The modern culture of the West tends to promote tolerance and respect for individuals, including those in immigrant or minority ethnic communities, no matter how illiberal their worldview, as long as they are not violent. Thus, while Western governments vigorously prosecute the war on terror, they often overlook essential ideological sources of “violent extremism.”

It is within this context of moral relativism and political correctness that Prime Minister Cameron delivered a stem-winder of a speech on July 20 in Birmingham, England. His remarks were intended to spur governmental and civil-societal resistance to “the growing scourge of radicalization” in British society. It called for decisive action to stigmatize barbaric practices such as female genital mutilation in the Muslim community and summoned universities to challenge the core tenets of the Islamist narrative – anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, for instance – in the same way they challenge Holocaust denial. It deserves to be remembered as one of the most ambitious and tough-minded addresses by a Western political leader about the growing threat posed by religious fanaticism.

Cameron’s message has been a mighty long time in coming. Thanks to ISIS’s control of vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, its expansion into Libya and Yemen – and its extensive recruiting power through social media – the subject of extremist ideology now commands attention worldwide. More often than not, however, the response of world leaders has been characterized by complacency and confusion.

Cameron broke from this pattern, advancing the argument that “any strategy to defeat extremism must confront, head on, the extreme ideology that underpins it.” Every decent government opposes violent extremism. Where Cameron parts company from the Western governing class is his insistence in calling the threat by its right name: Islamism.

For the prime minister to acknowledge the connection between an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam and violence - rather than to indulge the conceit that Islam is simply “a religion of peace” - serves a dual purpose. First, it brings pressure to bear on the agents of intolerance that have eclipsed liberal and reformist voices in Muslim communities. In modern-day Britain, Muslim victims of Islamism have been forced to endure female genital mutilation and forced marriage, among other characteristics of the “honor” culture. The past insouciance of British institutions toward these vulnerable members of society is nothing less than a betrayal of citizenship.

The second purpose of recognizing the faith-based ideology at the root of this violent menace is to support the voices of a more modern and diverse Islam, in Britain and beyond. Given the battle of ideas raging in the Islamic world, it does no good for open societies to pretend they are neutral, or, more bewildering still, to deny that any battle is being fought. For the sake of their own security, Cameron argued, British institutions should actively encourage “reforming” voices in Muslim communities who embrace liberal values.

For too long, political leaders have refused to confront Islamic extremism out of concern for cultural sensitivity or liberal tolerance. This has all but guaranteed that it would fester, and spread. To cite but one example: British Muslims who count themselves as supporters of ISIS now outnumber Muslims who serve in in the British armed forces. The triumph of liberal civilization over the illiberal ideology in our midst depends on staring the enemy full in the face. Prime Minister Cameron deserves our thanks for having done so.

Freedom of speech and freedom of religion are key rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Unfortunately, there are some in our country who have used the Constitution as an enabling device to further their advocacy of violent ideologies and actions.

Anwar al-Awlaki was born in New Mexico, attended Colorado State University, and worked at mosques in San Diego and Virginia. He was also a jihadist propagandist and, according to the United States government, a “key leader” of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Awlaki died in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen. But before he moved to Yemen in 2004, al-Awlaki preached at U.S. mosques, where he also reportedly met with future 9/11 hijackers. He also directly influenced many other extremists. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted but failed to blow up an airplane with explosives hidden in his underwear, allegedly received direct instructions from al-Awlaki. Nidal Hasan, who shot and killed 13 people in his 2009 attack at Fort Hood, called al-Awlaki a teacher and a friend. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, also claimed to be under al-Awlaki’s influence.

Al-Awlaki may be gone, but other Islamist propagandists are following in his footsteps. Ahmad Musa Jibril is an American Islamist preacher who may well become the inheritor of al-Awlaki’s mantle. From his home in Dearborn, Michigan, Jibril has produced Internet lectures advocating an extremist Salafist version of Islam. His YouTube sermons have praised Syrian fighters as “real men,” while his tweets are filled with anti-West invective, such as this January 2014 post.

Jibril differs slightly from al-Awlaki in style. He does not specifically advocate violence, but he praises Islamist ideals and thereby inspires his followers to violent jihad. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) dubbed Jibril part of “a new set of spiritual authorities” influencing Westerners to become foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict. Sixty percent of foreign fighters in Syria follow Jibril on Twitter, according to an April 2014 ICSR report. Jibril “bridges the gap” for Westerners who may not understand Arabic, said the ICSR's Shiraz Maher. Jibril “provides the political and theological justification” and “comfort” to jihadists, said ICSR director Peter Neumann.

While al-Awlaki eventually moved to Yemen, Jibril appears content to continue living in Michigan. Jibril’s Facebook and Twitter accounts have not been updated in more than a year, attributable to June 2014 court-ordered restrictions following violations of his probation from a  2005 fraud conviction for which he spent seven years in prison. Federal Judge Gerald Rosen reportedly restricted Jibril’s social-media access to ensure he does not influence others.

The accounts may be inactive, but they continue to influence foreign fighters. In June, for example, three British women—Sugra Dawood, Zohra Dawood, and Khadija Dawood—flew to Turkey with their combined nine children in order to cross into Syria. One of Sugra Dawood’s children, 14-year-old Ibrahim Iqbal, reportedly “liked” Jibril’s Facebook page.

