Executive Summary:
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is an extremist group formed from al-Qaeda offshoots in Iraq and Syria. Since its formation in 2013, ISIS has worked to sustain a self-declared caliphate in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Ultimately, ISIS seeks to unite the world under a single caliphate, and to that end the group has begun to establish satellite operations in nine countries. Initially, ISIS gained support within Iraq as a Sunni insurgency group fighting what some Sunnis viewed as a partisan Shiite-led Iraqi government. The group has since garnered additional momentum as a result of the Syrian civil war, and has recruited up to 33,000 fighters from around the world. Thousands of foreign ISIS fighters are estimated to have been killed in battle, while some have returned—or are reportedly planning to return—to their home countries.
ISIS finds its origins in al-Qaeda forerunner al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), formed by sectarian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. During the Iraq War and its aftermath, the group experienced a series of setbacks and restructurings, for a while going by the name the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). In June 2014, the group—then led by Iraqi extremist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—unilaterally declared a caliphate spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq, naming Baghdadi as its “caliph.” In his first speech as “caliph,” Baghdadi made clear that ISIS’s aspirations were not limited to any one region, saying that the group sought to establish governance over all Muslims. Consequently, the organization changed its name from the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (or the “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”) to simply the “Islamic State.”
Although ISIS controlled large swaths of territory across Iraq and Syria at the peak of its territorial control in the summer of 2014, the group lost the last of those territorial holdings over the course of 2017. At its height, ISIS controlled almost 40 percent of Iraqi territory. By April 2017, U.S.-backed Iraqi forces had reduced ISIS’s control of the country to less than 7 percent. On July 10, 2017, the Iraqi government announced the liberation of Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul, where Baghdadi had declared ISIS’s caliphate three years earlier. Following the November 17 recapture of Rawa, the last ISIS-held town in Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared military victory over ISIS in the country. In June 2017, U.S-backed forces began an offensive to drive ISIS out of its declared capital in Raqqa, Syria. On October 17, 2017, American-backed forces announced the liberation of Raqqa, and on November 21, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared that ISIS had been driven out of Syria by Iranian-backed forces. By December 2018, ISIS retained only a small foothold in the Syrian town of Baghuz along the Syrian-Iraqi border. In March 2019, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an assault on ISIS forces in Baghuz and retook the town.
Notwithstanding ISIS’s territorial losses, security officials expect ISIS to remain a threat and lead an ongoing insurgency in the region. In February 2021, Mazloum Abdi, general commander of the SDF, reported that ISIS is “trying to revive itself” and continues to threaten regional and global security. According to a February 2021 report by the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, ISIS remained a “cohesive organization and continued to operate as a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria,” while its strategy, capabilities, and group cohesion “remained largely unchanged.” The report also determined that while the international Coalition and its local partners have prevented ISIS from resurging, they have been unable to degrade ISIS to the point it no longer poses a threat. Observers in Europe allege ISIS remains a threat on the continent, though to a lesser extent than it did when it maintained its caliphate. ISIS no longer has the capabilities to launch large-scale attacks in Europe, but it continues to inspire individuals to carry out smaller attacks such as stabbings and vehicle attacks.
Despite its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continues to maintain and expand its global presence. The group has declared wilayat (provinces, governorates) in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and the North Caucasus. Within the first seven months of 2019, ISIS announced new provinces in India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Central Africa as it sought to reassert itself after the loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria. Citing ISIS’s violent activities in Africa, the United States in March 2021 designated ISIS’s provinces in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Beyond this, the terror group attracts considerable sympathy or has waged attacks in Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, the Philippines, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Palestinian territories. ISIS sympathizers have also carried out lone-wolf attacks in a variety of Western countries such as France and Belgium. In January 2020, ISIS announced a “new phase” that would shift its focus from the remains of its caliphate onto Israel.
ISIS has historically funded itself through extortion, robbery, human trafficking, and the highly lucrative oil industry. However, ISIS lost approximately $500 million in income between 2014 and 2015 due to loss of territory and military setbacks amid sustained coalition airstrikes. The group has also lured significant numbers of recruits through online propaganda, including videos and magazines produced in English, French, German, and a variety of other languages. ISIS recruiters have also been successful on social media platforms and encrypted messaging services such as Telegram.
Under its self-proclaimed caliphate, ISIS imposed sharia (Islamic law) and was notorious for killing civilians en masse, often by public execution and crucifixion. Since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has shifted its strategy in those countries from holding territory to insurgency against the state. ISIS encourages followers to undertake lone-wolf attacks using inexpensive means such as vehicles, knives, and homemade explosives. Despite ISIS’s territorial losses, its propaganda continues to inspire lone-wolf attackers such as Khalid Masood, who killed seven people in a ramming-and-stabbing attack in London in March 2017. While ISIS’s dreams of a global caliphate are unlikely to ever be realized, the group will continue to cause significant damage wherever it is able to gain a foothold. After the fall of Baghuz, defense officials in the region reported that ISIS modified its strategy. Without centralized control, the insurgency has been carrying out small-scale attacks throughout rural territory along the porous border of Iraq and Syria and the informal border of Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq.
On October 26, 2019, U.S. forces carried out an operation in Syria’s Idlib province that resulted in the death of Baghdadi. U.S. officials confirmed Baghdadi’s identity using DNA tests of his remains after he detonated an explosive vest. On October 31, ISIS’s Amaq News Agency acknowledged Baghdadi’s death and announced Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi as his successor and ISIS’s new caliph. On February 3, 2022, U.S. special forces launched a raid in Atmeh, northern Syria, targeting al-Mawla. At the beginning of the operation, al-Mawla detonated a bomb, killing himself and his family members. On March 10, 2022, ISIS released an audio recording confirming al-Mawla’s death and announcing the appointment of new ISIS leader, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi. According to the recording, al-Mawla, as well as ISIS’s former spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, were “killed in recent days.”
Despite losing its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2019, ISIS remains active beyond the borders it once claimed. According to the U.S. Department of State, ISIS’s affiliates outside of Iraq and Syria caused more casualties in 2020 than in any previous year. U.S. intelligence reports claimed ISIS still had up to 18,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria at the time of Baghdadi’s death. ISIS has also led a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria, remaining a “determined and dangerous enemy,” according to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. American military officers believe that ISIS is a growing problem in Afghanistan and, if their operations are not curbed as soon as possible, that the militant group could expand their attacks against the West. Afghan generals have even mentioned the increasing difficulty in fighting off the rebels. On August 17, 2019, a suicide bomber infiltrated a wedding in western Kabul and killed at least 63 people while also injuring another 182. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. The explosion came days before Afghanistan’s 100th Independence Day on August 19, 2019, and also coincided with on-going peace talks between the U.S. government and the Taliban. Since the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021, ISIS has continued to target the country’s Shiite minority and strike at civilian and government targets alike. In response, the Taliban government has launched counterterrorism campaigns against ISIS.
