477</sup>

FBI anti-Jewish hate crime statistics by year (both violent and non-violent incidents):<sup>478</sup>

Year	Anti-Jewish Bias Incidents (FBI)	Percent Change from Previous Year
2014	616	-2.20%
2015	667	+8.3%
2016	707	+6.0%
2017	984	+39.2%
2018	880	-10.6%
2019	1,172	+33.2%
2020	978	-16.6%
2021	913	-6.6%
2022	1,257	+37.7%
2023	1,951	+55.2%

Between 2014 and 2023, the ADL recorded 25,057 antisemitic incidents (incidents from the 2023 methodology change were not included to be consistent with previous years).

ADL Antisemitic Incidents by Year (both violent and non-violent incidents):<sup>479</sup>

Year	Antisemitic Incidents	Percent Change from Previous Year
2014	912	+21.4%
2015	942	+3.3%
2016	1,267	+34.5%
2017	1,986	+56.7%
2018	1,879	-5.4%
2019	2,107	+12.1%
2020	2,026	-3.8%
2021	2,717	+34.1%
2022	3,698	+36.1%
2023	7,523	+103.4%
January 1-June 14, 2024	1,480	-35.3% for the same period

ADL data includes instances of harassment, such as verbal and online harassment, that may not constitute criminal offenses. In other cases, there might be differences in data, such as in 2022, when the ADL logged 111 antisemitic assaults, while FBI statistics recorded 103 simple assaults and 38 aggravated assaults.<sup>480</sup> It is likely that these discrepancies between data from the U.S. Government and civil society groups is due to different methodologies for including incidents.

**Developments since October 7, 2023**

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the “Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023” in May 2024, which would require the Department of Education to consider the IHRA working definition of antisemitism when investigating complaints related to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The bill has not been voted on in the U.S. Senate as of October 11, 2024.<sup>481</sup>

In November 2023, FBI Director Christopher Wray reported that since October 7, 2023, the agency had observed a significant rise in threats against Muslim and Jewish communities in the United States.<sup>482</sup> The FBI recorded 706 anti-Jewish hate crimes for October and November 2023, compared to 222 for the same period in 2022, a 318% increase.<sup>483</sup>

After October 7, 2023, the ADL modified its collection methodology in the annual audit to include “support for resistance against Israel or Zionists that could be perceived as supporting terrorism or attacks on Jews, Israelis, or Zionists.”<sup>484</sup> Without

applying the methodological change to ADL data to ensure uniform comparison between years, the organization recorded 992 antisemitic incidents between October 7-27, 2023. In contrast, the organization recorded 347 antisemitic incidents for the entire month of October in 2022.<sup>485</sup> In 2023, the ADL recorded an increase of 237% in antisemitic incidents at Jewish institutions, including synagogues, and an increase of over 1,000% in antisemitic bomb threats, with almost 90% of 1,006 bomb threats targeting synagogues.<sup>486</sup> According to the ADL, antisemitic incidents for the approximate first half of 2024 decreased by 35.3% from 2023, even with the methodological change applied to 2024. However, more incidents may be reported or recorded during this period before the end of the year.

### Key Antisemitic Narratives

Tropes and antisemitic stereotypes may depict Jews as greedy or promoting communism. Attempts to camouflage antisemitism as anticommunism have a long history of use by extreme right groups.

Proponents of the white genocide conspiracy theory accuse Jews of working to eliminate white people and what is portrayed as white culture. This often overlaps with the great replacement conspiracy theory, which accuses a hostile entity or cabal (usually portrayed as Jews) of intentionally working to undermine the power of white citizens by promoting immigration and the growth of non-white racial or ethnic groups.<sup>487</sup> These two conspiracy theories allow perpetrators to portray antisemitic violence as acts of self-defense.

Narratives of Jewish control include accusations that Jews secretly control finance, media, Hollywood, or the government.<sup>488</sup> The infamous *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* is a prime example of the narrative of control, which is still invoked today.<sup>489</sup> Accusations that the philanthropist and Holocaust survivor George Soros controls global events often fit into this narrative of control as a repackaging of conspiracy theories starting over 200 years ago, alleging that the Rothschild family controls the world.<sup>490</sup> The term “globalist” can be used to refer to Jews, to question their loyalty to the United States, or to assert that they seek to control the world. The idea that Jews secretly control the government can take the form of the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG) narrative used by the extreme right. Denial or minimization of the Holocaust is common in the American extreme right milieu.

