

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Name: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Type of Organization:

- Insurgent
- non-state actor
- religious
- terrorist
- transnational
- violent

Ideologies and Affiliations:

- Islamist
- jihadist
- Qutbist
- Salafist
- Sunni
- takfiri

Place of Origin:

Indonesia

Year of Origin:

1993 (formal establishment)

Founder(s):

Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar

Places of Operation:

Indonesia (primary operations); Malaysia and Singapore (cells); the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand (possible operations)

Overview

Executive Summary:

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was a jihadist group in Southeast Asia that sought to establish a caliphate in the region through violent means.

In June 2024, senior JI leaders announced the dissolution of the network, but some elements have remained active.¹ One of JI's precursors was Darul Islam, an insurgent movement that gave rise to three separate revolts against the Indonesian government in the 1950s and 1960s. JI first raised its global profile after carrying out bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, killing 202 and 20 people (mostly foreign tourists), respectively.² Among other violent operations, JI was known for its links to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as the 1995 failed "Bojinka" plot, an attempt to bomb 12 U.S. commercial airlines in the span of two days.³ JI had links to [al-Qaeda](#) and the [Abu Sayyaf Group](#) (ASG), a Philippines-based terrorist organization.⁴ JI's co-founder and former leader [Abu Bakar Bashir](#) pledged loyalty to ISIS in July 2014. However, some reports claimed that JI did not support ISIS and remained tied to al-Qaeda.⁵ Nonetheless, regional authorities, including Australian intelligence officials, were concerned that JI was loyal to ISIS and would increase terrorist activities in the region.⁶

In July 2008, Bashir established a new group called Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which has since been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks.⁷ JAT's establishment caused a rift within JI, with some members following Bashir and others remaining committed to the original group. JI and JAT disagreed over strategy and tactics, and eventually JI leaders demanded that anyone who joined JAT must leave JI.⁸ JI named Para Wijayanto as its leader in 2008. He had been involved in the terrorist group's most notorious bombings dating as far back as 2000, according to

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Indonesian police.⁹ On June 29, 2019, Indonesian counterterrorism police arrested JI leader Para Wijayanto on the outskirts of Jakarta.¹⁰ On July 20, 2020, he was sentenced to seven years in prison on the charge of inciting others to commit an act of terrorism.¹¹ On July 20, 2020, he was sentenced to seven years in prison on the charge of inciting others to commit an act of terrorism.¹²

In the decade following JI's splintering, the group remained a threat given its extensive network and alleged ties to both [ISIS](#) and [al-Nusra Front](#) (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). Australian authorities in particular have expressed concern about JI foreign fighters returning to the region. This danger is exacerbated by Indonesia's relatively lax immigration laws, which allow Indonesian citizens to travel in and out of conflict zones. Consequently, Indonesian jihadists who have fought in Iraq and Syria do not face the threat of criminal charges upon returning home.¹³ At the height of ISIS's control of swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria, numerous reports indicated a resurgent threat from JI.¹⁴ Indonesian authorities feared militant and radicalized Indonesian-citizen jihadists returning home after training with JI.¹⁵ JI reportedly sought to rebuild its military wing from 2010 to at least 2017. JI supposedly kept its military activity underground in anticipation of a future confrontation, though the group had advised its recruits against any violent action.¹⁶

JI members involved in the 2002 Bali attacks began completing their sentences and leaving prison in 2018. Their release led to a reinvigorated JI with an expanded target base that included not only government officials, security forces and western targets, but also religious and ethnic minorities—a tactic also employed by ISIS. Given JI's new approach, Indonesian authorities again contended with rounding up and countering the terror group's activities.¹⁷ On December 10, 2020, Indonesia's counterterrorism police arrested JI's alleged military commander [Aris Sumarsono](#), who had evaded arrest for more than 18 years.¹⁸ On January 19, 2022, Zulkarnaen was sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was found guilty of withholding information and sheltering an extremist figure.¹⁹ In October 2022, a director at the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) claimed that JI had been "quietly infiltrating public institutions and almost every aspect of civilian lives, recruiting members, raising funds and spreading its ideology in secret." Indonesian police have continued to crackdown on charities linked to JI.²⁰

On June 30, 2024, a group of JI leaders announced that the network would be disbanded. In a video posted online, 16 of JI's most senior figures signed onto a statement that claimed the group would disband and confirmed their commitment to the Indonesian state and law. Additionally, JI-affiliated boarding schools would remain open, but all material taught would be in line with orthodox Islam and "free from the attitude of extremism."²¹ Among the leaders who signed on to the statement were emir Para Wijayanto and militant cleric and former leader Abu Rusdan—both in Indonesian police detention at the time of the announcement. According to the Jakarta-based think tank that confirmed the authenticity of the video, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), the leaders in the video were respected and credible enough within the organization to ensure widespread acceptance. However, analysts warned that the government should still be aware of potential splinter groups, of which JI has a history, particularly those committed to violence and against integration with the Republic of Indonesia.²² Analysts attributed the decision to disband to several factors, including police crackdowns and ensuing dialogue, wanting to control and sustain their schools, and potentially allowing members to be more involved in public life. Some analysts warned that the dissolution could be a tactic to avoid further law enforcement scrutiny and to ensure survival of the wider network.²³

Doctrine:

JI aimed to establish an Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*) in Southeast Asia. Initially, the state would encompass Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao (southern Philippines), and later absorb southern Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei.²⁴

Its founding doctrine pursued three-phase strategy of violent jihad to establish a caliphate. The first phase of jihad targets local government. The second targets regional governments through a conflagration of attacks in countries such as Singapore and Philippines. The third phase is global jihad. This latter phase developed as a result of association with al-Qaeda, which seeks a global jihad, as opposed to JI's initial localized jihad.²⁵

When Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar founded JI to overthrow the secular Indonesian state through political disruption and violence.²⁶ One of JI's precursors was Darul Islam, an insurgent movement that gave rise to three separate revolts against the Indonesian government in the 1950s and 1960s.²⁷ Both Bashir and Sungkar were involved in Darul Islam, which was too ideologically fractured to move forward as an organization. However, during this time, they became involved in subversive activities against President Suharto's government. Sungkar and Bashir later left Indonesia to join the jihad in Afghanistan and then Pakistan. It is in these two countries where they associated with Afghans who espoused extremist ideology and foreign fighters who had also sought to join jihad. It is during this period that they developed the ideological and operational underpinnings of JI.²⁸

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JI's ideological and tactical manual is titled *General Guidelines of the Struggle of Al-Jem'ah Al-Islamiyah* (PUPJI).²⁹ PUPJI states that one of the group's main objectives is to develop the resources and capabilities of its members and the organization as a whole, including by teaching skills like bomb-making and acting as a "networking" organization.³⁰

JI's doctrine is based on five founding principles: *iman* (belief), *hijrah* (emigration), *i'dad* (preparation to struggle in the way of God), *jihad* (struggle in the way of Allah), and *al-wala wal-bara* (division of the world into friends and enemies).³¹ JI's ideology is influenced by al-Qaeda's political theology, including works like Abu Musab al-Suri's "Call to Worldwide Islamic Resistance," Abu Bakr Naji's "The Management of Savagery," and Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif's "Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World."³²

Schisms within JI formed over disagreements on what the group's goals should be. One camp wanted to slowly progress into a caliphate through radical proselytizing and education, building an Islamic community, and increasing adherence to Islamic law. The other group advocated the use of violent jihad. This more violent group was led by former JI military leader Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, who encouraged a shift toward al-Qaeda-style tactics, resulting in a surge of attacks against Western assets in Indonesia in 2003.³³ These attacks displayed JI's tactical shift from targeting government and law enforcement to focusing on soft targets, such as tourist attractions, using car and suicide bombings.³⁴

Organizational Structure:

JI's ideological and tactical manual, *General Guidelines of the Struggle of Al-Jem'ah Al-Islamiyah* (PUPJI), outlined the group's structure. The manual divided JI's areas of operation into regional units that would serve different administrative and operational purposes, each of which is called a *mantiqi*. Each *mantiqi* is in turn divided into smaller districts, each of which is called a *wakalah*.

JI was headed by an emir (commander or prince), who appointed and presided over councils for governance, theology, fatwa (Islamic jurisprudence), and discipline.³⁵ The governing council included a central command that made policy and determined tactical and strategic operations.³⁶

Mantiqi I operated in Singapore and Malaysia and served as JI's source of financing for operations, i.e. to terror attacks and training. Mantiqi II covered Indonesia, the main area in which JI carried out terrorist activities such as launching attacks on government and law enforcement targets. Mantiqi III included the Philippine island of Mindanao, the Malaysian state of Sabah on the island of Borneo, and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, where cells were responsible for training. Mantiqi IV, which included Australia and the West Papua province of Indonesia, focused on fundraising.³⁷

In accordance with the PUPJI's guidelines, from 2000 to 2001 JI was governed by a five-member Regional Advisory Council chaired by Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali. Before his arrest in 2003, Hambali supervised the *mantiqi*.³⁸

Despite the hierarchy outlined in the PUPJI, JI became more decentralized in practice during the early 2000s.³⁹ Regional leaders developed a certain degree of autonomy and many cells were even completely isolated from one another.⁴⁰ This structure allowed JI to remain active even when top leaders were arrested or killed. Small bands were able to congregate in mountainous areas of Sulawesi, for example, where authorities feared they were trafficking weapons from neighboring countries.⁴¹ According to an October 2009 Congressional Research Service report, JI's core membership at its peak consisted of between 500 and several thousand persons, with countless more given radical educations in the JI-run *pesantrens*.⁴²

Following the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government cracked down on the group and a number of senior JI leaders and active members were either killed or arrested. The degradation of JI's leadership led to a shift in the group's structure.⁴³ During a meeting in 2008, remaining senior JI leaders and younger members—many whom received JI's religious education—formed a new central command, *markaziyah*, which oversaw the group's shift to religious outreach.⁴⁴ At that same meeting, JI senior leaders appointed Para Wijayanto as the group's new emir.⁴⁵ In 2009, JI created the Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI) to serve as its public-facing organization, with the objective of spreading JI's ideology and encouraging Muslims to enforce Islamic law.⁴⁶ This recent iteration of JI leadership also sought to rebuild the group's separate military wing in 2010, which had lapsed into inactivity following the Indonesian police crackdown of the early 2000s.⁴⁷ JI's MDUI would operate openly and focus on religious education, while the military wing would remain clandestine.⁴⁸ The military wing was reportedly based on the original PUPJI structure.⁴⁹