Internally displaced people (IDP) camps have reportedly become ISIS’s new frontier for recruitment and radicalization. Tens of thousands of former ISIS fighters and their families live in IDP camps in the Levant, which has provided former militants the opportunity to regroup. At the Kurdish-run al-Hol refugee camp in northeastern Syria, ISIS reportedly exerts more control than the guards stationed there and have enforced sharia law on all of the camp’s inhabitants. In some cases, women are reportedly enforcers for the camp’s “morality brigade,” or have even taken up arms in battle. Women and children, who made up a majority of al-Hol’s 62,000 residents as of early 2021, are particularly vulnerable to deferring to the fundamental agenda that ISIS espouses. The United Nations has condemned the deteriorating security situation at al-Hol and other camps, where residents face starvation, violence, exploitation, and other forms of abuse. Nonetheless, foreign governments have been slow to repatriate their citizens residing in the camps. In early March 2021, Belgium’s government announced it would begin to repatriate children of Belgian jihadists living in al-Hol, noting that the longer children remained in the camp, the greater the chance they would become “the terrorists of tomorrow.” That same month, Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria began putting captured ISIS fighters on trial while calling for the creation of an international tribunal in Syria to judge foreign fighters whose countries refuse to repatriate them.
Doctrine:
ISIS’s overarching goals center on the reestablishment of a global, Islamic caliphate and fostering violent conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. In October 2015, ISIS’s then-spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani issued a statement urging Muslims around the world to engage in a “holy war” against Russia and the United States, which he claimed were leading a “crusaders’ war against Muslims.” Since the loss of Mosul in Iraq and its self-declared capital in Raqqa, Syria, in 2017, ISIS has transitioned from a territory-holding group to an insurgency in both those countries. Yet unlike al-Qaeda, which views a global caliphate as a long-term goal, establishing an Islamic caliphate remains ISIS’s core objective. Since its official founding in June 2014, this doctrinal commitment led ISIS to hold territory for more than three years across Iraq and Syria, and continue to hold territory in Afghanistan, Libya, and Nigeria.
In his June 2014 speech announcing the creation of the caliphate, ISIS’s late spokesman and director of external operations Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared that “Without [the caliphate], authority becomes nothing more than kingship, dominance and rule, accompanied with destruction, corruption, oppression, subjugation, fear, and the decadence of the human being and his descent to the level of animals.” On the cover of the first issue of ISIS’s online English magazine Dabiq, the title “The Return of Khilafah” is superimposed over an image of the Arabian Peninsula, literally illustrating the group’s top priority. Its slogan, baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and expanding), similarly underscores the point.
ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate cannot function without a caliph, the key figurehead. That role was initially reserved for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose so-called legitimacy was likewise established in ISIS’s doctrine. ISIS asserted that Baghdadi was a member of the Islamic prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe, “one of the key qualifications in Islamic history for becoming the caliph.” In his “inaugural speech” launching the Islamic State on June 29, 2014, Baghdadi expanded further on the significance of the caliphate. Most important, he claimed, was that all Muslims submit and pledge allegiance (bay’a) to the caliphate. U.S. forces killed Baghdadi in a raid by U.S. forces in Syria on October 26, 2019. ISIS appointed Amir Muhammad Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, as Baghdadi’s successor.
In January 2020, ISIS released an audio message featuring spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi on behalf of al-Mawla. The spokesman called on followers around the world to launch a “new phase” focused on “fighting the Jews and reclaiming what they have stolen from the Muslims….” He called on ISIS fighters in Syria and Egypt’s Sinai to turn Jewish settlements into a “testing ground” for their weapons.
Underpinning the allegiance to the caliphate, ISIS adheres to a literalist interpretation of Sunni Islam, specifically embracing beliefs according to an extremist Salafi vision. Salafis believe that Islam has been tainted by centuries of human revision and interpretation. They call for a reversion to the practices and beliefs of the salaf, the first few generations of Muslims immediately following the Prophet. While Salafism under the Gulf monarchies tends to non-violent “quietism,” ISIS is explicitly willing to use violence in an attempt to return to the days of the salaf. This willingness is based on the conviction that violence is divinely ordained.
ISIS supplements its Salafist worldview with a belief in the revival of takfirist practices. As a Salafi-Takfiri group, the “enemies of Islam” may be Muslim too. Thus, according to ISIS doctrine, almost 200 million Shiite Muslims—as well as Sufis, Yazidis, and Ba’hai—are all apostates and deserving of death.
ISIS also cleaves to a form of millenarianism with the ultimate hope of “bringing about the apocalypse,” according to journalist Graeme Wood. Indeed, ISIS frequently refers to the apocalypse in its various recruitment materials, including magazines, videos, and speeches. According to ISIS’s aptly-named English-language magazine Dabiq, the apocalypse will be preceded by “One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders” in the town of Dabiq, located northeast of Aleppo in the Syrian countryside.
Organizational Structure:
ISIS is led by its emir (commander, chieftain, or prince), whom the group proclaimed caliph of ISIS’s self-declared Islamic State in June 2014. Beneath the emir are two chief deputies, who oversaw ISIS territory in Syria and Iraq, respectively. These two deputies and a cabinet of advisers are reported to comprise ISIS’s executive branch, called “Al Imara” or “The Emirate.”
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi served as ISIS’s caliph from 2014 until his death in a U.S. raid in Idlib, Syria, on October 26, 2019. Baghdadi’s likely successor, ISIS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, was reportedly killed in a U.S. strike in Syria the day after Baghdadi’s death. ISIS’s Amaq News Agency eulogized Baghdadi on October 31, and announced Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, as his successor. The appointment came after consultations of ISIS’s leadership council, according to Amaq. Amaq did not provide other details of Quraishi’s identity other than referring to him as “emir of the believers” and “caliph.” Al-Mawla killed himself during a raid launched by U.S. Special Forces in Syria on February 3, 2022. On March 10, ISIS announced the appointment of Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi as the group’s new leader. Shortly after, on November 30, ISIS released a statement claiming al-Qurashi was killed in action. The statement also declared Abu al-Hussain al-Hussaini al-Qurashi as the new leader of the terrorist group. Abu al-Hussain had a short-lived career as ISIS’s head. According to Ankara, Abu al-Hussain was killed by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) on April 29, 2023, in Syria’s Afrin province. Abu al-Hussain reportedly detonated a suicide vest to evade detainment. However, on August 3, 2023, ISIS released an audio statement in which the group’s spokesman confirmed Abu al-Hussain was killed in clashes with a rival group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Details regarding the location and timeline of his death remain unclear, although HTS controls part of northwest Syria. The group also announced the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as the group’s new leader.
Directly under the caliph, but not part of the executive branch, are ISIS’s legislative councils, the Shura Council and Shariah Council. The nine-member Shura Council is reportedly responsible for ensuring that lower councils adhere to ISIS’s religious doctrine, and is also responsible for relaying the caliph’s orders through the rest of the organization. According to terrorism analyst Jasmine Opperman, the council approves lower council decisions that impact the caliphate. It also has the authority to force the caliph to step down if he deviates from ISIS doctrine.
ISIS’s six-member Shariah Council is the group’s “most powerful” body, according to Richard Bennett of the Soufan Group. It was responsible for enforcing its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) within ISIS’s territory, as well as selecting the caliph. When ISIS conquered new territory, the group’s Shariah Council was responsible for creating a sharia police force and courts to enforce its interpretation of Islamic law.
According to a January 2015 report by CNN, Baghdadi’s two deputies each oversaw 12 governors in their respective territories in Iraq and Syria. The deputies also oversaw ministry-like councils that were responsible for day-to-day functions:
- Financial Council: ISIS’s treasury, which oversees oil and weapons sales and other revenue.
- Leadership Council: responsible for the organization’s laws and policies. The council’s decisions are approved by Baghdadi. The council also has the authority to depose al-Baghdadi if he strays from ISIS’s ideology.