The “Synagogue of Satan” narrative accuses Jews of being linked to or the agents of Satan.<sup>491</sup> The wording comes from the Book of Revelation in the New Testament. The term has been used by multiple antisemitic movements, including Christian antisemitic factions, extremist factions of the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement, white supremacists, QAnon, and the Nation of Islam.<sup>492</sup>

QAnon is a modern repackaging of the blood libel accusation, which dates to the Middle Ages.<sup>493</sup>

Other antisemitic narratives associate or blame all American Jews for the actions of Israel, which in turn can mean acts of violence, intimidation, or vandalism directed broadly against Jews.

Some left-wing activists have promoted the narrative that Israel is a colonial or settler-colonial power.<sup>494</sup> In some cases, this narrative has been used to justify and champion acts of terrorism targeting civilians, including the October 7, 2023, attacks.<sup>495</sup>

### **Justifications of Violence through Antisemitic Narratives**

Antisemitic propagandists in the U.S. are often careful not to cross the line that separates speech from criminal offenses. Terrorgram is a notable exception. Two leaders from the Terrorgram Collective were arrested in September 2024 and face 15 counts of soliciting hate crimes, advocating for the murder of government officials, and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists.<sup>496</sup> Terrorgram manuals primarily justify antisemitic violence by invoking the white genocide and ZOG conspiracy theories. Jews are also blamed for spreading pornography, destroying the family unit, and promoting LGBTQI+ identities, especially transgender identity. These narratives are also present in several other white supremacist and neo-Nazi movements in the U.S. However, Terrorgram has specifically advocated violently attacking Jews, synagogues, and Jewish institutions, in addition to multiple other targets.

Robert Bowers, the perpetrator of the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue attack, interacted with four antisemitic members of the alt-right on Gab, including individuals who promoted the white genocide conspiracy theory.<sup>497</sup> The Poway gunman, John T. Earnest, was directly inspired by Bowers, Brenton Tarrant, and the white genocide and great replacement conspiracy theories.<sup>498</sup> Tarrant and the ideology of violent white supremacist accelerationism also inspired at least one failed antisemitic attacker who expressed his desire to attack a synagogue.<sup>499</sup>

GDL propaganda positions Jews as the source of all evil in the world but stops short of directly advocating acts of violence. Jaime Tran, who shot and wounded two Orthodox Jewish men in Los Angeles in 2023, had previously spread GDL propaganda blaming Jews for COVID-19.<sup>500</sup> A GDL member was arrested in September 2024 after allegedly threatening the Nashville, Tennessee, district attorney and the Jewish community.<sup>501</sup> The individual reportedly referenced “The Day of the Rope” from the novel *The Turner Diaries*, which refers to a day of public executions of whites deemed to be traitors.

One of WOL's founding members, Saada Masoud, was sentenced to 18 months in prison in March 2023 for conspiracy to commit hate crimes related to three physical assaults in 2021 and 2022 related to the victim's Jewish or Israeli identity.<sup>502</sup> One of the attacks, on June 2, 2021, consisted of an attack on an individual wearing a yarmulke outside the victim's home.<sup>503</sup> In communications before and after two assaults, Masoud had advocated using violence to disrupt pro-Israel protests and had bragged about assaulting a Jewish political figure on Instagram.<sup>504</sup>

Inspired by conspiracy theories about the great replacement and white genocide, Robert Bowers carried out what is regarded as the deadliest antisemitic attack in American history on October 27, 2018, killing eleven Jews and injuring two more at a Pittsburgh synagogue while also wounding five police officers.<sup>505</sup> Bowers justified his act of violence as self-defense, claiming on the Gab social media platform that his attack was meant to prevent a Jewish refugee assistance organization from helping immigrants whom Bowers claimed killed white people.

