Ever since ISIS captured Mosul in June 2014, political and military leaders in Iraq and the United States have regarded the liberation of Iraq’s second-largest city as a sine qua non for rolling back the caliphate. The campaign against ISIS has made progress on many fronts, but predictions that the army of terror would soon be dislodged from Mosul appear premature at best.

The primary reason why the assault on Mosul has been repeatedly postponed rests with Iraq’s feeble and fractured central government. Recently, demonstrators loyal to radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr raucously occupied the parliament in Baghdad. As lawmakers fled the scene, the demonstrators – chanting “you are all thieves” – called for the dissolution of the government. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the arrest of the protesters and declared a state of emergency, but the latest crisis reveals the intensifying power struggle within the political system. In the recent past, such instability has nurtured the jihadist threat.

Under Abadi’s predecessor, political dysfunction in Baghdad set the conditions for the rise of ISIS. Iraq’s central government had welcomed Iranian assistance because of its fear of abandonment by America, and this hardened the Shiite character of the regime. Nouri al-Maliki’s tenure was marked by relentless marginalization of the Sunni minority. First, the Sons of Iraq – the force that with the U.S. had vanquished ISIS’s forerunner, al-Qaeda in Iraq – were disbanded and harassed. The Iraqi army was gradually transformed into a de facto Shia militia. Sunni opposition politicians - including the deputy prime minister - were arrested, and elections were manipulated.

The Shia-dominated government’s chronic misrule now represents the greatest threat to Iraq, according to Emma Sky, a former advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority. Sky observes that the destructive politics of the “green zone” – the walled-off enclave on the Tigris river where Iraq’s political class divvy up state largesse, generally for themselves and their clients – has put in jeopardy Iraq’s entire post-Saddam order. It has alienated crucial constituencies, not least the Sunni and Kurdish minorities whose support is crucial to the liberation of Mosul.

While stationed en masse in Iraq, the U.S. army was dubbed “the defense militia for those [Iraqis] without a militia.” Today, Sky writes, “the sad reality is that Iraq has become ungovernable, more a state of militias than a state of institutions.”

Whatever its costs, the robust U.S. presence in Iraq – political as much as military – ensured a degree of Iraqi social and political cohesion that prevented the consolidation of power in Baghdad under one sect at the expense of others. It is precisely this tyranny of the majority that arose in the wake of America’s withdrawal, and that ISIS has exploited to its advantage among the aggrieved and alienated Sunni minority ever since. Unfortunately for ISIS’s enemies, this state of affairs shows no signs of abating.

The 14th installment of ISIS’s English-language magazine, Dabiq, devoted comparatively little space to celebrating recent bombings in Brussels, dedicating less than two pages to eulogizing suicide bombers Najim Laachraoui, Khalid el-Bakraoui, and Ismail el-Bakraoui.

I emailed her and also sent a message on Facebook. No answer. Then I remembered my sister-in-law uses WhatsApp on her phone. She was in Lahore Sunday for a family wedding. The children were with her. I had no idea if they were staying near Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park. Lahore is a big, beautiful city, full of history, monuments, street food, and fun, Pakistan’s cultural center.

As my in-laws readied themselves for another day and night of wedding festivities on Easter Sunday, the city was reminded that it was also home to discontent and anger.

A splinter group of the Pakistani Taliban targeted a popular park where Easter celebrations were underway. The bomb blast killed more than 73 men, women and children and injured 320. As the chaos unfolded, rioting was spreading in another part of the city as mourners for Mumtaz Qadri, the recently hanged murderer and former bodyguard of liberal lawmaker Salmaan Taseer, marked the 40th day of his death with nationwide riots and rallies calling for Sharia law in Pakistan. Qadri killed Taseer in 2011 after the lawmaker pushed to reform Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which are often used in disputes to attack neighbors for personal gain. The targets are often Christian Pakistanis.

My sister-in-law thankfully responded to my messages on Whatsapp after what felt like an eternity, “We are fine. The city is in lockdown.” Relieved, I simply replied, “Ok, be safe. Bye,” and returned to the emerging headlines and comments growing on my Facebook feed. There were people asking for blood donations at the hospitals in Lahore. Some messages indicated families were looking for a loved one, and Facebook asked its billion plus members to check in – asking us all if we were safe. 

This was not the first time Christians have been targeted by Islamists in Pakistan. The same group that took responsibility for the attack, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, targeted two Christian churches in March 2015, killing 14 and wounding 70. This Easter’s attack was a possible response to the previous day’s announcement on Voice of Jihad, a website of the Afghan Taliban, announcing “Only Islamic rituals can be celebrated in an Islamic country.”

