Following U.S., UK, and Israeli strikes on Houthi assets in Yemen, an official Houthi Telegram channel announced the funerals of some of its military officers killed in the attacks. One of the names listed was Col. Majd al-Din al-Mortada. Al-Mortada, also known as “Abu Mortada,” was a key figure at the intersection of Houthi torture and extortion operations.

A poster announcing the death of Majd al-Din al-Mortada.

As highlighted in the CEP report on Houthi targeting of women and journalists, Houthi official Abdulqader al-Mortada serves as Chairman of the National Committee for Prisoners Affairs. Former detainees have testified that in this role he not only oversees torture in Houthi prisons, but personally partakes in torturing prisoners, including journalists.  About one year after the publication of CEP’s report in November 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Abdulqader al-Mortada for human rights abuses in Yemen.

A senior Yemeni official explained on X that not only was Abdulqader engaged in the abuse of detainees, but his brother “Abu Shehab” al-Mortada was involved in torturing and extorting prisoners in Houthi jails. This was outlined in the CEP report, but at that time it was not yet clear that a third al-Mortada brother, Majd al-Din al-Mortada, was also engaged in these activities.

According to one Yemeni news report, the al-Mortada family is in charge of the Central Security Camp Prison in Sanaa and the brothers divide the roles and responsibilities amongst themselves. Majd al-Din was “in charge of looting the money transferred to detainees from their families and blackmailing families [of prisoners] in various ways…[prisoners] are not allowed to contact anyone except to request money that is later confiscated by Abu Shahab and Majd al-Din al-Mortada.”

Another report on the Houthi prison system explained that officials in Central Security Camp Prison “have turned into black market traders, blackmailing the families of the kidnapped and making huge sums of money from the false promises and fake hopes [based on practices of] fraud and deception.” The report then goes on to assess that the Houthis had turned prisoners into a significant source of revenue, and according to some estimates this generates hundreds of thousands of dollars per month. Indeed, the report claims that Houthi operatives have expanded the scope of their kidnapping campaign to extract more money from the families of victims. 

In light of its “profitability,” the Central Security Camp Prison became known among Houthis by the tongue-in-cheek name “Mortada Port.” This is a reference to the revenues reaped by the Mortada family from this prison and implies a comparison to the profitability of regime-controlled ports, including Hodeidah port. As part of the 2018 UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement, the Houthis had committed to hand over Hodeidah port to a neutral third party and allocate all revenues from it to payment of public sector salaries. They have long since reneged on those commitments. 

Journalist Abdelkhaleq al-Omran, who was previously imprisoned by the Houthis in the Central Security Camp Prison, assessed that “Aid and medicines provided by international organizations are sold to the abductees at twice their [outside] prices.” Al-Omran explained that ICRC visited the prisoners and provided them with some goods which were later confiscated by the al-Mortada brothers and resold to the detainees. Some of the goods sold to prisoners at inflated prices are reported to be expired or about to expire.

The fact that the Houthis are extorting the prisoners in the Central Security Camp Prison and their families should not come as a surprise given the regime’s overall predatory nature. In previous CEP reports, including the work CEP has conducted on the diversion of humanitarian aid and the regime’s Security and Intelligence Services, similar behavior was repeatedly documented as the regime and its operatives have consistently demonstrated a staunch disregard for human life and basic human rights. This attitude is also evident from the past decade of conflict and instability to which the regime has dragged the Yemeni population and the broader Middle East in order to serve its own interests.

Given the current situation—where the Houthis not only hold UN staff hostage but have also caused the death of one employee recently—continued UN involvement in Houthi-controlled areas risks perpetuating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis rather than alleviating it. By operating there, UN organizations may inadvertently provide the Houthis with opportunities to generate revenue and leverage, thereby bolstering the Houthi regime.

The World Food Program, Yemen’s largest humanitarian aid provider, has yet to offer reliable statistics on the well-documented diversion of aid in Houthi-controlled areas. Despite this, in August 2024 it resumed operations after a six-month pause, with no clear indication that conditions have improved to justify the decision to recommence aid delivery. More recently, WFP once again scaled back its activities in specific Houthi-controlled areas due to the Houthis continued detention of its employees. Meanwhile, the UN continues to engage publicly with figures responsible for some of the regime’s most heinous crimes, such as Abdulqader al-Mortada, thereby granting them and their regime undue legitimacy.