“No Single Definition for Salafism, AJCS’ Conference Finds (!)”

This was the oddly bold caption headlining the 2014 conference report on “Salafism in the Arab World” (sub-title: “Perceptions, Trends and Groups”), hosted by the al-Jazeera “Center for Studies” [sic]. This “finding” was reiterated in the summary, which asserted in pride of place (as the number one point), “Salafism has no single definition.” The conference report continued in this eccentric and frivolous vein, publishing a photo of a participant – a bearded man in a long white dress – almost immediately after regretfully noting that “Salafism tends to elicit images of bearded men in long white dresses.” Indeed. For those hoping to chart the shifting sands of Salafism, the Salafism Conference would not be their first port-of-call.

Despite the inauspicious start, the conferees did clarify that Salafism was definitely not Jihadism - an ideological movement based on an extremist interpretation of the religious imperative to defend the core tenets of the Islamic faith. Jihadism is “extremist” because it explicitly sanctions and indeed encourages violence to accomplish this objective.

Similarly, the key findings simply ignored the related extremist concept of Takfirism, the act of accusing another Muslim of being an apostatizing takfir (from the word “kufr” meaning “infidel”). Takfirism is “extremist” because it is a principle that justifies the execution of any Muslim who is deemed to fall out of the correct creed.

So, the conference in totum was understandably keen to disassociate Salafism from any connotations of extremism and violence (i.e. Jihadism and Takfirism), affirming its definitively religious and pacifistic ethos.

But that is a disingenuous assertion that conveniently overlooks present realities. While the non-violent strain of Salafism was indeed predominant during the 1980s – in Europe at least, when it was widely perceived as apolitical and “quietist” (and so “not scary”) – that is no longer true, and not a realistic claim to make.

ISIS – violence and extremism incarnate – clearly self-identifies as a Salafist organization, and accurately so. Salafis of every stripe believe that Islam has been corrupted by “centuries of human interpretation.” Both ISIS and the ideology therefore call for a return to the practices and beliefs of the salaf, the first few generations of Muslims directly following the Prophet.

The key distinguishing feature is the commitment to violence to achieve this objective. The “conference Salafis” represented the “quietist strain.” They consent to the status quo and are strongly opposed to rebellion and the possibility of anarchy, which is how the Saudi Salafi (Wahabbist) dynasty has managed to retain its authority for the past 80 years. Next on the spectrum are the Salafi-Jihadis. The archetype for this is al-Qaeda, the anti-Western terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and believers that violence is divinely ordained.

Finally, occupying a position even more extreme than al-Qaeda, ISIS holds fast to the same principles but supplements this “philosophy” with Takfirism. So, according to the ISIS Salafi-Takfiri worldview, the “enemies of Islam” list is a much longer catalogue that goes well beyond just the 20th-Century adversaries: America, Europe, Western Christendom and the Zionists. ISIS also believes that the almost 200 million Shia Muslims, as well as Sufis, Yazidis and Ba’hai, are all apostates and deserve to be slaughtered.

So, the Salafi conference was correct to say there is no one definition of Salafism. But that is not the front-page topic. That headline should have stated, “Salafism Used To Justify Murder On Massive Scale.” Instead of petulantly refusing to acknowledge any relationship between Salafism and Jihadism and Takfirism, the so-called “quietists” need to raise their voices and condemn – loudly – the use of violence in the name of Salafism.

Feminist Muslim journalist Asra Nomani was invited to speak at Duke University on April 7, 2015, and then was summarily disinvited, due to her “straightforward alliance” with alleged “Islamophobes” like neuroscientist and atheist author Sam Harris, who are accused of having an irrational “dread or fear of Islam.”

This allegation was hurled by the university’s Muslim Students’ Association but was quickly refuted by the former Wall Street Journal writer. Nomani’s talk on women’s rights, however, wound up drawing a modest audience of nine women, plus Nomani’s parents and son. Nomani is not the first to be treated so harshly. Other examples of censored Muslim feminists include:

• Raheel Raza, who faced pressure to stop screening her Muslim feminist documentary “Honor Diaries” at the University of South Dakota;
• Sisters In Islam, a reform-minded group of feminist legal scholars was the target last fall of a religious edict or fatwa issued by the patriarchal Malaysian Ulema accusing the group of  “deviating” from Islam.

The modern Muslim narrative is being monopolized by self-described Muslim-rights organizations, whose backgrounds, writings and associations are not being scrutinized, especially to the degree of those they target.   This self-imposed political correctness serves no one, and deprives Muslims of the type of lively civic debate that is important for the future.