Lahore’s diverse cultural history can be attributed to the men and women who have traversed its roads for centuries. Rulers have included the Hindus, Sikhs, and Turks. Ptolemy mentions Lahore in his studies of geography in the 2nd century. Descriptions by a Chinese traveler confirm the city’s existence again in the 7th century. Today, it is the capital of Pakistan’s largest province – Punjab.

The Christians in Pakistan, especially Lahore, are part of the diversity and indigenous history of the country. Islamism, and its offspring – groups like Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, are the foreigners; born of Cold War politics to ward off the Russians in Afghanistan and fight India in Kashmir. Such groups have been tolerated for far too long.

As law enforcement began raids and making arrests following the Easter carnage, the real question that needs to be asked is will the government address the madrassas and training camps in southern Punjab, which continue to remain active with the Pakistani government’s knowledge. A 2008 U.S. State Department cable from its Lahore consulate office to Washington, D.C. noted that the number of extremist recruits in Punjab appeared to be increasing in certain areas since 2005. Locals stated this was the result of social services work being increasingly provided by extremist networks who were then “minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities.” The State Department cable highlights that the locals in affected Punjabi communities want the government to come in to stop the spread of extremist activity, replace the social services attracting the poor with government help instead. It is unclear if any improvements have been made since that 2008 cable.

It is unlikely. But, while we wait for the government to act, others are. There are numerous grass-roots organizations in the country that focus on a range of gaps in society from illiteracy, health education to specifically addressing issues of tolerance and democracy. The Insan Foundation Trust, for example, trains media staff to identify prejudicial content against minorities and women in programming to remove it. More importantly, the training includes learning how to create content to replace that bias to build greater understanding between communities in Pakistan through the entertainment and news aired daily throughout the country.

Chasing jihadists after every attack is not a strategy. It only ensures another Ankara, Belgium, or Lahore. A real strategy requires shutting down extremist channels for recruitment. This includes shuttering their ability to feed a child in a madrassa in return for spewing hate; targeting the foreign governments that sponsor the extremist networks in Pakistan; and asking the educated Islamist sympathizers among Pakistan’s government and military to understand that aligning with extremists in the  fight for Kashmir is not worth losing Pakistan.

While the Bangladeshi government continues to deny the presence of ISIS within its borders, increased violence against religious minorities and foreigners attributed to pro-ISIS militants has many asking if Islamist militancy is on the rise in that country. 

The murder of a Hindu priest in February is the third death for which ISIS claimed credit. Other murder victims have included a Japanese farmer and an Italian aid worker in September and October of 2015. The Sheikh Hasina government rejected arguments that ISIS was behind the violence, pointing instead to domestic militant groups, which have become more and more aggressive, reportedly in reaction to the government’s crackdown on Islamist activity since 2013. It was in 2013 that two leaders of the long-standing Jamaat-e-Islaami party were tried for war crimes dating to Bangladesh’s war of Independence in 1971.

Since then, various political administrations have maintained relationships with Islamist groups to varying degrees in order to build coalitions and stay in power.  Conversely, with the rise of Islamism in South Asia since the end of the cold war, numerous Islamist groups, both peaceful and violent, have proliferated. A common theme among these groups is envisioning the rebirth of a South Asian caliphate based on a much disputed hadith called Ghazwa-e-Hind. 

This has also contributed to the infiltration into Bangladesh of trans-national Islamist groups, from Hizb ut-Tahrir to al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS), as well as the proliferation of homegrown militant groups, best illustrated by Ansar Bangla Team (ABT). ABT gained international attention for reportedly orchestrating the murder of secular blogger Avijit Roy in March 2015.

Accusations against foreign governments, like Pakistan, complicate matters further. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services stand accused of supporting Islamist activity in the country for likely a two-pronged purpose: establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh as is hoped for in Pakistan by Islamists there; and use Bangladesh as a launching pad for anti-Indian activity.

This is not completely far-fetched. Most terrorist attacks in India can be traced back to Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad - alone - or in collaboration with minor Islamist groups in India. To do the same from existing jihadi training camps on the Bangladeshi side of the Indian-Bangla border stands within reason.

The Bangladesh Chronicle reports ISIS members have met militant groups like JMB, Huji, Hizb ut -Tahrir, and ABT in hopes of making Bangladesh an Islamic state by 2020. Bangladeshi militants appear to be giving their oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in an uploaded video on YouTube from August 2014 entitled “Muslims in Bangladesh give bayah to the caliph Ibrahim (Hafizahullah).”

Bangladesh’s official statements denying ISIS’s presence may be a strategic attempt to prevent alarm, while its intelligence and law enforcement divisions continue their investigations and arrests behind the scenes. Arrests of extremists are ongoing, and include pro-ISIS sympathizers, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists and Jamaat-e-Islaami protesters. The latter political party was banned in 2013 by the Bangladesh High Court, which is now reviewing the legitimacy of Islam’s position as the official national religion in an otherwise secular state in an attempt to curb rising extremism.