Indonesian police believed that a faction of JI reconstituted into a "Neo-JI"—a term coined by law enforcement to refer to a younger generation of JI militants. In 2019, former Indonesian police spokesperson Dedi Prasetyo said that the faction continued to recruit members in order to achieve its

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aim of establishing a caliphate in the country.⁵⁰ Neo-JI had also been linked to al-Qaeda in Syria.⁵¹

At the time of JI leader Para Wijayanto's arrest in 2019, the organization had approximately 6,000 members, according to the Indonesia-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.⁵² Other reports estimated that JI as a whole was comprised of between 2,000 to 3,000 members. The group had an unidentified number of supporters and sympathizers in the Muslim majority country.⁵³

Financing:

JI fundraised through membership donations and criminal and business activities, according to the U.S. State Department.⁵⁴ The group received financial, ideological, and logistical support from other groups in its network, such as al-Qaeda's core and other Middle Eastern contacts.⁵⁵ While some analysts believe al-Qaeda was JI's main source of revenue, others note the group's ability to exploit charities and divert resources away for terror operations.⁵⁶

Additional sources of money for JI included cash remittances from individuals of the Indonesian diaspora, profits from *hawala* (informal money-lender networks), weapons smuggling, and extortion.⁵⁷ It is unclear how much money the group had in its coffers and how these funds were distributed to operatives. After around 2009, JI's attacks lacked the sophistication of previous JI attacks, leading analysts to believe that the group suffered from a lack of funding.⁵⁸

The group also used charitable organizations as fronts for the organization. On September 4, 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) for sending multiple groups of JI terrorist fighters to Syria for providing funds, military training, and recruits to JI. HASI, ostensibly JI's humanitarian wing, was active as a non-governmental organization in Indonesia since 2011.⁵⁹

During their investigation into alleged JI leader Para Wijayanto, the Indonesian police discovered a new development in the terrorist group's financing effort: JI was profiting from two palm oil farms in Sumatra and Kalimantan.⁶⁰ The group used income from the palm oil businesses to fund their activities and pay salaries to leaders and other members in the network, said a police spokesperson.⁶¹

Following the arrest of two dozen suspected JI members in late 2020, Indonesian police discovered a JI funding scheme that involved more than 20,000 cash donation boxes across Indonesia. The boxes, typically used by charities in the country, were planted outside of minimarkets, gas stations, restaurants, and other businesses. The boxes were registered to the Abdurrahman bin Auf (ABA) Charity Foundation, an apparent front organization that diverted funds collected in the boxes to JI. Police said the money was used to purchase weapons, explosives, and to finance training for JI members in Syria.⁶²

Recruitment:

JI relied largely on social outreach efforts to recruit new followers.⁶³ For example, JI provided relief to victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in order to attract support for its cause.⁶⁴ While some JI recruits came from poorer backgrounds, many recruits were well-educated and attracted to "charismatic" preachers.⁶⁵ In its latter years, JI had attracted recruits from other Islamist groups in the region, including Indonesia-based Darul Islam, JI's ideological predecessor.⁶⁶

JI also recruited members through its Islamic schools and the family networks created by marriages in the community. The Al Mukmin school in Ngruki, Indonesia, was part of a network of pesantren for children of JI members.⁶⁷ The schools were meant to serve JI by perpetually replenishing the group's ranks. According to Sidney Jones of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, only some 40 pesantren in the country were associated with terrorist activities, while others focus on creating "upstanding citizens."⁶⁸

According to an April 2017 report on JI, the group increased efforts to recruit on university campuses. In 2014, Indonesian police obtained a PowerPoint presentation from JI's education wing showing that JI had reached 1,988 male university students and 862 females during 2013, though they did not necessarily become members.⁶⁹

Between late February and early March 2021, Indonesian counterterrorism police arrested 22 suspected JI members across East Java province. Among the suspects was known militant Usman bin Sef, also known as Fahim, who had led a JI cell that had recruited at least 50 new members in the province in the past five years, according to police.⁷⁰

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Training:

During the 1980s, members of JI's predecessor, Darul Islam, trained in Afghanistan.⁷¹ Beginning in the 1990s, JI training continued in Pakistan with assistance from the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).⁷² The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) helped with JI's training in the Philippines using training camps in the southern island of Mindanao.⁷³ Training camp activities included indoctrination studies and weapons and explosives training.⁷⁴

In January 2021, Indonesian police uncovered a compilation video allegedly showing an elite force of JI members engaged in weapons and physical training as well as kidnapping simulations between 2013 and 2018. The video was found on the laptop of a recently-arrested JI member. According to Indonesian police, the members were between 19 and 23 years old and received seven months of training before being sent to fight in Syria. The terrorist training camps were run in 12 locations in Indonesia and involved seven different groups comprised of up to 15 recruits. A former JI trainer claimed that the trainings cost approximately \$6,000 per month. Additionally, JI reportedly spent at least \$28,000 to send 120 fighters to train in Syria.⁷⁵

In March 2021, Indonesian counterterrorism police announced that they had arrested 22 members of a JI cell that had been conducting military-style training in East Java's Malang district. The JI fighters were allegedly plotting to attack police. Among the suspects was Fahim, who is suspected of leading the cell that recruited and trained new members in East Java. During the counterterrorism raids, Indonesian authorities also uncovered a bunker for weapons and bombmaking, as well as jihadist books.⁷⁶