The Muslim Students’ Association has a long history of being connected to foreign Islamist groups and individuals who advocate that society be governed under Islamic law. Yet, because they are an official Muslim organization, with a wide foreign-funded network, many people are afraid to question their statements, activities, or more importantly, investigate their overseas alliances. So instead, broadside attacks are leveled on Asra, a  professional investigative journalist who simply desires to speak to individuals of all backgrounds and opinions so she can be an informed reporter – for her alleged alliances.

From the non-violent Islamists of Turkey’s AKP to the machete-wielding Islamists killing bloggers in Bangladesh and the Islamists in Pakistan who murder politicians for daring to simply ask whether Pakistan’s blasphemy laws should be repealed - free speech and simple conversation are being attacked widely by Islamist groups and individuals.  The freedom to think for oneself  after considering a variety of opinions regarding today’s intersection of politics and religion – is being shut down at a frightening pace, especially, among Muslims.

I once worked for an alleged “Islamophobe,” because I wanted to not only understand the intellectual foundations of the group, but also the nature of their supporters. What I learned was that many purported “Islamophobes” go to great lengths to differentiate the private practice of Islam, which the majority of Muslims wish to defend, from the politicized statist systems exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Salafism, or Iran’s Khomeneism.

These sects within Islam are products of 18th and 19th century Islamic political thought in reaction to the politics and issues of those times. As such, they are seen as political movements, not religion per se. For that reason, many academics differentiate between followers of political Islam, who they term Islamists, and following the religion of Islam, which they refer to as Islamism.

But, there has never been one monolithic version of Islam. And just as the Christian community evolved away from some of the harsh prescriptions in the Old Testament without being accused of abandoning their faith, so too have the majority of Muslims who do not support jihad or apostasy. Islamophobes should support reformers and continue engaging in a critical dialogue of how religion is manipulated in the public sphere as Islamists have been doing for many decades now.

Asra Nomani and others intend to continue to engage all sides of this debate.  On May 7, Nomani led a panel discussion on “Islamophobia” at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. The panel included author Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Bassem Youssef, among others.

The outbreak of armed conflict in Syria has driven the country into chaos, with a spectrum of opposition groups claiming to be fighting for the people and against the Assad regime. As the Syrian Civil War enters its fifth year, Islamic extremist groups the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, and Ahrar al-Sham have emerged as the most prominent and powerful. 

In discussing the Syrian opposition groups, it is helpful to place their beliefs and goals on a scale to enable comparisons.  At one time, opposition groups ranged from those attempting to implement a free democratic society and government on the left, to those wanting to impose sharia over a newly instated caliphate on the right. Unfortunately, today there are far more Islamist groups than liberal democratic groups left operating in Syria.

ISIS, the Nusra Front, and Ahar al-Sham are Salafist, Sunni groups and make up some of the most far right Islamist groups in Syria. While the differences between their ideologies are fairly negligible, ISIS is the farthest right, hoping to create an Islamic State throughout the entire region under strict seventh century Arabia-esque conditions. The Nusra Front lies towards the “center” of the three, aspiring toward the creation of an Islamic State, but supposedly in stages and with the consent of the local population. Finally, while Ahar al-Sham hopes to create an Islamic State as well, it claims to want to confine itself to the borders within Syria and merely replace Assad with its own government. 

The histories of these three groups are tightly intertwined.  Each has ties to al-Qaeda, leading to their jockeying for position in Syria.  ISIS traces its roots to al-Qaeda in Iraq in the early 2000s, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began training militants to attack coalition forces.  The group suffered defeats and declined in strength until 2011, when coalition forces began to withdraw from Iraq. Under its new leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the group moved into Syria, changed its name to ISIS, conquered a wide swath of Syria and Iraq and declared itself a Caliphate.

In 2013, ISIS claimed that it and the Nusra Front would merge despite denials from both the Nusra Front and al-Qaeda.  At this point, a schism developed between ISIS and al-Qaeda and the Nusra Front, causing huge tensions.  A number of Nusra fighters defected to ISIS and the groups clashed.  ISIS blamed the group for “betrayal and treason,” and by March 2014, more than 3,000 fighters had been killed in battles between ISIS and the Nusra Front. 

In 2013, ISIS’s relations with Ahar al-Sham, a militant group whose leadership also has ties to al-Qaeda, also disintegrated.  However, Ahar al-Sham continued to cooperate with the Nusra Front. Since then, despite its inclusion in the Free Syrian Army, Ahar al-Sham has grown to become one of the largest Islamist militant groups in Syria, attempting to unite what remains of the Islamic opposition. 