John Earnest, the white supremacist gunman who attacked a synagogue in Poway, California, cited Bowers as one of his inspirations, along with the Christchurch attacker Brenton Tarrant, and similarly claimed he acted to defend white people from a genocide orchestrated by Jews. On April 27, 2019, Earnest killed one synagogue congregant and wounded three others. In a manifesto posted online, the gunman endorsed several antisemitic conspiracy theories in addition to the white genocide allegation, including that Jews control the media and banking, spread communism, and are guilty of blood libel. One month before his attack, Earnest had also attempted to burn down a mosque.<sup>506</sup>

David Anderson, one of the two perpetrators of the December 10, 2019, Jersey City rampage that included murdering three people in a kosher grocery store, was allegedly inspired by segments of an extremist version of the BHI movement, although he was not a formal member of any group.<sup>507</sup> Anderson posted antisemitic content on Facebook, including using the antisemitic phrase "Synagogue of Satan" and the false claim that modern Jews are descended from the Khazar people and control law enforcement.<sup>508</sup>

On January 15, 2022, British national Malik Faisal Akram took hostages in a Colleyville, Texas synagogue and demanded the release of al-Qaeda-linked Aafia Siddiqui from prison.<sup>509</sup> Akram's attack indicated that he thought that Jews enjoyed a level of power in the U.S. that would give him a negotiating position.<sup>510</sup> Akram also contacted a New York rabbi he allegedly thought was influential and could help negotiate.<sup>511</sup>

It is important to note that there have also been unsuccessful antisemitic plots, where would-be perpetrators were arrested before committing acts of violence, as well as multiple individuals who have made threats of violence.<sup>512</sup>

From 2014 to 2024, three individuals who sympathized with violent Islamist extremism were arrested for plotting attacks on the American Jewish community.<sup>513</sup> James Gonzalo Medina was sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2017 for planning to attack a Florida synagogue in 2016.<sup>514</sup> Medina, who was arrested in an FBI operation and found guilty of a hate crime, told a confidential human source that he wanted to murder Jews because he thought they were responsible for causing global conflict and that it was necessary to attack Jews in the U.S. as revenge.<sup>515</sup>

In 2018, Damon Joseph was arrested and later sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to provide material support to ISIS and planning to commit a hate crime, an attack on an Ohio synagogue.<sup>516</sup> Joseph posted online propaganda supporting ISIS and told an undercover FBI agent that he wanted to attack “Jews who support [the] state of Israel.”<sup>517</sup> Joseph had also expressed support for Robert Bowers’ October 2018 synagogue attack itself, despite the different ideological motivation.<sup>518</sup> Joseph notably stated that he had held antisemitic beliefs long before his involvement with violent Islamist extremism.<sup>519</sup>

In May 2019, Jonathon Xie was arrested for attempting to conceal material support to Hamas.<sup>520</sup> Xie sent \$100 to an individual he thought was a member of Hamas’ military wing and posted on social media that he wanted to shoot attendees at a pro-Israel March.<sup>521</sup> Xie was sentenced to time served, 64 months in prison, in September 2024.<sup>522</sup>

Following the October 7, 2023, attacks, 73% of Jewish college and university students reported experiencing or witnessing antisemitism.<sup>523</sup> Students and faculty have reported antisemitic remarks, harassment, and threats.<sup>524</sup> In several cases, students wearing yarmulkes or Stars of David have been assaulted.<sup>525</sup> In one notable case, Patrick Dai, a former student at Cornell University, was sentenced to 21 months in prison and three years of supervised release for threatening to murder Jewish people on campus on a web forum and promoting acts of antisemitic violence in October 2023.<sup>526</sup>

### **Variations and Common Themes of Antisemitic Narratives across different Extremist Ideologies**

Antisemitism across the ideological spectrum relies on conspiracy theories and narratives of Jewish control. Examples include extreme right groups, such as Patriot Front, and left-wing ideologues that accuse Jews of having too much power and influence in government.<sup>527</sup> This has included debates among some in the online left about whether it is permissible to use the term ZOG, a longtime fixture of extreme right antisemitic rhetoric.<sup>528</sup>

Protestors have targeted synagogues fundraising for Israeli groups and broadly antisemitic reasons, such as Holocaust denial.<sup>529</sup>