As Known As:

- Islamic Organization⁷⁷
- Jemaa Islamiyah⁷⁸
- Jema'a Islamiyah⁷⁹
- Jemaa Islamiyya⁸⁰
- Jema'a Islamiyya⁸¹
- Jemaa Islamiyyah⁸²
- Jema'a Islamiyyah⁸³
- Jemaah Islamiyah⁸⁴
- Jemaah Islamiya⁸⁵
- Jema'ah Islamiyah⁸⁶
- Jemaah Islamiyyah⁸⁷
- Jema'ah Islamiyyah⁸⁸

¹ Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah? (Updated)," Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, July 4, 2024, <https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-96-is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah>.

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⁴ Yanina Goldburt, "An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network," *al Nakhlah* (Fall 2004), <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx>.

⁵ "The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah," Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 1, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

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⁸ "Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)," International Crisis Group, July 6, 2020, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b107-indonesia-the-dark-side-of-jama-ah-ansharut-tauhid-jat.pdf>.

⁹ Amy Chew, "Indonesia's arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah leader involved in Bali bombings exposes active recruitment to create caliphate," *South China Morning Post*, July 1, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3016833/indonesias-arrest-ji-leader-para-wijayanto-exposes>.

¹⁰ Amy Chew, "Indonesia's arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah leader involved in Bali bombings exposes active recruitment to create caliphate," *South China Morning Post*, July 1, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3016833/indonesias-arrest-ji-leader-para-wijayanto-exposes>.

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Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Key Leaders



Abu Bakar Bashir

Founder and spiritual leader,
alleged operational leader



Abdullah Sungkar

Founder and former spiritual
leader, deceased



Noordin Top

Top recruiter, one of the
masterminds behind the August
2003 attack on Marriott Hotel and
September 2004 car bomb outside
Australian Embassy in Jakarta,
reportedly killed by Indonesian
police in Java on September 17,
2009



**Riduan Isamuddin (a.k.a
Hambali)**

Operational leader, head of
regional shura, suspected al-Qaeda
operations director for East Asia,
now in extrajudicial detention at
Guantanamo Bay



**Mohamed Iqbal
Abdurrahman (a.k.a Abu
Jibril)**

Primary recruiter and second-in-
command, arrested in Malaysia



**Zulkifli Abdir (a.k.a.
Marwan)**

Bomb maker and member of
central command, confirmed dead
February 5, 2015



Angga Dimas Pershada

JI operative and fundraiser



Bambang Sukirno

JI leader and fundraiser

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)



Wiji Joko Santoso

Head of JI's foreign affairs division
and head of JI operations in Syria



Para Wijayanto

Emir



**Aris Sumarsono (a.k.a.
Zulkarnaen)**

JI military commander



**Usman bin Sef (a.k.a.
Fahim)**

JI leader in East Java Province

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

History:

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Violent history:

JI has plotted and executed a range of terrorist operations, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 as well as a score of bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines. The group's former leader, Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, was also responsible for laundering the money to fund al-Qaeda terrorist plots, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the failed 1995 Bojinka plot, an attempt to bomb 12 U.S. commercial airlines in the span of two days.⁸⁹ Crackdowns on JI have forced the group to operate underground and alongside local terror groups. In July 2014, founder and former JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance to violent terrorist group ISIS while in prison.⁹⁰