Despite their shaky histories and their clashes throughout Syria, each group employs similar tactics; they carry out offensives, attempt to conquer territory, govern the areas they control, and provide services to the population.  This alignment in overall strategy is what creates such competition between the three most powerful groups in Syria.  They each have the goal of creating a new state based on Islamic law, but disagree on its character, timing and governance.

Continual jockeying for advantage and competition for fighters and resources contributes to a continuation of the cycle of violence in Syria.  While these groups are in direct competition with one other, their stated primary objective is to force out the Assad regime.   Without a viable, secular alternative, however, the end of the Assad regime could easily lead to an even more violent future for Syrians, as these three groups then turn their weapons more forcefully on one another in a battle for supremacy.

“Nothing is safe from the cultural cleansing under way in the country: it targets human lives, minorities, and is marked by the systematic destruction of humanity’s ancient heritage.” – Irina Bukova, Director-General of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 6 March 2015

Since ISIS launched its bloody and brutal territorial seizure in the summer of 2014, thousands of civilians in Iraq and Syria have lost their lives to the group’s heavy-handed interpretation of Islam. A report by the Iraq Body Count monitoring project shows that approximately 4,325 civilians were killed by ISIS last year in Iraq alone. According to estimates made in late 2014, more than 20,000 foreign fighters from the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and the West joined the jihad in Iraq and Syria. More than one-fifth were from Western Europe. Then there are the refugees and internally displaced people, who, after witnessing the death of loved ones or seeing their homes ripped from them, are forced to watch the destruction of their culture and their ties to the land.

While ISIS continues to claim future generations, it makes casualties of histories and cultures that have been on this earth for centuries. Evidence of the rich history and diversity of the region are being erased, sometimes in minutes, and in its stead, ISIS establishes its narrow view of religion, history, art – all humanity. What is taking place is truly cultural genocide.

Destruction of monuments and relics from civilizations past is not a new phenomenon. Conquerors and warring parties have historically sought to assert their military dominance through siege and pillage—from the Crusades of the Middle Ages to Nazi plunder of European cultural legacies and Soviet vandalism of Russian cultural monuments and cathedrals.

Islamic extremists have adopted these same tactics en masse decades later: In 2001, the Taliban exploded 1,700 year-old sandstone statues of Buddha in the Bamiyan Valley of the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan. In 2012, Ansar Dine attacked Timbuktu in Mali, a hub of trade and Islamic learning that flourished from the 13th to the 17th centuries. Ansar Dine destroyed tombs containing antiquities, battered down the door of a 15th century mosque, and set fire to libraries containing ancient manuscripts. That same year, Fundamentalist Salafist Muslims targeted Sufi heritage sites in Libya and Egypt.

What sets ISIS apart is its scale of wanton destruction in such a short period of time and the extent to which this destruction is used for propaganda and profit. ISIS has razed its way through many historical sites, even publicizing their attacks.

• Summer of 2014: According to Human Rights Watch, in June 2014, ISIS destroys seven Shiite places of worship in the city of Tal Afar, kidnapping 40 Shia Turkmen in the process.  On July 25, ISIS extremists explode the Tomb of Jonah, located in a Sunni mosque also called the Mosque of the Prophet Yunus in Mosul. Jonah was a key figure in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. ISIS also blows up several Sunni holy sites during the summer.
• February 26, 2015: ISIS strikes again in Mosul. Videos show ISIS destroying 7th century stone statues from Nineveh, an ancient Assyrian city, housed in a Mosul Museum. Thousands of books and manuscripts, containing ancient narratives, are destroyed in Mosul’s libraries.
• March 5, 2015: Iraq’s Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities confirms that ISIS bulldozed the ancient Nimrud archeological site near Mosul, using heavy military vehicles.  Nimrud, also Assyrian, was founded more than 3,300 years ago. Director General at UNESCO, Irina Bokova declares, “The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage constitutes a war crime. There is absolutely no political or religious justification for the destruction of humanity’s cultural heritage.”
• March 7, 2015: Iraqi officials report that ISIS desecrates the ancient city of Hatra, completely bulldozing the ruins of the UNESCO heritage site. The city was founded during the Parthian Empire more than 2,000 years ago. Unlike the destruction of Assyrian heritage sites at Nineveh and Nimrud, Hatra or Al-Hadr reflects a combination of Greco-Roman and eastern influence, including temples dedicated to Apollo and Poseidon. The Iraq Tourism and Antiquities Ministry blames the international community for failing to help Iraq protect its ancient monuments.
• March 12, 2015: Iraqi antiquities director, Qais Rasheed reports that Khorasabad, a 2,700-year-old city famed for its colossal statues of human-headed winged bulls, has been ransacked and razed by ISIS. Without satellite imagery, it is difficult to assess the damage to the three square kilometer site, but Rasheed confirms that looting took place and the ancient city’s walls were demolished. 