- Military Council: responsible for the organization’s military operations.
- Legal Council: responsible for decisions on executions and recruitment. It also handles family disputes and religious transgressions.
- Fighters Assistance Council: responsible for providing aid and housing to foreign fighters who come to ISIS’s territory, including moving them into and out of the territory.
- Security Council: responsible for police and security oversight of ISIS’s territory. It also carries out executions.
- Intelligence Council: ISIS’s intelligence-gathering wing.
- Media Council: manages ISIS’s media strategy, including social media.
In addition to governing bodies, ISIS operates a secret service wing, previously run by the late Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. This wing, referred to as the Emni, reportedly serves as both an internal police and external operations unit, whose members seek to export terror abroad. According to an August 2016 report by the New York Times, multiple lieutenants are responsible for planning attacks in three distinct target regions: Europe, Asia, and the Arab world. The unit is reportedly responsible for deploying operatives back into Europe, for the purpose of connecting with local ISIS sympathizers and plotting domestic attacks.
At its height in 2014, ISIS controlled approximately 40 percent of Iraq, dwindling down to 6.8 percent by April 2017. In June 2017, ISIS blew up the historic Great Mosque of al-Nuri, where Baghdadi had declared his caliphate in 2014. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi called ISIS’s destruction of the over-800-year-old mosque “an official announcement of their defeat.” Also in June 2017, U.S-backed forces began an offensive to drive ISIS out of its declared capital in Raqqa, Syria. U.S.-backed forces in Iraq and Syria liberated Mosul and Raqqa on July 10 and October 17, 2017, respectively. On November 17, Abadi declared a military victory over ISIS in Iraq following the recapture of Rawa, the last ISIS-held town in the country. In Iraq, the United Nations estimated that ISIS used 100,000 people as human shields, and more than 1,000 Syrians were killed in American-led airstrikes during the liberation of Raqqa. Despite these territorial losses, Iraqi security officials expected ISIS to revert to guerrilla warfare and continue carrying out sporadic attacks in the region as part of an insurgency.
ISIS continued to capture and hold new territory in Syria through early 2018 as it engaged rebel and regime forces. On November 21, 2017, ISIS launched a new offensive targeting the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in north Hama, Syria. HTS accused the Syrian regime of aiding ISIS fighters against the rebel group in northern Hama in October 2017, a claim that the Carter Center finds “likely” to be true since the ISIS fighters that attacked HTS first traveled through regime-held territory in large numbers. According to the Carter Center, Russian and regime planes have regularly bombed HTS along its frontline with ISIS while not attacking ISIS fighters in the area. Nonetheless, ISIS has continued its offensive against the Syrian regime, expanding into Idlib in November, and capturing regime-held villages along the Euphrates river in early December.
In May 2018, the U.S.-led coalition began Operation Roundup to eliminate ISIS’s remaining presence. By December 2018, ISIS retained only a small foothold in the Syrian town of Baghuz along the Syrian-Iraqi border. In March 2019, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an assault on ISIS forces in Baghuz. Hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families reportedly surrendered to the SDF, which declared days later that the battle to retake Baghuz was as “good as over.”
ISIS’s October 31, 2019, announcement of Quraishi as its new “caliph” signified that though the group had lost its territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, it still remained committed to the concept of an expansive caliphate. According to the United Nations, as of 2023, 1.2 million Iraqis remained displaced by ISIS’s insurgency, and more than 6.8 million Syrians remain internally displaced due to the conflict.
Wilayat
Before its military defeats in Syria and Iraq in November 2017, ISIS controlled wilayat (provinces) in both countries including in Raqqa, Idlib, and Hama in Syria, and Ninawa, Kirkuk, and Anbar in Iraq. The terror group also controls provinces across the Middle East and Africa. These provinces begin as local jihadist groups, which then pledge allegiance to ISIS’s caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Since ISIS lost its last territorial hold in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has shifted its focus to its provinces in what could be an attempt to decentralize the group while reaffirming its global presence. In May 2019, ISIS announced the creation of new provinces in India and Pakistan. That July, ISIS announced the creation of a province in Turkey. ISIS’s affiliates in Egypt and West Africa renewed their allegiances to Baghdadi in June 2019. ISIS fighters in Mali and Burkina Faso also renewed their allegiance to Baghdadi that month.
Before accepting a pledge of allegiance and forming a new wilaya, ISIS must receive a proposal detailing the group’s military and governance strategy, as well as identifying a collectively chosen leader. Issue 7 of ISIS’s Dabiq magazine described the process in detail:
“This [approval] process includes documenting their bay’āt [pledge of allegiance], unifying the jamā’āt [assembly] who have given bay’ah, holding consultations to nominate a wālī [governor] and members for the regional shūrā assembly, planning a strategy to achieve consolidation in their region for the Khilāfah [caliphate] so as to implement the Sharī’ah [Islamic law], and presenting all this to the Islamic State leadership for approval.”
Below is a list of official wilayat outside of Syria and Iraq:
Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia: Wilayat Khorasan
Jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged allegiance to ISIS in November 2014. ISIS accepted the pledge in January 2015, officially forming Wilayat Khorasan, and appointed former Pakistani Taliban commander Hafiz Said Khan as leader. The province also included parts of India, Iran, and other parts of Central Asia. A September 2015 U.N. report alleged 70 ISIS militants traveled from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan to form the core of the new wilaya. Other members include former Taliban insurgents and dozens of foreign fighters. In August 2015, the Afghanistan-based jihadist group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) pledged allegiance to ISIS and was subsumed into Wilayat Khorasan.
Wilayat Khorasan claimed its first attack on Afghan forces in September 2015 when it killed three policemen at a checkpoint in eastern Afghanistan. The group has since continued to carry out deadly attacks and maintain a small stronghold in the region. On March 8, 2017, the group launched a suicide bomb and gun attack at a hospital in Kabul, killing 30 people. As for intended targets, ISIS declared war on Afghanistan’s Shiite, mostly Hazara, population and has regularly claimed responsibility for attacks against the ethnic and religious minority.
There were approximately 1,300 ISIS fighters in Afghanistan as of September 2016, according to General John Nicholson, the highest-ranking U.S. military commander in the country. Nicholson said on September 23, 2016, that ISIS leaders in Syria provide the Afghanistan fighters with money, guidance, and communications support. According to Nicholson, ISIS’s fighters are largely former members of the Pakistan Taliban and primarily based in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar region.
ISIS restructured the Khorasan Province in May 2019 when it announced the creation of separate Pakistani and Indian provinces. ISIS Khorasan continued to operate, claiming responsibility that month for several attacks in Afghanistan. The U.N. Security Council designated the Khorasan Province in May 2019.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of the Afghan government on August 15, 2021, and ahead of the impending full withdrawal of U.S. military forces by August 31, on August 22, 2021, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan announced that ISIS posed a significant threat to Americans in Afghanistan. According to reports from U.S. intelligence and military officials, ISIS would seek to exploit Afghanistan’s security vacuum and plot attacks against American targets as the Biden administration attempted to evacuate American citizens and U.S. personnel from Afghanistan.
On August 26, a suicide attack was carried out at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. The attack began when a suicide bomber—who possessed 20 pounds of explosives packed with ball bearings—detonated himself outside of the airport, near Abbey Gate. According to media reports, as many as 170 people and 13 U.S. service members were killed, with an additional 200 wounded. The Taliban condemned the attack, later launching an investigation into the perpetrators. That evening, ISIS-K issued an official statement on Telegram claiming responsibility for the attack.
