Over nearly a decade, the Houthis have strengthened their grip on Yemen’s economy, built a ruthless and efficient security apparatus, acquired and deployed advanced weaponry, and indoctrinated around 20 million people living under their control. Throughout this time, many policymakers and regional experts claimed "armed intervention only drives the Houthis to further excel at what they are best at: fighting." However, after seven years of entrenchment and expansion (2018–2025), the Houthi terror enterprise is today being challenged militarily in a very sustained and powerful manner.

Since the mid-March regular U.S. airstrikes across roughly half of the 14 governorates under full or partial Houthi control, the group’s response has been notably anemic. While the Houthis have largely refused to acknowledge casualties among their senior officials, reports suggest that key figures have been targeted. General Abdulrab “Abu Taha” Jarfan, previously identified by CEP as a former undersecretary of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service, was reported by Al-Arabiya to have been assassinated. Zain Alabedein al-Mahturi, a security official allegedly trained in Iran and related to top regime figures, was also reportedly killed in the U.S. strikes in March. Additionally, Hassan and Hashem Sharaf al-Din, both holding senior positions in the Houthi government, were said to have been targeted. While Houthi media claims they survived, Hashem, the regime’s minister of information, was reportedly injured in a "traffic accident." 

All told, the number of regime fatalities is believed to have surpassed 100 so far with a very limited number of collateral damage. In response, the Houthis have so far limited their retaliation to drone and missile attacks against U.S. warships in the region—none of which have been successful.

The U.S. strikes in the vicinity of Marib have already disrupted Houthi preparations to take that strategic city. Under the previous U.S. rules of engagement, the Houthis were able to separate the Red Sea theater from their prosecution of the civil war. But now concentrations of troops and engineering works in support of sieges are subject to destruction by U.S. air power. Hence the Houthis have stopped preparations to take Marib and will be unable to make significant headway on the front lines until they are safe from aerial assault.

How can the gap between the Houthis' powerful image and their lackluster response to painful strikes be explained? 

The primary explanation for this dissonance is the group’s intensive focus on information operations. The goal of this effort is clear: to convince both the Yemeni public and the international community that resisting the group’s extremist ambitions is futile. To that end, the Houthis’ complete dominance of Yemen’s information space has enabled them to monitor and control both domestic narratives and the material transmitted abroad. 

As noted in CEP’s report on Houthi telecommunications, one of the regime’s first moves after seizing Sanaa in 2014 was to take control of Yemen’s media outlets and the infrastructure used to disseminate information (ISPs, MNOs). The Houthis then gave journalists and media figures in areas under their control a stark choice: promote the regime’s narrative or remain silent. Those who dared to criticize the regime anyway were prosecuted for crimes against national security, sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and subjected to brutal torture. Notably, one former critic, after enduring time in a Houthi prison, has since been “convinced” to become one of the regime’s chief propagandists.

Military operations have been carefully integrated into the Houthi media strategy to create an aura of invincibility. A key factor in this effort has been the advanced weaponry supplied by Iran. Precision strikes and long-range attacks against Yemen’s far wealthier and more powerful neighbors pressured those countries to scale back their support for anti-Houthi forces. Additionally, intensifying strikes on Riyadh and Dubai further fueled the perception that the Saudi-led campaign had not only failed to defeat the Houthis but had, in fact, made them stronger over time. Given this narrative of the indomitable Houthi warrior, why would any other country—with far less at stake in Yemen than the Gulf states—risk becoming entangled in the country’s quagmire?

In parallel, the Houthis carefully cultivated the image of a reasonable, peace-seeking interlocutor. Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a key regime figure and relative of Supreme Leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi, even published an article in The Washington Post titled “Houthi leader: We want peace for Yemen, but Saudi airstrikes must stop.” For those familiar with the group’s ruthless ideology, this portrayal was absurd. 

Nevertheless, the false impression that the Houthis are both undefeatable and interested in peace proved highly effective, earning the Houthis significant political and diplomatic advantages.

First, it regrettably helped to shape the largely ineffective approach of the previous U.S. administration towards this terror group. If the Houthis truly wanted peace, the former White House reasoned, then pressure should be placed on Saudi Arabia while the Houthis are incentivized. Early in his tenure, President Biden lifted the Houthis’ Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation and scaled back military support for Saudi Arabia. This gave the Houthis breathing room to intensify attacks on the kingdom, seize additional Yemeni territory, and later attempt to extort Saudi Arabia in what resembled a negotiated surrender. During the Saudi-Houthi ceasefire reached in 2022-23—portrayed as a “reprieve for the Yemeni people”—the Houthis took advantage of the lull to rest, rearm, and fortify their underground strategic facilities.

Second, the assessment that engaging with the Houthis could yield productive results enabled the group to maintain their “diplomatic installation” in Muscat, Oman. This outpost reportedly employed over 100 personnel and served as a hub for smuggling weapons into Yemen and trafficking illicit gains out. Few agreements were reached with the Houthis, and those that were went unfulfilled by the regime. Despite these setbacks, that assessment that the solution to the conflict must be political rather than military, driven by the group’s own media campaigns, largely persisted and military pressure was only exerted again after January 2024 following sustained attempts by the Houthis to shut down international shipping through the Red Sea following the pogrom-like terror attack of Hamas against Israel and Israeli civilians. Unfortunately, these initial, extremely cautious military operations did not yield significant results. 

The ongoing, much broader U.S. airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen will test the belief that it is more effective to engage the Houthis at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. While the group's information campaign effectively shaped the views of many senior Western decision-makers, the image they created in the media is unlikely to withstand the latest collision with reality. Now, Washington must rally a coalition and apply sustained military, economic, and diplomatic pressure to drive the Houthis to collapse.