The very fabric of the region’s religious and cultural history has been reduced to tatters and bare threads. One’s initial reaction is, “Why? Why this seemingly nihilistic destruction of priceless artefacts?” The “because” is dual, there is a push and a pull.  David Pinault explains that ISIS uses Quranic scripture and accounts of the Prophet Muhammad himself to justify attacks on these regional treasures.The video showing the destruction of the Mosul Museum is accompanied by elegant chants that quote Quranic verses describing Abraham, a key figure in both Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions, smashing his father’s idols. An ISIS extremist goes on to remind viewers that even Muhammad “removed and destroyed the idols with his own exalted and noble hands when he conquered Mecca.”

This justification tactic is utter hypocrisy, according to Peter Webly of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation: “While it is true that Muhammad ordered the destruction of the pagan idols in the Ka’aba… the mere existence of such an extensive pre-Islamic heritage across most of the Muslim world reveals the lie that ISIS is emulating the practice of his [Muhammad] companions when it conquered other lands…” Furthermore, the fact that ISIS is involved in the illicit trade of antiquities and materials such as gold, tarnishes their ‘holier-than-thou’ literalism.

ISIS’s war path decimates culture and history because they stand to gain a lot from their heinous acts. The benefit of destruction is two-fold – profit and propaganda. The same destruction meant to rid Iraq and Syria of its ‘false idols’ is ultimately allowing the group to capitalize on ruination. The profit from the illicit trade of stolen antiquities perpetuates inestimable harm. According to a Wall Street Journal report on the heroes attempting to curb antiquities smuggling, looting is ISIS’ second-largest source of revenue after oil. An Iraqi official also claims that ISIS has made as much as $36 million from one single area at al-Nabek in Syria, an early Christian site known for its mosaics. ISIS has even established an office to deal specifically with looted antiquities. The whole racket is simply not in line with their violent literalism and public justifications for destroying heritage sites. If the Quran told them to destroy, why profit?

Then there is the message. What better propaganda is there for young extremists? “Here it is, your opportunity to follow in the footsteps of prophets, Abraham and Muhammad. It is your chance, confused youth, to rail against mundane life in pluralistic societies. Come with us and destroy the past.” 

It is clear that ISIS, so self-righteous in their actions, seeks not merely to destroy blasphemous ‘false idols’—they want to obliterate the cultural origins of the very people they are attempting to suck into their caliphate. They are destroying the past so that they might rewrite a rich history and protect their violent future.

In the spring of 1995, 20-year old Alisa Flatow, an American student at Brandeis University, was in the middle of her semester in Israel studying at a women’s seminary. Alisa boarded a bus on April 10 bound for the beach, but never reached her destination. A suicide bomber from the Iranian sponsored group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) drove up next to the bus and blew up his car.

Alisa’s father, Stephen, flew from his New Jersey home to Israel’s Soroka Medical Center, where his daughter was on life support. He recalled holding Alisa’s hand as doctors declared her brain dead. She was taken off of life support a half hour after he arrived. In total, eight people died in the PIJ attack.

Alisa was the oldest of Stephen and Rosalyn Flatow’s five children. She majored in sociology at Brandeis and planned to become a physical therapist. According to a statement released by her family shortly after her death, Alisa “believed in the good inherent in all people. She believed she was safe in Israel and no one could dissuade her from that belief.”

This month marks 20 years since Alisa’s untimely death. Iran’s connections to global terrorism are well documented. Alisa’s memory lives on in multiple institutions in New Jersey and Israel since dedicated to her.

Her tragedy is also the inspiration behind a landmark legal case in the fight against global extremism, as Alisa’s father turned his family’s tragedy into a call to arms against state sponsors of terrorism, notably Iran.

The 1996 Antiterrorism Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed legal immunity from foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. Later that year, Congress created what is commonly called the Flatow Amendment, which allowed U.S. citizens to file for damages from countries that sponsor terrorist acts. Stephen Flatow used his new legal rights to file suit against Iran for sponsoring the attack that killed his daughter. In 1998, he won a $248 million judgment against Iran. Flatow has collected only a fraction of that amount, but he opened the door for other U.S. victims of terror to seek a small measure of justice.