- **January 25, 2015:** Four-hundred members of the Philippines's counterterrorism police force conduct a raid in the village of Mamasapano. Forty-three police officers of the Special Action Force (SAF) are killed in the raid, making it the deadliest operation for the police force in over 10 years.⁹¹
- **August 21, 2014:** Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott voices concern over JI's support for ISIS. Approximately 100 Australian deaths are believed to be connected to JI activities in the country. Prime Minister Abbott fears JI's alignment with ISIS movement could lead to increased terror activities in the region.⁹²
- **February 2010:** Indonesian authorities raid a training camp in Aceh, Indonesia, and arrest more than 120 JI suspects, as well as militants from other extremist groups. Aceh-trained militants allegedly intended to carry out attacks on foreigners and assassinate moderate Muslim leaders.⁹³
- **July 17, 2009:** JI detonates nearly simultaneous explosions at the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott hotels in Jakarta, killing nine people and injuring 41.⁹⁴ The attacks stun the Indonesian government, whose crackdown on JI supposedly kept the country free of terror attacks since 2005.
- **October 2, 2005:** Suicide bombers detonate three blasts on the island of Bali, Indonesia, killing 20, and wounding more than 100.⁹⁵ The attack has a major effect on Indonesian public opinion, turning the public against JI. As a result, Indonesian politicians and authorities are able to take a hard line stance against militants without fear of alienating constituents.⁹⁶
- **December 12, 2004:** A bomb explodes in the main public market in Mindanao, Philippines, killing 15 and injuring 69. Several people are arrested in connection to the attack, including Indonesian JI members and a former MILF member.⁹⁷
- **September 9, 2004:** A suicide car bomb explodes outside the Australian embassy in central Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 10 and wounding more than 100. Indonesian authorities later arrest and convict six members of JI in connection to the attack.⁹⁸
- **May 28, 2004:** Twin bomb explosions kill 22 people in a market in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The attack exacerbates sectarian violence, reminiscent of similar attacks following the resignation of President Suharto in 1998.⁹⁹
- **August 5, 2003:** A bomb outside the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, kills 12, including a Dutchman, and wounds 149. Though no one claimed responsibility, the attack bears the hallmark of JI and investigators said that JI at least funded the Bali bombers.¹⁰⁰
- **July 10, 2003:** Two months after the May 10, 2003, bombing in a city market in Koronadal, Mindanao, a blast at the same market kills three and wounds 25. Authorities later arrest several persons in connection with the attacks, including suspected Indonesian JI members.¹⁰¹
- **May 10, 2003:** A bomb detonates at the city market in Mindanao, Philippines, killing 10 and injuring 42. Philippine police later arrest several persons in connection with the bombing, including suspected JI members from Indonesia.¹⁰²
- **March 4, 2003:** JI bombs the airport in Davao, a southern port city in the Philippines, killing 22 and wounding 143. MILF denies involvement. Later, JI-linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants take responsibility for the attack.¹⁰³
- **October 12, 2002:** JI bombs crowded nightclubs, Sari Club and Paddy's, on the predominantly Hindu tourist island of Bali. The bombings kill 202 people, mostly foreigners from Western countries, including 88 Australians. As a direct result, the U.S. designates JI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).¹⁰⁴
- **December 2001:** The Singaporean intelligence authorities did not foresee a joint JI-al-Qaeda plot to target the U.S., British, and Israeli embassies. However, the plan is inadvertently thwarted when Singaporean authorities arrest key JI members, essentially incapacitating JI in Singapore.¹⁰⁵
- **December 30, 2000:** JI bombs the Light Railways Train in Manila, Philippines, killing 22.¹⁰⁶ It occurs during Rizal Day, a national holiday commemorating the martyrdom of the nation's hero, José Rizal. According to Philippines police investigation, JI member Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was responsible for the bombing. He later confesses that the bombing assignment in the Philippines was funded by the JI.¹⁰⁷

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

- **December 24, 2000:** JI debuts its first major terrorist operation, simultaneously bombing 28 churches in the Indonesian cities of Jakarta, Sumatra, and Java, killing 19 and wounding more than 120. The Christmas Eve project was planned and coordinated by JI operational leader, Hambali.¹⁰⁸
- **August 1, 2000:** *Rabitatul Mujahidin* decides to attack Philippine interests in Indonesia in retaliation for the Philippine government's crackdown on MILF. A bomb detonates outside the Philippine Ambassador's home in Jakarta, killing two and injuring 20.¹⁰⁹
- **1999:** JI forms a regional alliance called the *Rabitatul Mujahidin* to operationalize its objectives. The alliance includes the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, as well as an unnamed self-exiled group of Rohingyas based in Bangladesh, and an unnamed jihadist group from southern Thailand.¹¹⁰
- **May 1998:** Indonesian President Suharto resigns after 30 years in power. Bashir and Sungkar return to Indonesia, seizing an opportunity to establish a caliphate. JI militants launch a campaign of sectarian violence against Christians and Hindus.¹¹¹
- **1995:** Ramzi Yousef attempts to bomb 12 American airliners, part of what is known as the Bojinka plot, planned by Yousef and his partner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). The plot ultimately failed because of a chemical fire that Yousef started in his kitchen in Manila, attempting to create a liquid explosive device. The fire brings in the Philippine police, who in turn shared recovered files with the United States. The Bojinka plot was also financed by Hambali's front company, Konsojaya Trading Company.¹¹² According to the 9/11 Commission Report, it is with this plot that KSM conceived of using aircraft as weapons.¹¹³
- **February 26, 1993:** A 1,200-lb bomb detonates in a rented van in the parking garage below the World Trade Center.¹¹⁴ The blast from the bomb kills six people and injures 1,000.¹¹⁵ The attack is financed by a Malaysia-based firm called Konsojaya Trading Company.¹¹⁶ This front company was founded by JI leader Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, to launder terror-financing funds.¹¹⁷

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- ¹¹³ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. (Washington, D.C.): National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch5.pdf.
- ¹¹⁴ “1993 World Trade Center Fast Facts,” CNN, February 13, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-center-bombing-fast-facts/>.
- ¹¹⁵ Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. (Stanford: Stanford UP), p. 17, <http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=10507>.
- ¹¹⁶ Aurel Croissant and Daniel Barlow, “Government Responses in Southeast Asia,” *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford UP), p. 212, <http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=10507>.
- ¹¹⁷ Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances,” in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford UP), p. 124, <http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=10507>.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Designations:

Designations by the U.S. Government:

- **October 23, 2002:** The U.S. Department of State designates Jemaah Islamiyah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 23, 2002.¹¹⁸
- **January 24, 2003:** The U.S. Department of State designates Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin (a.k.a. Hambali) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on January 24, 2003.¹¹⁹
- The U.S. Department of State designates Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman (a.k.a. Abu Jibril) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on January 24, 2003.¹²⁰
- **April 13, 2006:** The U.S. Department of State designates Abu Bakar Bashir as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on April 13, 2006.¹²¹
- **August 16, 2011:** The U.S. Department of State designates Umar Patek as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on August 16, 2011.¹²²
- **August 16, 2011:** The U.S. Department of State designates Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on August 16, 2011.¹²³
- **September 24, 2014:** The U.S. Department of Treasury designates Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on September 24, 2014.¹²⁴

