Boko Haram rose to international prominence in April 2014 following its abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls in the Nigerian town of Chibok.

The radical Islamist sect had previously gained notoriety through countless acts of violence, including bombings, raids and kidnappings that killed thousands.  Clearly, even prior to the kidnapping of schoolgirls, Boko Haram had emerged as a serious security threat in Northeastern Nigeria.

The numbers bare this out. Since Boko Haram escalated attacks in mid2009, approximately 11,100 people (on all sides) have died in incidents relating to Boko Haram. From July 2013 to June 2014, 7,000 people  died in incidents relating to Boko Haram attacks (compared to 1,900 deaths the year before). Based on these numbers, The Nigeria Social Violence Dataset compiled by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) argued that “Nigerian casualties are now running more than double those in Afghanistan, and substantially higher than in Iraq just a few years ago,” making it one of the most significant insurgencies in the world.

As the scale of violence escalates and the territory subject to attack widens, questions over Boko Haram’s territorial ambitions arise. Does the group seek to establish autonomy over an area in Nigeria or does it seek to expand beyond Nigeria to exert control over the wider region?

Boko Haram claims to be motivated by domestic grievances in Nigeria linked to failures of local governance, sectarian tensions between Christian and Muslims, and large economic inequality. In addition, and as the name of the group  (which broadly translates to “Western education is sin”’), indicates, the group seeks to implement Islamic rule. While this suggests a domestic focus of the group, more recently Boko Haram has conducted operations in Cameroon and Niger, both of which border Nigeria. For example, in July 2014 Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of Cameroon's vice prime minister which some experts interpreted as “signal[ing] an evolving regional vision for the group”.

In addition, Boko Haram appears to have been in contact with international terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).   Some of its key leaders including Mamman Nur and Khalid Al-Barnawi have reported links to AQIM and al-Shabab.

Boko Haram’s transnational activities and links to regional terrorist organizations appear to indicate the presence of aspirations beyond the borders of Nigeria. There are also indications of a schism within the organization, with some factions seeking to grow regional influence by linking with international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, while others want to maintain an exclusively domestic focus by establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria.

Either way, Nigeria’s neighbors have every reason to remain concerned.

Evidence of a schism between ISIS and al-Qaeda can be seen in the structure and operations of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 

On July 2, 2014 the central region judge for AQIM, Abu Abdullah Othman al-Asemi, released a video expressing support for ISIS. In the video, Al-Asemi stated that “ISIS is dearer to us than our own families and relatives and we always pray for you.”

Al-Asemi’s statement provoked a response from AQIM Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel. Droukdel affirmed his continuing commitment to al-Qaeda, saying “we still adhere to our pledge of allegiance to our sheikh and emir, Ayman al Zawahiri…” and rejected the caliphate established by ISIS. “It is obvious for the Muslims and all Jihadi organizations that follow the correct method, that the announcement of such a serious step [meaning the establishment of the Caliphate], will not happen but after the expansion of consultation,” he said.

Droukdel was referring to ISIS’s unilateral proclamation of the caliphate absent consultation with outside religious scholars and leaders. These contradictory announcements, one by AQIM’s judge for the Sahara region backing ISIS, and another from AQIM’s emir backing al-Qaeda and rejecting the ISIS caliphate, demonstrated the growing rivalry between the two organizations and the resulting rift caused within the rank and file of AQIM.  

This rift became a full and obvious split in September 2014. AQIM’s central region commander Gouri Abdelmalek, known under the pseudonym Khaled Abu Suleimane, led a splinter group away from AQIM to swear loyalty to ISIS. This new group, the so-called ‘Caliphate Soldiers in Algeria,’ joined with forces under another AQIM commander from eastern Algeria. In addressing ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Suleimane stated, “You have in the Islamic Maghreb men if you order them they will obey you…The Maghreb has deviated from the true path.”

The defection of this large contingent of soldiers from AQIM greatly weakened the organization. In the same month, the Soldiers of the Caliphate went into action, kidnapping and executing Herve Gourdel, a French citizen traveling on vacation in Northern Algeria, in retaliation for French air strikes in Iraq against ISIS. The execution signaled support for ISIS, and also demonstrated how organizations external to ISIS were starting to co-opt ISIS’s tactics, namely quick and violent executions of Westerners.

The al-Qaeda-ISIS split is not isolated to AQIM – it has become a global problem for al-Qaeda. Younger cadres of Islamist radicals across the globe are becoming dissatisfied with al-Qaeda, following nearly a decade without a major successful attack on the West. Many believe that Al-Qaeda has stagnated under al-Zawahiri, who cannot relate to younger generations of disaffected men – ultimately the backbone of Islamic jihadism.

ISIS’s unparalleled success and lightning sweep across Syria and Iraq has also won the support and admiration of tens of thousands of Islamists globally. Whatever the cause, al-Qaeda faces an existential threat in the continued popularity of ISIS, as illustrated in AQIM’s experience in North Africa.