Both the extreme right and some elements of the pro-Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement use the term “Zionist” to refer to Jews as a whole. The Massachusetts-based pro-BDS group, the Mapping Project, has listed the physical addresses of Jewish entities such as a religious high school, the local chapter of the National Jewish Council for Disabilities, and Jewish newspapers.<sup>530</sup> Synagogues and homes have been targeted with anti-Israel graffiti, likely from left-wing groups.<sup>531</sup>

Acts of violence have been committed against Jews in the U.S. as revenge for Israeli actions, such as the attack on diners at a Los Angeles restaurant in May 2021 by two members of a pro-Palestine automobile procession who were later convicted of hate crimes.<sup>532</sup> The attack took place during the May 2021 conflict between Israel and Hamas. Similar events post October 7, 2023, have included an October 25, 2023, home invasion in Los Angeles by an individual who yelled “Free Palestine” and threats against Jews; an Indianapolis woman who intentionally drove her car into what she believed to be an Israeli school; and a man who fired a shotgun outside of an Albany, New York synagogue while yelling pro-Palestinian slogans.<sup>533</sup>

Antisemitic tropes about Jewish control of media and propaganda frequently associated with the extreme right and imageboard culture have been adopted by some online generation-Z adherents of militant Salafism.<sup>534</sup>

There has been minimal historical cross-ideological cooperation among antisemitic actors in the U.S. Biases such as racism and Islamophobia, have often played a role in preventing cooperation between different ideological groups. Historically, American neo-Nazis have at times expressed limited support for the Black Muslim group the Nation of Islam due to the latter’s promotion of antisemitic narratives.<sup>535</sup> More recently, some neo-Nazi propagandists have expressed written online support for groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and even ISIS, in part due to antisemitism as well as a willingness to fight against a perceived common enemy.<sup>536</sup> It is important to note that these same extreme-right groups have also expressed strong anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiments and that others in the movement have issued warnings regarding any perceived support of a Foreign Terrorist Organization.<sup>537</sup>

Goyim Defense Leafue (GDL) propaganda presents Jews as the primary enemy and conceals the group’s neo-Nazism. They have attempted to appeal to African Americans by disseminating propaganda accusing Jews of responsibility for the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>538</sup> The group also promoted antisemitic comments by the musician Ye (Kanye West).<sup>539</sup>

An American neo-Nazi website that promotes violent accelerationism has repeatedly praised Hamas both before and after October 7, 2023, declaring that the terrorist group is one of the few entities engaged in fighting against Jews.<sup>540</sup> In a Telegram post, the site assured their readers that they still supported violence against Muslims, but that the latter were actively fighting their common enemy.<sup>541</sup> Ideologically similar Telegram-based propagandists have also expressed support for Hamas before October 7, 2023 and after, including a leader of the Terrorgram Collective who urged the propaganda group's supporters to follow Hamas social media following October 7, 2023.<sup>542</sup> Real-world efforts of collaboration between the extreme right hoping to engage with pro-Palestinian groups following October 7, 2023 at demonstrations have failed.<sup>543</sup> Terrorgram and their ideological allies also expressed similar support for Hamas in May 2021, during fighting between Israel and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Antisemitism has served as a bridge narrative for white supremacist Christian nationalist Nick Fuentes, the leader of the "Groyper" movement, and some non-white streamers and internet personalities.<sup>544</sup>

The "Synagogue of Satan" antisemitic narrative has been used to justify violence by different extremist movements. Both Bowers and Earnest used the term in social media posts and a manifesto, respectively.<sup>545</sup> David Anderson, who was a follower of extremist BHI ideology, referred to Jews on Facebook as members of the "Synagogue of Satan."<sup>546</sup> A 2023 study by the Network Contagion Research Institute found that the use of the term on X (formerly known as Twitter) was correlated with increased attacks on synagogues in the U.S.<sup>547</sup>

White supremacist accelerationists who have expressed support for Hamas have done so to inspire violence in the U.S. both before and after October 7, 2023. These extreme right actors have expressed support for Hamas's tactics, longevity, and ability to carry out violence against Jews.<sup>548</sup>