While these moves are all necessary to protect Bangladesh’s secular status, none address the ability of these militant groups to collaborate, and engage with each other, when recruiting. Bangla-language extremist websites, YouTube videos, Twitter, and other social media platforms give extremist groups access to a wide audience and leave law enforcement always playing catch-up, as they were forced to do following the murder of the Hindu priest in February.  

In November 2015, Bangladesh blocked Facebook, Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp, Line and Tango – in an effort to preempt Islamist retaliation after death penalties that were upheld against two Jamaat-e-Islami leaders convicted in 2013 of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971.

The benefit of such bans is questionable given the availability of proxy servers and backdoors. Nevertheless, despite denying the existence of ISIS in the country, Bangladesh is attempting to act against extremism on many fronts. It remains to be seen, however, if South Asia will become the newest extension of Islamist extremism that ISIS and other militant groups are working toward. 

In early March, French officials successfully prevented two girls from leaving to join ISIS in Syria, and the country collectively breathed a sigh of relief. But what happens next? What happens to the kids who are saved from falling under the spell of ISIS’s suicidal and apocryphal ideology, but often against their will?

It may be too soon for studies to reveal whether would-be foreign fighters make the transition back to normal, productive lives. Nonetheless, programs being tested in different countries—and the anecdotal evidence beginning to trickle in—hints at less-than-stellar outcomes.

The most troubling results, of course, are represented by those individuals prevented from joining jihad in Syria who have gone on to carry out terrorist plots at home. Ibrahim Abdeslam is one such individual. Reportedly thwarted from traveling to Syria in early 2015, Abdeslam was intercepted by authorities in Turkey and forcibly returned to Brussels. In November 2015, Abdeslam, blew himself up outside Paris’s Comptoir Voltaire cafe as part of the deadly ISIS attacks, which killed 130 and wounded more than 350.

How did Abdeslam manage to participate in such a complicated and deadly assault after being stopped en route to Syria? Reports say that Abdeslam was interrogated by Belgian police upon his return, but was ultimately released after authorities concluded that he showed “no sign of a possible threat.” Part of the problem was a complicated legal situation. According to one unnamed Belgian authority, “We knew [Ibrahim and Saleh Abdeslam] were radicalized and could have visited Syria,” but Ibrahim could not be prosecuted because “we had no evidence that he participated in the activities of a terrorist group.”

Abdeslam is only one of many disappointed foreign fighters who have been quietly reintroduced into Western society. Whether or not a would-be foreign fighter will be monitored, arrested, prosecuted, or placed into a de-radicalization program is very much a case-by-case decision. What’s even less clear is the success rate of de-radicalization and other intervention programs.

Consider the case of “A,” a Jewish girl from Paris who was inspired to join ISIS. “A” was just moments away from boarding a plane to Syria when she was convinced to stay behind. Her parents remained vigilant, and “A” was enrolled in a de-radicalization program, the Centre de Prévention des Dérives Sectaires liées à l’Islam (Center for the Prevention of Sectarian Abuses linked to Islam). Nonetheless, the girl reportedly still managed to stay in touch with her ISIS recruiters, even after her travel plans came to an end and after she was ensconced in the de-radicalization program.

One of the two girls stopped in early March, Israé, had attended that same de-radicalization program, apparently to little effect. Two years after Israé’s first attempt to leave for Syria, and her enrollment in the program, Israé again tried to join ISIS.

Now, Israé and her cohort Louisa are again living at home, and both face travel bans. Still, reasonable concern exists regarding how their guardians will rehabilitate the two girls, and constructively redirect their pro-ISIS fervor. After all, although Israé, Louisa, and “A” ultimately were stopped before reaching ISIS-controlled territory and becoming jihadi brides, they have both shown a fierce determination to maintain their ties to the terrorist group.

Today, concerns exist over not only reintegration, but governments’ capacity to effectively monitor ongoing threats at home. In 2015, France’s resources were stretched exceptionally thin. Since then, increased funding has been devoted to domestic and international surveillance following passage of the country’s “Stop-Djihadisme” program. France has declared that a number of domestic terrorist threats have been thwarted, but massive intelligence gaps have been revealed following the Paris attacks in November.

Similar problems plagued Belgium long before terrorists targeted the Brussels airport and metro. The country is struggling to maintain surveillance on the hundreds of Belgians already abroad, as well as track suspected extremists at home.

ISIS hopefuls, their families, and their communities today remain vulnerable, not only due to resource limitations, but to a dearth of deradicalization programs whose effectiveness has been established. So what happens next? The reality is often a mosaic of hastily thrown together solutions, tailored for each individual, and occasionally misapplied.