The next day, Marine General Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command told reporters that U.S. troops in Kabul are preparing for more ISIS-K attacks. U.S. forces are allegedly sharing information with Taliban fighters stationed outside of Kabul’s airport in anticipation of future ISIS attacks that could include car bombs or rocket fire. That same day, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby announced that the Taliban had released “thousands” of ISIS-K militants from U.S. prisons in Afghanistan following their takeover of the country. Kirby did not reveal how many prisoners remain at Bagram Air Base.
On the evening of August 27, 2021, the U.S. military carried out a drone strike in Nangarhar, targeting and killing two “high profile” ISIS-K targets. According to Kirby, the targets were “ISIS-K planners and facilitators.” Another ISIS-K member was wounded in the attack.
As of November 2021, ISIS reportedly had between 2,000 and 3,500 fighters in Afghanistan. On November 17, 2021, U.N. Special Representative Deborah Lyons told the U.N. Security Council ISIS-K had to date carried out 334 attacks in Afghanistan that year while establishing a presence in every Afghan province. According to Lyons, the Taliban have been unable to stop ISIS-K’s growth.
Since seizing power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have increased offensive military strikes against ISIS-K targets around Afghanistan. In November 2021, the Taliban began conducting background checks to purge ISIS infiltrators from the Afghan military. On November 15, 2021, the Taliban announced the launch of Operation IS, a crackdown on suspected ISIS hideouts in Afghanistan. That month, the Taliban deployed more than 1,300 fighters to Nangahar province to disrupt ISIS-K operations.
On February 4, 2022, U.S. military officials briefed reporters on the results of an investigation into the ISIS-K bombing at Abbey Gate. The investigation, led by Brigadier General Lance Curtis, interviewed more than 130 people and spanned five countries over three and a half months. The investigation found that none of the casualties were injured or killed by gunfire, contradicting previous claims that casualties were a result of both a suicide bomber and ISIS-K gunmen. According to media sources, the report also determined that a single suicide bomber carried out the attack alone.
Algeria: Wilayat al-Jazair
In 2014, ISIS accepted the pledge of allegiance from Algeria-based terrorist group Jund al-Khilafah, and announced that the establishment of an Algerian governorate, Wilayat al-Jazair. By December 2014, however, Wilayat al-Jazair leader Abd al-Malik Guri (a.k.a. Khalid Abu Sulayman) was killed by the Algerian military.
Wilayat al-Jazair is credited with the September 24, 2014, beheading of French tourist Hervé Gourdel but has been minimally active there in the months since. On October 21, 2015, Wilayat al-Jazair released an audio statement attempting to reassure its supporters that ISIS’s presence in Algeria was secure. During the same statement, however, an ISIS militant urged fighters not to risk their lives unnecessarily, appearing to indicate the underlying vulnerability of ISIS’s Algerian governorate.
Central Africa: Wilayat Central Africa
Baghdadi first mentions a Central Africa province in an August 2018 speech. On April 18, 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility through its Amaq News Agency for a shooting attack in Kamango, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), that killed three. ISIS credited the attack to its affiliate, Wilayat Central Africa, or Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). It was the group’s first attack claimed in the Congo and the first attack credited to the Central Africa province. ISIS also credited an April 25 attack in the DRC to the group. That attack killed three soldiers. Later in the month, ISIS released a video featuring Baghdadi, who called on ISIS’s supporters to seek revenge for the loss of the group’s caliphate. Baghdadi was seen in the video handling documents, including one called Wilayat Central Africa. Although ISIS-affiliated media portrayed ISCAP as a wilayat encompassing units across central, east, and southern Africa, ISCAP has become synonymous with Islamic State in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC).
Democratic Republic of the Congo: ISIS-DRC
Locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), ISIS-DRC is led by Seka Musa Baluku. ISIS-DRC has carried out attacks across North Kivu and Ituri provinces in eastern DRC targeting Congolese citizens and regional military forces. In 2020 alone, ISIS-DRC reportedly killed more than 849 civilians. ISIS-DRC is also known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen. The U.S. Department of the Treasury first sanctioned ADF and six of its members including Baluku in 2014 for their roles in significant human rights abuses. ISIS-DRC was also designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 10, 2021.
Mozambique: ISIS-Mozambique
Led by Abu Yasir Hassan, ISIS-Mozambique pledged allegiance to ISIS in approximately April 2018. Also known as Ansar al-Sunna, the group has killed more than 1,300 civilians since October 2017. ISIS-Mozambique’s attacks have caused the displacement of nearly 670,000 people within northern Mozambique. The United States designated ISIS-Mozambique as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 10, 2021. That same month, U.S. forces began training Mozambican troops to fight against an ISIS-driven insurgency that had already killed at least 2,000 people and displaced 670,000.
Egypt: Wilayat Sinai
In November 2014, Egypt’s Ansar Beit al-Maqdis—a jihadist group based in the Sinai Peninsula—pledged allegiance to ISIS and became Wilayat Sinai, ISIS’s Sinai province. The group grew amid the chaos of Egypt’s 2011 revolution, and is known for killing hundreds of Egyptian soldiers and police officers.
Since its pledge of allegiance, Wilayat Sinai has accrued an estimated “several hundreds, if not over a thousand” fighters in the Sinai region, according to CIA Director John Brennan. The group has claimed responsibility for an attack on an Egyptian vessel and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai that killed all 224 people on board. On February 9, 2017, Wilayat Sinai claimed responsibility for a number of rocket attacks targeting an Israeli resort in Eilat, an attack that caused no damage or casualties.Following the attack, Wilayat Sinai took to Telegram to claim responsibility and warn that “what is coming is graver and more bitter.”
Beginning in December 2016, Wilayat Sinai launched a campaign against Egypt’s Coptic Christian community. On December 11, 2016, ISIS claimed a suicide bombing at a chapel adjacent to St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, killing at least 28 people during Sunday Mass. On April 9, 2017, ISIS claimed a bombing of St. George’s Church in Tanta and a suicide bombing at St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Alexandria that altogether killed at least 45 people. On May 26, ISIS launched its first attack against a monastery when gunmen attacked two buses and a truck carrying Coptic Christians to the monastery of St. Samuel the Confessor south of Cairo, killing 29 people. In February 2017, Wilayat Sinai released a propaganda video declaring Christians to be their “favorite prey.”
On November 24, 2017, militants carrying the ISIS flag carried out a bomb and gun attack on the al Rawdah mosque in Bir al-Abed in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, killing at least 305 people and wounding at least 128 others in the deadliest attack in the country’s history. Although Egyptian authorities suspect ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai is responsible, the group has not claimed responsibility.
Israeli intelligence has accused Wilayat Sinai of cooperating with Hamas in the neighboring Gaza Strip. Hamas has reportedly used its underground tunnel system beneath the Gaza-Egypt border to transport aid to Wilayat Sinai, while also providing military training and medical aid to ISIS militants in the Sinai. Nonetheless, on January 4, 2018, Wilayat Sinai released an execution video of an alleged Hamas member and called on supporters to attack Hamas in Gaza because the group failed to stop U.S. President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017.