### **The Role of Antisemitic Narratives in Recruitment**

Antisemitism is a crucial foundation for extreme right recruitment. Basic propaganda messages used by multiple extreme right groups contain extreme antisemitism as a way of weeding out unwelcome applicants. The neo-Nazi book *Siege*, which celebrates and advocates for violence against Jews and others, has been required reading in whole or in part for several accelerationist groups in the mid-2010s to early 2020s.<sup>549</sup> The ten-part movie *Europa the Last Battle*, which blames Jews for both world wars, glorifies Nazi Germany, and denies the Holocaust, has been used as a movement recruitment tool and has been promoted by members of the Proud Boys, White Lives Matter, and other groups and movements.<sup>550</sup> In a poll by an X (formerly known as Twitter) account that supports the Active Club movement on January 25,

2024, *Europa the Last Battle* was ranked as the best propaganda film for “waking people up” by 64% of all 1,199 respondents out of four choices.<sup>551</sup> Some groups, such as at least one chapter of the Proud Boys, might conceal antisemitic rhetoric to recruit but require it for a member to advance within the group.<sup>552</sup> Antisemitic conspiracy theories can be an important recruitment mechanism because they seek to convince potential recruits that they have access to once-hidden knowledge that explains how the world functions and that the individual can now play a role in exposing hidden schemes.<sup>553</sup>

### **The Dissemination of Antisemitic Narratives**

The internet is a crucial site for spreading antisemitic narratives. Internet communication allows narratives to reach a large audience and adapt quickly to changing circumstances.<sup>554</sup> In some cases, extremist social media users are attracted to platforms that will provide a sizable audience. In other instances, they might use platforms with fewer users that rarely remove content. Important online locations for antisemitic narratives include Gab, 4chan and other imageboards, Telegram, X (formerly known as Twitter), and Facebook.

Following weeks of antisemitic posts on Gab, the Pittsburgh Synagogue attacker posted a goodbye message on the site before committing his massacre.<sup>555</sup> The social network was founded with a “free speech” ethos, and the site’s creator, Andrew Torba, has endorsed antisemitic conspiracy theories and rhetoric.<sup>556</sup>

4chan and similar imageboards are often locations for sharing antisemitic conspiracy theories and memes. The site’s users are often skeptical of established groups. The Poway Synagogue attacker posted his manifesto on the 8chan imageboard. QAnon posts began on 4chan but later moved to 8chan, and then on the site’s next iteration, 8kun. Multiple antisemitic memes and tactics have emerged on 4chan’s “politically incorrect” board (/pol) and have later been shared on social media platforms.<sup>557</sup>

Telegram, which historically has little moderation, is an important site for antisemitic propaganda and extreme right recruitment. The platform became a leading site for spreading extreme-right content after users were removed from social media sites. Telegram has also been used by white supremacist accelerationists who glorify acts of terrorism and have allegedly solicited others to engage in extreme right motivated criminal and terrorist acts.<sup>558</sup>

X (formerly known as Twitter) has reemerged as an important platform for antisemitic content.<sup>559</sup> The site claimed to have 250 million daily users in March 2024.<sup>560</sup> The platform is a prime location for semi-mainstream and niche antisemitic influencers, including individuals such as Candace Owens, Nick Fuentes, and others.<sup>561</sup> Fuentes,

along with other extremists, was reinstated on the site through the intervention of X's (formerly known as Twitter) owner, Elon Musk.<sup>562</sup> Antisemitic content is common on the platform and moderation is lacking.

Extremist BHI factions have used Facebook to spread antisemitic content.<sup>563</sup> The platform has a poor record of removing hate speech from BHI pages.<sup>564</sup>

Some extreme right groups, such as the Goyim Defense League (GDL), are known for provocative protests and spreading antisemitic flyers to attract media coverage.<sup>565</sup>

### **Antisemitic Key Actors**

Violent antisemitic acts in the U.S. have primarily been committed by individuals with little or no established connection to official groups. Perpetrators (and would-be perpetrators) of violence have been motivated by antisemitic narratives promoted more broadly by groups, movements, or individuals. In some cases, these narratives have been modified and mainstreamed over time. Lethal antisemitic violence in the U.S. has been committed by individuals espousing white supremacist and extreme right beliefs and individuals inspired by extremist BHI ideology. Some pro-Palestine groups have expressed support for the actions of terrorist groups.<sup>566</sup>