Matthew Eisenfeld, a 25-year-old rabbinical student from Hartford, Conn., and 22-year-old Sara Duker of Teaneck, N.J., were among the 24 people killed in a February 25, 1996, Hamas bus bombing in Jerusalem. Their families won a $327 million judgment against Iran in 2000 for sponsoring the attack. A U.S. court held Iran liable in 2006 for the 1996 bombing of an American military dormitory in Saudi Arabia and ordered the country to pay $254 million to the families of 17 victims. The courts have also held Iran liable for the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and awarded more than $10 billion to its victims. Most recently, a U.S. court in September 2014 ruled in favor of some 300 terror victims who alleged that Jordan’s Arab Bank had facilitated payments to Hamas and other terrorist groups.

In a recent article on the anniversary of Alisa’s death, Stephen Flatow said that his daughter still “plays a big role” in his life “as if she is still here.” The Flatows and other families have struggled to collect their settlements over the years but the case set an important precedent in the fight to hold accountable sponsors of terrorism.

Turkey’s relationship with violent extremist group ISIS might generously be described as “permissive” - less generously, “complicit.”

Not only has Turkey adopted a relaxed stance toward ISIS, some claim it has actively aided and abetted the terror group. This is notable because – uniquely – confronting ISIS head-on is one task on which the rest of the world appears united. And even across the Middle East, where every issue is fiercely disputed, historical enmity and sectarian divisions have been temporarily shelved in favor of the larger aim of destroying ISIS. Except by Turkey.

The reason is clear: Turkey has embraced the ancient maxim that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Here, Turkey’s enemy is not ISIS, but the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a banned militant organization that seeks autonomy for Turkey’s Kurds, which comprises as much as 20 percent of the total population. As the Turkish government openly concedes, the decades-long “Kurdish problem” is far more pertinent than the “ISIS problem.”

In 2014, Turkey’s laissez-faire stance toward ISIS was illustrated by two exemplary cases. First, Turkey (a NATO member) did not allow U.S. airplanes to use its military base at İncirlik to attack ISIS, which meant NATO pilots were forced to fly from bases in the Gulf, adding thousands of additional flight miles to their missions and thereby increasing the risk of being shot down. Second, it was only after several weeks of intense international pressure – and at the very last moment – that Turkey finally relented and permitted PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish military support for the beleaguered Syrian town of Kobani, whose residents faced imminent slaughter at the hands of ISIS.

While these facts are beyond dispute, Turkey has sharply denied the stronger accusation that it is actually complicit in assisting ISIS. Responding to claims that Turkey has provided weapons, logistical support, financial assistance and military training to ISIS, Turkish President Recep Erdogan entreated the U.S. “to make your assessment about Turkey basing your information on objective sources.”

A reasonable request. Still, an example of a non-objective source might be CNN Türk. While parent CNN International was covering the Kurdish protests that were engulfing the country on June 2, its Turkish subsidiary elected to televise a documentary on penguins. This followed a cooking program showcasing the “Flavors of Nigde” two days earlier when the demonstrations commenced. We might also discount other major Turkish news channels aligned with the ruling AKP party that decided to show a dance competition and a workshop on studying abroad. It was “a classic case of the revolution not being televised.”

Ironical observations aside, such selective reporting illustrates how the “Kurdish Problem” colors Turkish politics both internal and external, even when the rest of the world might be dancing to a different beat. For the Turkish government, the overarching regional foreign policy priority invariably translates into not doing anything that might help the Kurds – led by exiled leader Abdullah Ocalan - inch towards autonomy. The calculus has translated into standing back and allowing ISIS to – in the eyes of Turkey – weaken the PKK and, by extension, the Kurdish independence movement. To the rest of the world, however, such calculated abstention looks like cooperation and complicity with a brutal extremist terrorist organization.

The charge of complicity is probably an unfair assessment overall, given that Turkey has in fact authorized the use of force against ISIS and has finally implemented serious measures to make it much harder for prospective ISIS fighters to cross its once  porous border into Syria. (It has also provided millions of dollars of humanitarian aid, and hosts almost 2 million Syrian refugees).

But as regional power with the second-biggest army in NATO after the U.S., and a large, mostly secular population seeking greater integration with the West via EU membership, it is not sufficient. Indeed, despite the White House’s official line (“we respect their internal decision-making processes”), U.S. dissatisfaction with Turkey’s behavior is strong. This became obvious when U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden strayed from the official Administration line by publicly disparaging Turkey’s commitment.

Under the narrow, opaque lens of domestic politics, Turkey’s equivocation is understandable. But in the long-term, it is doubtful that the world will easily forget Turkey’s sluggishness on the ISIS front, especially as it seeks a greater role on the world stage.