India: Wilayat al-Hind
On May 10, 2019, ISIS’s Amaq News Agency announced the creation of a new province in India called Wilayah al-Hind, based in India-administered Kashmir. ISIS claimed credit for clashes with Indian police earlier in the week. Indian police in Kashmir dismissed the claim of a new ISIS province based in Kashmir as propaganda. India formerly fell under the jurisdiction of ISIS’s Khorasan Province, which former members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan formed in 2015 after pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Khorasan Province previously also included Afghanistan, Pakistan, parts of Iran, and other parts of central Asia. ISIS announced a separate province in Pakistan the following week.
Libya: Wilayat al-Tarabulus, al-Barqa, and al-Fezza
ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of Libya’s wilaya in November 2014. Since then, ISIS in Libya has divided its control into three provinces: Wilayat al-Tarabulus (a.k.a. Wilayat Tripolitania) in the west, Wilayat Barqa in the east, and Wilayat Fezza in the south. In January 2015, Wilayat al-Tarabulus attacked the five-star Corinthia hotel in Tripoli, killing nine people including five foreign nationals. The U.S. Department of State designated ISIS’s Libya branch as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in May 2016. Since then, a combination of Libyan forces and U.S. airstrikes are believed to have driven many ISIS fighters from its former stronghold in Sirte. Despite losing ground in Sirte, the group has a presence in other parts of the country.
In 2015, Baghdadi appointed Abul-Mughirah al-Qahtani to oversee ISIS’s provinces in Libya. Qahtani was killed in a November 2015 U.S. airstrike in Derna. In March 2016, ISIS announced Abdul Qadr al-Najdi as its new leader in Libya. Al-Najdi reportedly died in September 2020. In March 2021, forces loyal to Libyan military leader Khalifa Haftar arrested the “most prominent leader” of ISIS in Libya, Mohamed Miloud Mohamed, a.k.a. Abu Omar. Mohamed had participated in ISIS’s 2015 takeover of Sirte and reportedly had close ties with al-Najdi.
ISIS’s roots in Libya can be traced back to the spring of 2014, when a group of Libyans fighting for ISIS in Syria and Iraq—the “Battle Brigade—returned to Libya and established the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which then pledged allegiance to ISIS.
Mali and Niger: Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), formerly Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)
ISGS is based in Mali and Niger and has carried out multiple attacks in northern Mali as well as neighboring Burkina Faso. In May 2015, Adnan al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Mourabitoun and pledged allegiance to ISIS. ISIS’s Amaq News Agency recognized the pledge in October 2016. The ISGS reportedly includes members of the Peul ethnic group from the Mali-Niger border region. Sahrawi and the ISGS have reportedly carried out several attacks on military targets in Niger. The U.S. government sanctioned Sahrawi and ISGS in May 2018. The United Nations sanctioned ISGS in February 2020. During a meeting of G5 Sahel leaders in January 2020, France declared Sahrawi a “major enemy.” The French government estimates ISGS is responsible for the deaths of 2,000 to 3,000 people in the region. French forces killed Sahrawi in a drone strike in August 2021.
On the night of June 11, 2022, French forces deployed under Operation Barkhane, France’s counterterrorism mission in the Sahel, carried out an operation on the border between Mali and Niger, capturing ISGS senior leader Oumeya Ould Albakaye in the process. According to the French Armed Forces Ministry, Albakaye was found with several mobile phones, weapons, and “numerous resources.” According to media sources, Albakaye will be held by French forces for questioning and then handed to the Malian authorities. Albakaye is an explosives expert and served as ISGS’s chief in Gourma, Mali and Oudalan, Burkina Faso. The French army stated that Albakaye is believed to have carried out terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to undermine French forces within Mali. Despite successful operations against ISGS, the last of the French forces withdrew from Mali on August 15, 2022, due to ongoing political and security hostilities between Mali’s military government and their now former Western allies.
Since March 2022, ISGS—which had recently rebranded under the name Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) as the group was declared a separate province—battled with the al-Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in the region of Menaka and Gao, the insurgent-heavy areas of Mali’s north. Their fighting from March until October 2022 resulted in around 1,000 civilian deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands. Furthermore, according to U.N. analysts, IS Sahel has shifted their operations further south, having seized the town of Talataye in early September 2022. As of August 2023, IS Sahel has not been ousted from Talataye, and continues to be a heavy threat to Mali and Burkina Faso as the two countries, and increasingly Niger, are unable to sustainably curtail the extremist group’s activities. According to the United Nations in August 2023, IS Sahel has doubled the amount of territory they control in Mali since 2022. In particular, the group controls rural areas in eastern Menaka and large parts of the Asongo area in northern Gao.
Nigeria: Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
ISIS accepted Nigerian-based terror group Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance in March 2015. Boko Haram, now called Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyaa or the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), has waged an insurgency to impose sharia in northern Nigeria since 2009, resulting in the death of approximately 4,000 civilians in 2015 alone. Boko Haram split into two groups when ISIS appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the head of the ISWAP in August 2016. Although Boko Haram founder Abubakar Shekau did not win the endorsement of ISIS, he refused to relinquish his authority and has continued to lead a group of followers under the banner of Boko Haram. Shekau has maintained his allegiance to ISIS and, in March 2017, began including ISIS logos in official Boko Haram videos.
Since the split, the attacks carried out by each faction are sometimes difficult to differentiate. One difference, however, is that ISWAP controls territory in the Lake Chad Basin area in northern Borno State whereas Shekau’s faction controls land in central and southern Borno State, including Boko Haram’s historical territorial stronghold of the Sambisa Forest.
In February of 2019, al-Barnawi was reportedly replaced as the leader of ISWAP. On March 4, 2019, Boko Haram announced that al-Barnawi was demoted to a member of the group’s Shura council, and that Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi (a.k.a. Ba Idrissa) replaced him as leader. The specific reason for this leadership shake-up is unknown, but it occurred against the backdrop of larger internal disputes within the organization. In early 2020, infighting within Boko Haram continued, and al-Barnawi’s successor Ba Idrissa was similarly purged. It is currently unclear if al-Barnawi survived the infighting and if he is currently alive.
ISIS reinstalled al-Barnawi as leader of ISWAP in April 2021. ISWAP and Boko Haram continued to violently clash, resulting in the death of Boko Haram leader Shekau the following month in a confrontation with ISWAP fighters. In June 2021, ISWAP released an audio message of al-Barnawi confirming Shekau’s death, which he said had been directly ordered by ISIS leader al-Quraishi.
On October 14, 2021, Nigeria’s military confirmed al-Barnawi had been killed. The military did not provide details of the location of or circumstances leading to al-Barnawi’s death. Following al-Barnawi’s death, Malam Bako, a member of ISWAP’s Shura Council, allegedly assumed leadership of ISWAP. Nigerian security forces killed Bako, and another prominent member of ISWAP in an undisclosed location on October 20. In November 2021, Sani Shuwaram was appointed the new leader of ISWAP. On March 20, 2022, Nigerian media reported Shuwaram had been killed, along with multiple other ISWAP fighters, in a Nigerian airstrike in the Sabon Tumbuns general area of Lake Chad. Mallam Bako Gorgore was reportedly named as Shuwaram’s replacement.
According to U.N. analysts, as of early 2022, ISWAP has between 4,000 and 5,000 fighters.