The neo-Nazi accelerationist Terrorgram Collective considers Jews their principal enemy. The decentralized online community celebrates individuals who have committed acts of white supremacist terrorism and has advocated for attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions, in addition to attacks on Muslims, people of color, LGBTQI+ people, infrastructure, and the government. Terrorgram lionizes those who have harmed American Jews, advocates extreme violence against Jews, and has suggested specific targets, such as synagogues and prominent Jewish individuals.<sup>567</sup> The ambiguity of online anonymity sometimes makes it difficult to ascertain if criminals have interacted with Terrorgram content.

In far-right American media, the great replacement conspiracy theory has gained traction, often with overt antisemitic rhetoric removed.<sup>568</sup>

Extremist BHI factions have promoted the belief that modern Jews are fraudulently claiming to be descended from the ancient Israelites.<sup>569</sup> The majority of BHI groups are neither extremist nor antisemitic and condemn violence.<sup>570</sup> Antisemitic violence has been committed by individuals inspired by or on the fringes of the extremist BHI movement and not from established groups themselves.<sup>571</sup>

Following October 7, 2023, the National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), a coordinating group that supports autonomous chapters on college and university

campuses, released a “Day of Resistance Toolkit,” which celebrated the “historic win for the Palestinian resistance” against the “Zionist enemy.”<sup>572</sup> The manual called for demonstrations, justified the Hamas-led attack, and used an image of a motorized hang glider in a poster template.<sup>573</sup> The group claims to be affiliated with over 350 pro-Palestine organizations in the U.S.<sup>574</sup> NSJP does not control or fund individual campus groups. The group is not directly linked to violence in the U.S.

The Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network was sanctioned and declared a sham charity and a fundraiser for the U.S. listed terrorist group the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) by the U.S. Treasury Department on October 15, 2024.<sup>575</sup> Samidoun is based in Vancouver, Canada, and has worked with American college and university students and has co-sponsored protests in New York and Chicago.<sup>576</sup> The group’s co-founder has justified and celebrated the October 7, 2023, attacks, including attacks on civilians.<sup>577</sup>

The pro-Palestine and antizionist group Within Our Lifetime (WOL), founded by students in 2015, has been involved in organizing protests in New York. The group’s leader, Nerdeen Kiswani, has praised the October 7, 2023, attacks and armed Palestinian resistance and has called for the removal of Zionists from New York society.<sup>578</sup> Among their “points of unity,” the group calls for “the abolition of Zionism” and affirms their belief in “all forms of Palestinian resistance.”<sup>579</sup>

### **The Transnational Dimension of Key Antisemitic Actors**

Transnational connections between extreme-right groups and movements have primarily occurred based on a shared ideology that leads to alliances.<sup>580</sup> Antisemitic narratives are common to these entities, such as the ZOG slogan and great replacement and white genocide conspiracy theory and play a role in these connections in that they make up an ideological pillar. Transnational connections can be used in recruitment narratives, lend prestige to nodes in a growing international scene, and be used for propaganda that depicts a united movement.

International online neo-Nazi spaces that promote violence can lead to collaboration. Las Vegas resident Conor Climo had communicated with members of the transnational neo-Nazi accelerationist group Feuerkrieg Division, led by an Estonian teenager, and had spoken about burning down a synagogue and attacking the ADL before he was arrested in November 2020.<sup>581</sup>

Antisemitic narratives have led to non-Americans committing attacks while in the U.S. or attempting to enter the country to commit attacks. While it is not clear that the Colleyville synagogue hostage taker, a British national, entered the U.S. for the explicit purpose of his attack, he did eventually target the American Jewish

community in an attempt to free Aafia Siddiqui from prison. A Toronto resident was arrested in Canada on September 4, 2024, who was allegedly plotting to travel to New York to commit an attack on Jews in Brooklyn in the name of ISIS on the anniversary of October 7 2023 or October 11, the holy day of Yom Kippur.<sup>582</sup> The alleged Brooklyn plot is an example of how the October 7, 2023 attack has inspired individuals with different extremist ideologies.