Designations by Foreign Governments and Organizations:

- **October 27, 2002:** Australia designated Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization on October 27, 2002.¹²⁵
 - **April 23, 2008:** Indonesia designated Jemaah Islamiyah as an illegal organization on April 23, 2008.¹²⁶
 - **November 2002:** The United Kingdom designated Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization in November 2002.¹²⁷
 - **October 25, 2002:** The United Nations Security Council Committee listed Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization linked to al-Qaeda or the Taliban on October 25, 2002.¹²⁸
- The United Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) as a terrorist organization for supporting acts or activities of Jemaah Islamiyah on March 13, 2015.¹²⁹

¹¹⁸ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," U.S. Department of State, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Designated Two as Terrorists Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah," IIP Digital United States Embassy, January 24, 2003, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/01/20030124161402mkellerh@pd.state.gov0.1734735.html#axzz3GdW8jgk6>.

¹²⁰ U.S. Designated Two as Terrorists Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah," IIP Digital United States Embassy, January 24, 2003, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/01/20030124161402mkellerh@pd.state.gov0.1734735.html#axzz3GdW8jgk6>.

¹²¹ "Recent OFAC Actions," U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 13, 2006, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20060413.aspx>.

¹²² "Treasury Sanctions Three Senior Members of the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 16, 2011, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1276.aspx>.

¹²³ "Treasury Sanctions Three Senior Members of the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 16, 2011, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1276.aspx>.

¹²⁴ "Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 24, 2014, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2651.aspx>.

¹²⁵ "Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)," Australian National Security, October 19, 2014, <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx>.

¹²⁶ Mark Forbes, "Jakarta backs court's decision to outlaw Jemaah Islamiyah," *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 23, 2008, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/jakarta-backs-courts-decision-to-outlaw-jemaah-islamiyah/2008/04/22/1208742940633.html>.

¹²⁷ "Proscribed Terrorist Organisations," GOV.UK, August 20, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354891/ProscribedOrganisationsAug14.pdf.

¹²⁸ "The List established and maintained by the 1267/1989 Committee," United Nations, last modified March 26, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/1267.pdf>.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

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“QDe.147HILAL AHMAR SOCIETY INDONESIA (HASI),” United Nations, March 13, 2015,
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/hilal-ahmar-society-indonesia-%28hasi%29.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Associations:

Ties to Extremist Entities:

- **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)**
ASG, an extremist Islamic insurgent group in the Philippines, has provided a special training camp for JI militants within its training camp in Southern Mindanao. JI members in turn have provided training in subjects such as bomb-making and weapons-handling. JI also served as a direct connection between ASG and al-Qaeda core. A key JI leader, Zulkifli Abdir, a.k.a Marwan, was long harbored in the ASG-controlled region in the Philippines and continued to operate there.¹³⁰ Marwan was confirmed dead after a 12-hour bloody gunfight with Philippine police's elite Special Action Force (SAF), during which 44 members of SAF were killed.¹³¹ However, a Philippine intelligence chief has asserted that 10 to 12 JI members continue to reside among ASG in the southern Philippines.¹³²
- **Al-Qaeda**
JI's experiences with al-Qaeda jihadists in Afghanistan significantly influenced its doctrine and also served to solidify a connection between JI and al-Qaeda core.¹³³ Al-Qaeda core had initially provided a bulk of revenue to JI also, though JI members are able to raise their own funds. Some analysts believe the group is still financially connected.¹³⁴ Between 2014 and 2016, some members of JI associated with al-Qaeda's former formal affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra Front, and joined the group there.¹³⁵
- **ISIS**
In July 2014, former JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from an Indonesian prison.¹³⁶ Though some recent reports claim that JI leadership is opposed to ISIS, Southeast Asian and Australian government officials fear a possible JI-ISIS link threatens the region.¹³⁷ Australian PM Abbott concurs on this assessment, stating, "Jemaah Islamiyah have pledged their allegiance to the ISIL movement and that does indicate the potential for increased terror activity in our region."¹³⁸ Some analysts believe that the Indonesian jihadists see ISIS as an "embryo of an Islamic caliphate."¹³⁹
- **Al-Nusra Front (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham)**
By one account from a JI member himself, there were at least 150 Indonesian fighters who have joined either ISIS or al-Nusra Front to fight on the frontlines in Syria.¹⁴⁰
- **Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Indonesia**
JAT seeks to establish an extreme interpretation of Islamic law with the ultimate goal of creating an Indonesian caliphate. There is likely an overlap in membership with JI since JAT founder, Abu Bakar Bashir, is a key leader of JI.¹⁴¹ According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, however, Bashir's establishment of JAT led to his break from JI.¹⁴²
- **Kumpulan Mujahadin Malaysia (KMM, or Malaysian Militant Group), Malaysia**
KMM is a Malaysian extremist group that seeks to overthrow the Malaysian government and establish an Islamic state. The group also aims to include Indonesia and southern Philippines to create a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic state. Many of KMM's members, much like the Jemaah Islamiyah, (JI) trained as jihadists in Afghanistan with some members fighting in the Soviet-Afghan war.¹⁴³ As mujahidin, KMM members established relationships with members of other Islamic extremist groups in the region.¹⁴⁴ Some sources claim that Abu Bakar Bashir, JI's founder, is also a founder of the KMM,¹⁴⁵ while others claim that he advises and assists KMM leaders.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁰ "Marwan alive has serious implications: Trillanes," ABS-CBN News, August 7, 2014, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/08/07/14/marwan-alive-has-serious-implications-trillanes>.