Despite the Nigerian military’s success in targeting Boko Haram members, ISWAP has carried out significant attacks in 2022. On July 5, 2022, ISWAP militants raided the Kuje maximum prison in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital. According to media sources, the militants detonated “very high-grade explosives” killing a security officer and injuring three others. While 879 inmates fled, more than half were returned to the prison while 443 inmates remain at large. The raid occurred a month after ISWAP gunmen detonated explosives and opened fire on a Catholic church in Ondo State, southwestern Nigeria on June 5. The assailants shot and killed at least 40 to 50 people and injured 87 others. The attack was the first time ISWAP—which regularly carries out attacks in the northeast or northwest of the country—had been blamed for an attack in the southwest.
North Caucasus: Wilayat Qawqaz
In June 2015, ISIS announced the creation of a governorate in Russia’s North Caucasus, after months of garnering support in the region. The governorate is reportedly comprised of former al-Qaeda militants in the region who pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the months leading up to the announcement. More than a dozen suspected ISIS fighters have been arrested in Russia since the announcement.
Pakistan: Wilayat Pakistan
On May 14, 2019, ISIS’s Amaq News Agency announced the creation of a Pakistan province, which claimed credit for killing a Pakistani police officer earlier in the week. Pakistan’s government denied that ISIS had created a base in the country. Pakistan formerly fell under the jurisdiction of ISIS’s Khorasan Province, which former members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan formed in 2015 after pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Khorasan Province previously also included Afghanistan, India, parts of Iran, and other parts of central Asia. ISIS announced a separate province in India the previous week.
Saudi Arabia: Wilayat al-Haramayn
ISIS declared a governorate in Saudi Arabia in November 2014. Since then, ISIS has been involved in a number of attacks in Saudi Arabia, including the November 2014 targeting of a Shiite shrine in al-Dalwa village, the November 2015 shooting of a Danish resident in Riyadh, and a thwarted multiple car bombing attack east of Riyadh in April 2015. In May 2015, ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia, killing more than 20 people and wounding more than 120 others. In August 2015, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a mosque in southern Saudi Arabia, killing 15 people.
The U.S. Department of State designated ISIS’s Saudi branch as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in May 2016.
Turkey: Wilayat Turkey
On July 10, 2019, ISIS released a video of a group of fighters in Turkey pledging allegiance to Baghdadi and declaring a new province in Turkey. The speaker, identified as Abu Qatada at-Turki, threatens both Turkey and the United States. The militants appear in front of the ISIS flag with RPGs, machine guns, grenades, and assault rifles. ISIS has long had a presence in Turkey, which had previously served as a transit point for foreign fighters traveling to Syria. In the September 2015 edition of its propaganda magazine Dabiq, ISIS labeled the Turkish government apostates and called the country a “priority for … jihad.”
In August 2022, the BBC reported details of an ISIS smuggling network in Turkey facilitated by a Canadian intelligence agent during the height of ISIS’s physical caliphate. Prior to his arrest by Turkish authorities in 2015, Mohammed Al Rasheed had smuggled multiple Britons into Syria for at least eight months while sharing their passport information with Canadian authorities through the Canadian embassy in Jordan. Rasheed often photographed identification papers or filmed travelers on his phone. He reportedly mapped the locations of the homes of Western foreign fighters in Syria. He also collected IP addresses and the locations of Internet cafes in ISIS-held territory. Rasheed told Turkish authorities he was collecting information on foreign fighters and passing it to the Canadians in exchange for asylum.
Prior to declaring a wilayah in Turkey, the Turkish government has suspected ISIS of responsibility for numerous attacks, including a triple suicide bombing at Ataturk Airport on June 28, 2016, that killed 45, and an August 21, 2016, suicide bombing that killed 51 people at a wedding. ISIS claimed responsibility for a January 1, 2017, shooting at a nightclub in Turkey that killed 39.
Yemen: Wilayat Sana’a
A self-proclaimed ISIS affiliate, calling itself “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed responsibility for a deadly mosque bombing in Yemen in March 2015, in which at least 142 people were killed. In late April 2015, the group formally announced itself as an ISIS governorate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi confirmed the group’s status as a governorate in November 2015. The U.S. Department of State designated ISIS’s Yemeni branch as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in May 2016.
ISIS has not gained as much traction among Yemenis as al-Qaeda, according to Yemeni officials. Many of the leaders of ISIS in Yemen are Saudi nationals. Compounded with ISIS’s centralized authority based in Syria, many in Yemen’s tribal areas reportedly view the terror group as foreign and disconnected from Yemeni interests. Furthermore, AQAP has forged alliances and worked with local tribal authorities in power-sharing agreements while ISIS leadership has failed to make inroads in Yemeni tribal structure.
General Directorate of Provinces (GDP)
ISIS’s General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) are structures that were put in place to maintain the group’s global network, tactical capacity, and reputation following the defeat of the territorial “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. There are nine regional networks that were developed between 2017 and 2019. The operational capacity of each regional network varies widely. However, given constantly evolving challenges, each network plans accordingly and adapts to the security changes in their immediate environment.
In terms of the GDP, within ISIS’s core area, the terror group maintains two distinct organizational structures for Iraq and Syria. The Iraq office is presumably called the Bilad al-Rafidayn office, and the Syrian outpost is known as the al-Sham office. Turkey’s division within the GDP, the al-Faruq office, managed Turkey, the Caucasus, the Russian Federation, and parts of Eastern Europe. However, Turkish police have reportedly targeted and arrested key al-Faruq officials, leading ISIS’s network in Turkey to now be managed by the al-Sham office.
ISIS boasts three well-established offices within the GDP. Afghanistan’s Al-Siddiq office covers South Asia and Central Asia. Somalia’s al-Karrar office covers Somalia, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ISIS’s regional division in the Lake Chad basin is called al-Furqan and oversees ISIS activity in Nigeria and the western Sahel.
There are three offices that are less active or are struggling to enforce their influence in their objective areas. The Libya-based al-Anfal office reportedly covered northern Africa and the Sahel; the Yemen-based Umm al-Qura office directs and coordinates activity in the Arabian Peninsula; and the Sinai Peninsula based Zu al-Nurayn office is responsible for Egypt and the Sudan.
The U.S. Department of State has identified Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rufay’i and Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki as two high-ranking officials within the GDP network. Rufay’i, who previously served as the wali of ISIS’s Iraq province, is the emir of Iraq’s Bilad al-Rafidayn Office, and Al-Mainuki as a senior leader of ISIS’s al-Furqan Office.
Financing:
At the height of its power in Iraq and Syria, ISIS was been called the richest terrorist organization in the world. Months after the caliphate’s formation in June 2014, analysts estimated the group’s assets at $1.3–2 billion, with a daily income of $3 million. Since then, coalition airstrikes, military setbacks, and loss of territory have dampened the group’s profits. ISIS’s annual revenue reportedly fell from $2.9 billion in 2014 to $2.4 billion in 2015, according to the European think tank Center for the Analysis of Terrorism. In 2016, ISIS was estimated to have taken in $870 million, according to findings by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. By June 2017, ISIS had reportedly lost 80 percent of its revenue sources. The group reportedly had a revenue stream of just $16 million during the second financial quarter of 2017, compared with $81 million during the same period in 2015, according to global data-monitoring company IHS Markit. The lost revenue forced ISIS to cut its fighters’ wages by 50 percent in February 2016. As ISIS’s physical caliphate collapsed in 2018, the terror group sought different avenues of financing.