Juraj Krajčík, who killed two people and wounded one in an attack on an LGBTQ+ bar in Bratislava in October 2022, directly thanked members of Terrorgram in his manifesto.<sup>583</sup> Krajčík notably hoped to attack a Chabad house and promoted the white genocide, great replacement, and ZOG conspiracy theories.<sup>584</sup>

### **Financial Strategies Applied by the Identified Key Actors**

GDL funds its activities through donations and merchandise sales. Members and affiliates have previously used CashApp and accept donations through Amazon Gift Cards, GabPay, GiveSendGo, Zelle, and cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Monero, Ethereum, and others.<sup>585</sup> The group allegedly does business as “HandsomeTruth Enterprises.”<sup>586</sup> Money is reportedly spent on legal fees and costs related to spreading physical propaganda, such as printing, vehicle rentals, and fuel. The group also presumably pays for the costs of maintaining a website.<sup>587</sup>

Most violent actions in the U.S. are carried out by lone individuals who are self-funded.<sup>588</sup> The Terrorgram Collective has used free web services.

NSJP is not a registered nonprofit organization and has not filed tax documents.<sup>589</sup> Samidoun previously processed donations through the tax-exempt charitable organization Alliance for Global Justice.<sup>590</sup> Samidoun’s inclusion as a Specially Designated National on the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) means that “U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.”<sup>591</sup> WOL is not registered as a nonprofit. The group previously fundraised through the left-wing “anti-war” group the Westchester People’s Action Coalition (WESPAC) Foundation, based in White Plains, New York, but the arrangement was severed following a potential lawsuit.<sup>592</sup>

In the summer of 2024, the ADL requested that the Internal Revenue Service investigate whether WESPAC and the Alliance for Global Justice violated the law while serving as fiscal sponsors for WOL and Samidoun, respectively.<sup>593</sup> Fiscal sponsorships allow established 501(c)(3) nonprofit entities to fundraise on behalf of other projects or small organizations not registered as nonprofits.<sup>594</sup> The entity that is being sponsored must operate in a fashion consistent with 501(c)(3) rules, and the

sponsor must be responsible for the funds and receipts and provide accountability for the funds.<sup>595</sup>

### **Role of Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran or other states**

Russian disinformation campaigns in the U.S. have promoted antisemitic narratives.<sup>596</sup> The website Veterans Today, with a focus on military, veteran, and foreign policy stories, as well as antisemitic propaganda, has published articles from Russian state-sponsored media, an antisemitic website, SouthFront, linked by the U.S. government to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and an internet journal affiliated with the government-chartered Russian Academy of Sciences.<sup>597</sup>

Russian government-controlled media has maligned George Soros using a variety of antisemitic tropes.<sup>598</sup> Additionally, Rinaldo Nazario, the leader of the neo-Nazi accelerationist group The Base, has gone on Russian television in an attempt to whitewash his image and that of his organization.<sup>599</sup>

The Russian government-backed RT news channel has allegedly financed far-right media personalities in the U.S. who have trafficked in antisemitic narratives.<sup>600</sup>

A 2023 report from the ADL and Center for Countering Digital Hate found that antisemitic content from Iranian government-owned PressTV had spread on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms, finding a left-wing audience.<sup>601</sup> Programming geared towards the West did not differentiate between Jews, Zionism, and Israel. The report also found that 20.5% of all web traffic for the PressTV site was coming from the U.S.<sup>602</sup>

Multiple organizations operating in the U.S., including a charitable foundation and several religious institutions, have ties to the Iranian government.<sup>603</sup> Several of these groups promote Iranian soft power and anti-Israel propaganda; however, independent of one another and not in a coordinated fashion.<sup>604</sup> The main financing point, the 501(c)(3) non-profit organization the Alavi Foundation, promotes Iranian interests in the U.S. and has funded at least one religious institution that employs an individual who has spread antisemitic propaganda.<sup>605</sup>

In June 2024, the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated that Iran was seeking to exploit protests in the U.S. related to the Israeli invasion of Gaza and that Iranian entities were “posing as activists online,” allegedly spurring on protests and providing undisclosed financial support.<sup>606</sup> The 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment confirmed that Iranian entities were encouraging protests in the U.S. regarding Israel post-October 7, 2023.<sup>607</sup>

No evidence has been found during the research for this project to indicate that the main antisemitic actors in the U.S. receive support from the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or other foreign states.