Jibril has yet to return to his digital pulpit since the court-ordered restrictions expired in March, but his audience continues to grow. His Facebook page has more than 240,000 likes, up from about 217,000 in July 2014. His YouTube page has more than 9,500 subscribers, and his Twitter account has more than 28,000 followers.

Al-Awlaki made the leap from rhetorical to physical support for AQAP, while Jibril remains an ideological supporter of general jihadism rather than a specific group. Still, the similarities between them are clear, as illustrated below.

Al-Awlaki eventually wore his militancy on his sleeve, making it easier for U.S. authorities to label, track, and eventually kill him. Islamists like Jibril—who just avoid crossing the line from repugnant-yet-protected speech into explicitly violent rhetoric—are harder to stop.

For more than a decade now, a debate has raged over whether Pakistan is an ally or a foe in the battle against violent extremism. In Western media, analysis usually focuses on Pakistan’s weak civil central government, the virulently anti-Indian military or conspiracy theories about the country’s intelligence arm – the ISI.

If the conversation is limited to these three factors – then you are left to conclude that Pakistan is incapable or unwilling to address extremism. Yet, if one looks past the government and takes a closer look at what the people of Pakistan are doing, a more complex picture emerges. The truth is, a growing number of Pakistanis are initiating grassroots change, especially by pushing counter-narratives to radicalism through public education programs and campaigns throughout the country.

It is easy to see why many people concluded that waiting for the government to act was pointless. As Pakistan’s Express Tribune reports, “The 2006 Madrassa Reform Project [in Pakistan] aimed to reform 8,000 schools by integrating a balance between formal and religious education and expanding curricula to include the teaching of social and hard sciences, religious tolerance, and human rights. Only 6.3 percent of the targeted madrassas were reached. In 2008, the education ministry reported it had only spent $4 million of the allotted $100 million for madrassa reform over the past six years.”

Also, in 2013, the former Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan emphasized the need to correct the Islamized education system to combat indoctrination. Yet, there has been no change due to alleged budgetary constraints.

Into this void have flooded regular Pakistanis. Organizations such as Khudi host a variety of programs, seminars and conferences to raise awareness of issues related to human rights, including respect for tolerance in society. The group also publishes an inter-university magazine to increase communication between Pakistani youth throughout the country’s provinces. The magazine provides an opportunity for students who typically identify ethnically, linguistically and parochially with their unique communities, to get to know students of other provinces. One goal of such interraction is a reduction in sectarian violence in Pakistan, which has increased significantly in the last decade.

Other identified CSO activity by The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) includes the National Rural Support Programme, which improves the communication skills of local communities, so they may better identify and combat issues of extremism at a local level.

A WORDE report, “Pakistan’s Civil Society: Alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism,” highlights the activities of religious leaders and organizations that have played a critical role in reducing extremism in Pakistan. Imam, Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri, authored a 600-page fatwa rejecting terrorism and suicide bombing. An organization in Lahore called the Minhaj-ul-Quran encourages its religious students to celebrate Christmas with Christians in the city. Interfaith activity is a key factor in increasing respect and tolerance for non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.

De-radicalization programs are also a necessary counter-extremism measure. Such programs represent a unique area of NGO and CSO outreach, due to the role played by the Pakistani military. Unlike the general population, arrested militants are already processed into the military/law enforcement system. As a result, this is one area where the Pakistani military has made an effort to support de-radicalization programs, such as the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation. The Sabaoon Center is run by the Hum Pakistani Foundation in Swat, where some of the heaviest anti-Taliban fighting has occurred over the years. Other known de-radicalization programs include Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila.

The Pakistani government has attempted to address extremism also, but with mixed results. After Taliban militants killed more than 100 children at the Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif presented a 20-point National Action Plan (“NAP”) to address extremism in Pakistan. Unfortunately, only one point addressed education reform, which focused narrowly on registering and regulating religious schools. The remainder of the plan focused on cracking down on terrorists, including increasing the power of anti-terrorism laws, enforcement and anti-terrorism courts.

As a result, since the passage of NAP, there has been a spike in death sentences in Pakistan’s anti-terrorism courts, resulting in 139 executions between January-June of 2015 alone. This comes on the heels of the July 2014 Protection of Pakistan Act, which increased monitoring for terrorism-related activity in the country. The new legislation “grants police officers the powers to shoot and kill alleged terrorists and detain suspects for questioning for up to 60 days without charge.”

Still, with or without the active contribution from Pakistan’s central government, the push to improve education is growing. Pakistani Nobel-laureate, Malala Yousafzai recently began a campaign entitled #booksnotbullets, hoping to push governments like Pakistan to divert funds from its military to education. 

Progress is being made, but sometimes only in small increments. Malala’s campaign comes on the heels of Pakistani authorities acquitting eight of the 10 Taliban members who stood accused of shooting Malala in the head and wounding other girls on a school bus. Twenty-five-year sentences were expected for all 10 defendants but a purported lack of evidence resulted in most of the attackers being acquitted.