Militant financing expert Patrick Johnson of the RAND Corporation credited ISIS’s survival and evolution to its strong, diversified fundraising apparatus. As the group expanded through 2013 and 2014, ISIS derived the largest part of its revenue from the spoils of war, particularly as the group commandeered oil fields and weapons caches. While ISIS controlled territory in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017, the group reportedly derived its income primarily from taxation, oil, looting, and extortion.
For years, ISIS controlled oil fields in its strongholds of eastern Syria and northern Iraq, smuggling crude oil by truck in exchange for cash and refined petroleum. Customers reportedly included ISIS sympathizers, as well as those who formally opposed ISIS, including the Turkish and Syrian governments. For financial purposes, the group also targeted for seizure key infrastructure, including factories and power plants. ISIS’s exploitation of the energy assets under its control was hamstrung by maintenance needs, which it reportedly addressed by intimidating on-site engineers.
ISIS also reportedly fills its coffers through extortion, including bank looting, taxation, and kidnapping for ransom. The group has also collected profit from the sale of women and children as sex slaves. In 2014, ISIS allegedly collected at least $25 million in ransom payments, a figure that may in fact be much higher. By December 2015, ISIS reportedly collected $45 million annually through kidnapping ransoms, and more than $360 million annually from tax collection. However in mid-2017 ISIS lost its last major population centers in Iraq and Syria, thus losing all tax revenue.
ISIS has also illegally exported valuable antiquities from Iraq and Syria to Turkey. In May 2015, the United Nations estimated that ISIS earned as much as $100 million annually from the illegal sale of antiquities looted from captured territories. Professor Michael Danti of Boston University noted that Islamic law specifies “exactly what to do with antiquities when you find them. You sell them and 20% of the profits goes as a tax.” The United Nations has condemned ISIS’s antiquities looting as “a form of violent extremism that seeks to destroy the present, past and future of human civilization.”
The group has also attracted donations from terrorist sympathizers worldwide. Wealthy individuals in the Gulf reportedly provided funding that helped to launch ISIS and other jihadist groups amid the turmoil of the Syrian civil war. For example, U.S.-designated Qatari national ‘Abd al-Rahman bin ‘Umayr al-Nu’aymi provided significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s forerunner, according to the U.S. Treasury. Beyond that, ISIS uses its extensive presence on social media platforms to solicit both small- and large-scale donations.
The loss of its physical caliphate has freed ISIS from its financial responsibilities in maintaining a state. While ISIS can no longer steadily rely on the sale of oil or taxes for income, the group has nonetheless continued to exploit revenue streams established during the caliphate, including ransoms and extortion. Raids on ISIS-linked businesses in Iraq have also shown that ISIS launders its cash reserves through investments in legitimate businesses across the Middle East such as hotels, car dealerships, and real estate. ISIS leaders reportedly smuggled approximately $400 million in Western currencies and gold out of Syria and Iraq as they fled their former strongholds. Iraqi officials allege ISIS transferred the majority of its wealth Turkey, where it has been invested in gold when not held by individuals. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS reportedly also continues to take advantage of corrupt government officials and extortion to profit from the billions of dollars flow into the countries for reconstruction efforts.
ISIS has also taken advantage of the anonymity provided by digital cryptocurrencies to raise and transfer funds globally. According to a 2018 Europol report, ISIS has used cryptocurrencies to fund online terrorist activities but had not yet used it to directly fund a terrorist attack. In November 2018, for example, Zoobia Shahnaz of Long Island, New York, pleaded guilty to converting money from a credit card scam to bitcoin to send to ISIS. On April 20, 2019, the day before ISIS’s Easter bombing in Sri Lanka, Israeli blockchain intelligence company Whitestream recorded an increase in ISIS-held bitcoin holdings on the Canadian digital coin platform CoinPayments from approximately $500,000 to $4.5 million. That balance returned to $500,000 the day after the attack. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has created guidelines for nations to address the use of digital currencies by terrorist and criminal organizations, which FATF called “serious and urgent.”
After a pair of earthquakes across Syria and Turkey on February 6, 2023, regional observers questioned what became of ISIS’s fortune. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, approximately 20 ISIS fighters escaped a military prison, known as the “Black Prison,” in Rajo, Syria. The escapees reportedly paid between $1,000 and $10,000 for help in their escape from the prison, which was damaged during the earthquake. The incident renews questions among regional observers over how the prisoners got hold of such large sums, as well as who accepted the money.
Recruitment:
Online/Digital Recruitment
Since its inception, ISIS has maintained a powerful online media campaign aimed at recruiting members internationally. According to national security pundit John Little, ISIS “launched [its] offensive with a… media campaign well planned in advance. [The campaign] wasn’t an afterthought.” Recruitment methods include slickly produced videos, an online magazine, and the use of social media outlets.
ISIS’s Al-Hayat Media Center is responsible for much of the group’s marketing and recruitment. The group has also released propaganda materials through media centers Al-Furqan and Al-I’tasim Media, news agencies Amaq Agency and Bayan Radio, as well as through more than a dozen regional media outlets that produce content on behalf of the group’s various wilayas. The center’s explicit goal is to “convey the message of the Islamic State in different languages with the aim of unifying Muslims under one flag.” In addition to pursuing fighters, recruiters seek to attract doctors, accountants, engineers, and wives, in the interest of building a “new society.”
Social Media
ISIS recruiters have utilized social media outlets to “field questions about joining” the group, a process which resembles an “online version of [a] religious seminar.” CEP has documented as ISIS recruiters exploit online platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Tumblr, Ask.fm, and Askbook, to advertise and recruit for ISIS. Recruiters also use instant-messaging services such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Wickr, KiK, and YikYak to provide advice about logistical issues–such as transportation and finances–regarding the trek to Syria as well as instructions on how to carry out domestic attacks on behalf of the terrorist group.
Canadian national Mubin Shaikh, a Taliban recruiter turned security operative, claims that recruiters interview potential jihadists to ensure commitment to the cause, as well as to weed out spies. According to Shaikh, recruiters use whatever means possible. “If they can Skype you, they’ll Skype you. They want to see what you look like. You can’t be that secretive with them.” Common interview tactics include testing the recruit’s knowledge of Islamic scholars. Shaikh also describes a large net of jihadists, claiming that recruiters often contact established ISIS sympathizers within a potential recruit’s city in order to vet recruits, “whether [the recruit is] American, Canadian or British.” To avoid detection, recruiters use encryption software and proxy servers during the interview process.
High-Production Videos
ISIS’s Al-Hayat Media Center produces much of the recruitment material disseminated by the terror group, though the group also releases high-production video content through Al-Faruq Media, Al-I’tisam Media, and through regional video producers dispersed throughout the group’s various wilayas. In May 2014, the media center launched a video series called the Mujatweets, shot in HD quality, to show “snippets of day-to-day life in the Islamic State.” The Mujatweets serve as explicit propaganda, aimed at depicting life in the Islamic State as bountiful and heroic.
In the first episode of Mujatweets, an ISIS fighter appeals to Western jihadists by singing in German. In the sixth episode, a member of ISIS speaks in French, claiming that it is an obligation for Muslims to immigrate to the Islamic State. In the third and seventh episodes, shots of a sandwich shop and a bustling marketplace aim to attract newcomers with scenes of abundance. According to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “the purpose [of the Mujatweets] is to show that life under ISIS rule is peaceful and normal, and to shatter the image of the jihad fighters as fierce religious fanatics by presenting them as ordinary, friendly people eager to help the local population.”