### **Governmental Actions against Antisemitism**

In September 2023, the administration of President Biden released the first National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism in response to rising antisemitic incidents.<sup>608</sup> Announcing a whole-of-society approach, the document lists over 100 actions that federal agencies pledged to commit within a year, focused on four pillars of increasing education and awareness of antisemitism, improving safety for Jewish communities, countering antisemitism as a discriminatory act, and building coalitions to oppose hate.<sup>609</sup> The National Strategy also serves as a guidepost for the non-governmental sector to see where the government places emphasis.<sup>610</sup>

Antisemitism, when it is a criminal act, is handled by local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues financial grants to religious institutions through the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, which is used to improve security.<sup>611</sup> Funding of \$664 million was made available in fiscal year 2024.<sup>612</sup> DHS also provides security advisers and recommendations for religious institutions.

In September 2023, eight federal agencies officially included antisemitism and Islamophobia in the list of prohibited biases in programs that receive federal funding.<sup>613</sup> This allows individuals to file Title VI complaints with the appropriate agency.

The State Department's Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism works with foreign envoys and government officials. In 2021, the special envoy was elevated to the position of ambassador at large. The July 2024 12-point Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism, the first framework of its kind, was launched after a collaborative drafting process and is currently endorsed by 38 countries and four international organizations.<sup>614</sup> The guidelines are non-binding but create norms and serve as formalized recommendations for states, civil society, and private institutions.<sup>615</sup>

### **Non-Governmental Bodies with a Mandate to Foster Jewish life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

The U.S.'s first secular Jewish non-governmental organization, the B'nai B'rith, was founded in 1843. Multiple Jewish organizations in the U.S. coordinate through the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations to coordinate activities between 49 member organizations that work in various public service,

fundraising, research, and advocacy capacities. The Conference works to reduce dual efforts in organizations and encourage cooperation.<sup>616</sup>

The ADL monitors antisemitism and records and maintains statistics on domestic terrorist plots and antisemitic incidents. The ADL has 25 regional offices in the U.S. that work on local coordination, advocacy, and educational programs.<sup>617</sup> The organization also operates three research centers related to monitoring and reporting on domestic extremism, online antisemitism, and global issues related to countering antisemitism.<sup>618</sup> The ADL also provides training and assistance to law enforcement, including providing intelligence regarding crime and extremism.

The Secure Community Network (SCN) is a Jewish security non-profit that provides threat intelligence, facility assessments, training, crisis management, and guidance to synagogues, community centers, summer camps, schools, and special events, as well as coordinating with law enforcement.<sup>619</sup> The Community Security Service (CSS) provides security training to volunteer security personnel at synagogues and coordinates with law enforcement agencies.<sup>620</sup>

### **Inspiring Practices to Foster Jewish Life and/or Combat Antisemitism**

The 2023 U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism exemplifies good governmental practices for fighting antisemitism. The document was the first national plan for combating antisemitism and offered concrete steps that specific agencies, departments, and other government-affiliated entities could take to counter antisemitism, presenting an all-of-government approach. The strategy was created with input from the Jewish community, non-governmental organizations, academics, and local and federal officials, as well as European special envoys combating antisemitism.<sup>621</sup>

An example of a non-profit organization using the legal system to fight antisemitism occurred when Tanya Gersh, a Montana resident, with legal assistance from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), won a suit in 2018 against Andrew Anglin, the individual behind the neo-Nazi website the Daily Stormer. Anglin had directed his followers to terrorize Gersh, leading to over 700 messages directed against her and her family, including antisemitic harassment and death threats.<sup>622</sup> A Montana federal judge ruled that the First Amendment did not apply to speech advocating antisemitic harassment.<sup>623</sup> In 2020, Gersh won a \$14 million civil judgment against Anglin, and in 2022, a judge ordered that Anglin be arrested for non-payment.<sup>624</sup>

## Endnotes

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