¹³¹ Tim Hume, "Man killed in Philippines raid was wanted terror suspect Marwan, DNA indicates," CNN, February 5, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/world/philippines-marwan-dna-positive/>.

¹³² "Marwan alive has serious implications: Trillanes," ABS-CBN News, August 7, 2014, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/08/07/14/marwan-alive-has-serious-implications-trillanes>.

¹³³ David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, "Jemaah Islamiyah," Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf.

¹³⁴ Yanina Goldburt, "An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network," *al Nakhlah* (Fall 2004), <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx>.

¹³⁵ Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria," Middle East Institute, January 27, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/there-and-back-again-indonesian-fighters-syria>.

¹³⁶ Perdani, Yuliasri and Ina Parlina. "Govt to tighten prison security following Ba'asyir's 'baiat'," *Jakarta Post*, August 5, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/05/govt-tighten-prison-security-following-ba-asyir-s-baiat.html>.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

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- ¹³⁷ Stephanie Balogh, "Jemaah Islamiyah alignment to Islamic State a potential threat: Abbott," *Australian* (Surry Hills), August 21, 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/middle-east-in-turmoil/jemaah-islamiyah-alignment-to-islamic-state-a-potential-threat-abbott/story-fn7ycml4-1227031712670>; "The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah," Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 1, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.
- ¹³⁸ Sarah Dean, David Martosko et al, "'Truly sickening and utterly evil': Tony Abbott warns of Aussie beheadings as it's revealed Indonesian terrorists Jemaah Islamiyah has sided with ISIS killers who beheaded James Foley," *Daily Mail* (London), August 20, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2730480/PM-Tony-Abbott-warns-Australians-new-threats-Indonesian-terror-group-Jemaah-Islamiyah-calls-James-Foleys-beheading-truly-sickening.html>.
- ¹³⁹ "Indonesians joining rebels in Syria, Iraq," *Manila Times*, June 20, 2012, <http://www.manilatimes.net/indonesians-joining-rebels-in-syria-iraq/105529/>.
- ¹⁴⁰ Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria," Middle East Institute, January 27, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/there-and-back-again-indonesian-fighters-syria>.
- ¹⁴¹ "Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)," 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar, accessed October 19, 2014, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/jat.html>.
- ¹⁴² "The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah," Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 3, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.
- ¹⁴³ "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Malaysian Mujahideen Movement," Global Security.org, accessed April 17, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kmm.htm>.
- ¹⁴⁴ "Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Malaysian Mujahideen Movement," Global Security.org, accessed April 17, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kmm.htm>.
- ¹⁴⁵ "Jemaah Islamiyah," Mapping Militant Organizations, Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, February 2012, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/251>.
- ¹⁴⁶ "Terrorist Organization Profile: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4401.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Media Coverage:

JI and ISIS, Resurgent Threat

From 2014, activity in the Philippines, combined with JI's alignment with ISIS,¹⁴⁷ renewed fears of a resurgent JI threat in Australia and the surrounding region. Australian PM Abbot concurred on this assessment, stating, "Jemaah Islamiyah have pledged their allegiance to the ISIL movement and that does indicate the potential for increased terror activity in our region."¹⁴⁸ In July 2014, JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from an Indonesian prison.¹⁴⁹

In May of 2014, a spate of terror arrests in Java was thought to signal the return of JI to the country, possibly ushering in a new stage in JI's history.¹⁵⁰ According to a source within the National Police anti-terror squad, "The new JI cell is very neat and organized; they have a management, soldiers and an Amir. We estimate to have at least 3,000 soldiers and we think the Amir is a returning old player."¹⁵¹ During the May arrests, it was revealed that the group had a makeshift arms industry. The particular cell is known for its weapons assembly skills.¹⁵² In addition to this the growth of support for ISIS, some analysts believe that the Indonesian jihadis see ISIS as an 'embryo of an Islamic caliphate.'¹⁵³ With the announcement of JI's dissolution in June 2024, it remains to be seen if any elements will continue to pose a violent threat.¹⁵⁴

JI and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Both Western and Southeast Asian media outlets highlight the strong relationship between JI and the ASG, the latter still making news even in the U.S. and Europe for targeting tourists for kidnap and ransom. ASG, known to have conducted vicious killings in 2014,¹⁵⁵ continually harbors JI terrorists, such as now-deceased leader Marwan.¹⁵⁶ According to Philippine Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, Marwan was one of the most dangerous terrorists in the world and topped the FBI's most-wanted list. Agence France-Presse reported that ASG militants are harboring three Malaysian JI members who provide bomb making training to the group.¹⁵⁷ This highlights one of the key features of the relationship: exchange of tactics and skills. For instance, JI fighters were trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in turn established a training camp at Camp Abu Bakr in Mindanao, Philippines. In summer 2014, the GMA network, a major Tagalog and English language news conglomerate in the Philippines, drew attention to ASG's connection to JI during coverage of the ASG's recent deadly attacks on over two dozen civilians.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁷ Stephanie Balogh, "Jemaah Islamiyah alignment to Islamic State a potential threat: Abbott," *Australian* (Surry Hills), August 21, 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/middle-east-in-turmoil/jemaah-islamiyah-alignment-to-islamic-state-a-potential-threat-abbott/story-fn7ycml4-1227031712670>.

¹⁴⁸ Sarah Dean, David Martosko et al, "'Truly sickening and utterly evil': Tony Abbott warns of Aussie beheadings as it's revealed Indonesian terrorists Jemaah Islamiyah has sided with ISIS killers who beheaded James Foley," *Daily Mail* (London), August 20, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2730480/PM-Tony-Abbott-warns-Australians-new-threats-Indonesian-terror-group-Jemaah-Islamiyah-calls-James-Foleys-beheading-truly-sickening.html>.

¹⁴⁹ Perdani, Yuliasri and Ina Parlina. "Govt to tighten prison security following Ba'asyir's 'baiat'," *Jakarta Post*, August 5, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/05/govt-tighten-prison-security-following-ba-asyir-s-baiat.html>.

¹⁵⁰ Farouk Arnaz, "Arrests Reveal Jemaah Islamiyah's Return, Police Source Says," *Jakarta Globe*, May 21, 2014, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/arrests-reveal-jemaah-islamiyahs-return/>.

¹⁵¹ Farouk Arnaz, "Arrests Reveal Jemaah Islamiyah's Return, Police Source Says," *Jakarta Globe*, May 21, 2014, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/arrests-reveal-jemaah-islamiyahs-return/>.

¹⁵² Farouk Arnaz, "Arrests Reveal Jemaah Islamiyah's Return, Police Source Says," *Jakarta Globe*, May 21, 2014, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/arrests-reveal-jemaah-islamiyahs-return/>.

¹⁵³ "Indonesians joining rebels in Syria, Iraq," *Manila Times*, June 20, 2012, <http://www.manilatimes.net/indonesians-joining-rebels-in-syria-iraq/105529/>.

¹⁵⁴ "Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah (Updated)," Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict, July 4, 2024, <https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated.pdf.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ "21 civilians killed in suspected Abu Sayyaf ambush in Sulu," GMA Network, July 28, 2014, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/372295/news/regions/21-civilians-killed-in-suspected-abu-sayyaf-ambush-in-sulu>.

¹⁵⁶ "Marwan alive has serious implications: Trillanes," ABS-CBN News, August 7, 2014, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/08/07/14/marwan-alive-has-serious-implications-trillanes>.

¹⁵⁷ Agence France-Presse, "Toll in Philippine clashes with Islamists rises to 26," *Daily Mail* (London), February 28, 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2973152/Toll-Philippine-clashes-Islamists-rises-26.html>.

¹⁵⁸ "21 civilians killed in suspected Abu Sayyaf ambush in Sulu," GMA Network, July 28, 2014, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/372295/news/regions/21-civilians-killed-in-suspected-abu-sayyaf-ambush-in-sulu>.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Rhetoric:

Istimata (Absolute Struggle) Webpage, In Reference to Bali bombings, December 2002

“Let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted for.

[...]

“The heinous crime and international conspiracy of the Christians also extends to the Philippines and Indonesia. This has resulted in Muslim cleansing in Moro, Ambon, Poso and surrounding areas. It is clearly evident the crusade is continuing and will not stop. Every blow will be repaid. Blood will be redeemed by blood. A life for a life. One Muslim to another is like a single body. If one part is in pain, the other part will also feel it.

[...]

“To all you Christian unbelievers, if you define this act on your civilians as heinous and cruel, you yourself have committed crimes which are more heinous. The cries of the babies and Muslim women... has never succeeded in stopping your brutality. Well, here we are the Muslim men! We will harness the pain of the death of our brothers and sisters. You will bear the consequences of your actions wherever you are.

[...]

“We are responsible for the incident in Legina, Kuta, Bali.”¹⁵⁹

Abu Bakar Bashir, October 2002

“The government of Indonesia right now is being directed by America to service its needs and the primary need of America is to bury Islam particularly in Indonesia. Therefore, following on from this, America will be able to direct political and economic affairs in accordance with its own desires. Because of this, let us defend our religion, let us being to defend our religion... Hence our religion Islam, our nation and our country is currently being threatened by foreign races with hall manner of libels, with the bombings in Bali, with explosions everywhere, all of those are the plots of non-believers whose aims are to weaken and profane the believers of Islam. Therefore, accordingly they can exert power over this country in order that it may be taken advantage of. Brother and sisters let us hope for and be conscious of the defense of Islam, let us embark upon Jihad for Allah, let us struggle to implement the law of Allah and let us apply a unity within ourselves between all Muslims.”¹⁶⁰

Imam Samudra, Bali Bombing Perpetrator, October 2002

“I hate Americans because it is the real center of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly tyrannized Islam...I carry out jihad because it’s the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing.”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Greg Fealy, “Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali Bombings,” International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter #31, July 2003, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/31/IIASN31_03.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003), 167.

¹⁶¹ Greg Fealy, “Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali Bombings,” International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter #31, July 2003, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/31/IIASN31_03.pdf.