In addition to the Mujatweets series, the al-Hayat media center produces longer recruitment videos, the infamous beheading videos, and online propaganda magazines. Al-Hayat media center is notable for high video production quality and consistent circulation. Long War Journal editor Bill Roggio commented on the fast turnout of the al-Hayat’s videos. “Al-Qaeda will issue a propaganda statement, what, once every month? With the Islamic State, I saw the aftermath of the battle of Tabqa that gave them full control of a province in Syria — I saw that video two days after the battle.”
Online Magazines and Newsletters: Dabiq, Rumiyah, and al-Naba
Both Dabiq and Rumiyah serve as another recruitment tool for the terror group. The group also releases text missives through its al-Naba newsletter, and through text releases from the group’s propaganda news agency, Amaq.
ISIS’s released its first online, multi-language magazine on July 5, 2014, just one month after capturing the Iraqi city of Mosul. Dabiq was named after a small town in northern Syria where Islamic scriptures prophesized the final apocalyptic battle between Christians and Muslims would be held. The magazine provided English-language readers with battlefield updates, administrative reporting, and religious commentary. ISIS also used Dabiq’s 15 issues to promote religious propaganda to justify its crimes, such as enslaving and selling Yazidi women as sex slaves. The magazine was available via pro-ISIS Telegram accounts, widely shared on Twitter and Facebook, and briefly available for purchase on Amazon.
In September 2016, as it appeared that the town of Dabiq would soon fall to Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army forces, ISIS replaced its magazine with a new one, Rumiyah. The name change sought to shift emphasis away from a mythical final battle between Muslims and Christians that was to take place in Dabiq. The name Rumiyah refers to two hadiths that calls for Islam to conquer Constantinople and then Rome on its path to conquering the West, which ISIS referenced in a eulogy of its recently deceased spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani in Rumiyah’s first issue. ISIS has used the magazine to call for lone-wolf attacks in Western countries, including the United States and Australia. ISIS releases Rumiyah via pro-ISIS Telegram accounts and social media accounts.
ISIS also releases a weekly newsletter called al-Naba. Distributed as a PDF via Telegram and other social media sites, Al-Naba often covers battlefield updates and interviews with high-ranking ISIS members.
To reach a wide range of audiences, ISIS magazines are translated into a variety of languages, including Arabic, English, French, German, and Russian. ISIS’s online magazines—released en masse through Telegram, Twitter, and other online outlets—are filled with propaganda detailing the group’s strategy. Dabiq and Rumiyah initially encouraged all Muslims to migrate to the Islamic State or carry out domestic attacks, but the messaging has since shifted to encourage more domestic and lone-wolf-style attacks.
Recruiters’ Psychological Tactics
Some psychologists believe that potential jihadists joined ISIS in their quest for “personal significance” or due to the existential desire to matter and be respected, according to psychology professor Arie W. Kruglanski. According to this theory, ISIS recruitment measures directly appeal to disaffected and disillusioned individuals seeking to “make their mark.” MEMRI deputy director Eliot Zweig concurred, stating, “You see messages of camaraderie” rather than difficulty, gore and suffering. “It is ‘come and join us, join me and we'll fight the good fight together.’” Others claim that recruits are simply “thrill seekers,” or young people craving a “fresh identity.” According to terrorism expert Max Abrahms, recruitment over social media lures “ignorant people with respect to religion… [who] would probably fail the most basic test on Islam.”
The depiction of the Islamic State as a free and open society is another recruiting approach. According to John Horgan, a psychologist who studies terrorists, the exploitation of this image “makes radicalization and recruitment much easier.” Recruits believe that ISIS “is an equal opportunity organization.” Indeed, its recruitment tactics appeal to “everything from the sadistic psychopath to the humanitarian to the idealistic driven,” says Horgan. Andrew Poulin, a Canadian who converted to Islam and immigrated to the Islamic State, was featured in one of the group’s propaganda videos, saying: “Before I come here to Syria, I had money, I had a family, I had good friends. It wasn’t like I was some anarchist or somebody who just wants to destroy the world and kill everybody. I was a regular person. We need the engineers, we need doctors, we need professionals. Every person can contribute something to the Islamic State.”
Recruiters also radicalize by exploiting grievances, declaring that the Muslim world has endured humiliation and victimization at the hands of the West. The recruiters paint the choice of every Muslim individual in black and white: either join ISIS and live in dignity, or continue living as a victimized Muslim in a secular land. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in his speech introducing the creation of the “caliphate,” declared, “by Allah’s grace—you have a state and Khilafah [caliphate], which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership.” This Manichean approach feeds into the message of obligation. According to terrorism expert Paul Cruickshank, ISIS recruiters flood social media with the message of “you have to join. It’s your religious duty.” However, as ISIS lost its territory in Syria and Iraq, its propaganda shifted to encourage more domestic and lone-wolf-style attacks.
On-the-ground Recruitment
ISIS’s on-the-ground recruitment strategies have been growing due to a mounting crackdown on the group’s online recruitment methods. Operating mostly in European, American, and Canadian cities, on-the-ground recruiters are believed to include preachers, jihadist sympathizers, and fighters returning from Syria. According to a leaked police report, recruiters operate out of mosques, cafes, restaurants, gyms and private homes and apartments. Similar to online recruitment, on-the-ground recruiters act as radicalizing agents who provide logistical support to those who wish to immigrate to the Islamic State.
Some reports suggest that young Muslims are radicalized at “pop-up” meetings, which are never held in the same place twice. Others include extremists leafleting in European Muslim communities.
On-the-ground recruitment is believed to take place in Canada also. Imam Syed Soharwardy, founder of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, claims that potential recruits are paired up with “jihadi mentors.” According to Sohwarwardy, the mentor-recruit relationship can form at “religious seminars, community activities or classes that might look normal to the average Westerner.” Other possible venues for radicalization include “student groups” at colleges and high schools.
On-the-ground radicalization can be instigated by one’s emotional or physical proximity to an extremist. For example, U.S. citizen Douglas McCain—who died in Syria as an ISIS fighter—had lived in the same building as a classmate who joined Somali militant group al-Shabab. Similarly, a group of 10 Minnesotan acquaintances were found to have co-conspired to join ISIS abroad in a radicalization process that appeared in to have taken place largely in person.
Training:
The training to become an ISIS soldier is believed to include both ideological and physical components. During religious training, referred to as sharii, ISIS members receive what ISIS-affiliated Syrian cleric Abu Moussa referred to as “the basics about religion… [during which ISIS trainers] cleanse you from religious innovations and Ba’athist ideas.” New recruits are also believed to undergo physical training. A video released by ISIS’s al-Hayat Media Center in October 2014 depicted recruits participating in training exercises in Iraq’s Nineveh province. The jihadists-in-training were filmed while completing weapons training, hand-to-hand combat exercises, and live-fire training.
At its peak in 2014 and 2015, foreign fighters arriving in ISIS-controlled territory reportedly complete anywhere between a few days of basic weapons training to a year-long intensive training course. The training program for an elite fighting unit, for example, is reported to require 10 levels of training. The first level is believed to include hours of strenuous physical activity such as running, jumping, pushups, and crawling, while higher levels may comprise aquatic training and celestial navigation.
In addition to training voluntary recruits, ISIS also reportedly forced captured Syrian pilots to train ISIS fighters using stolen aircraft. In October 2014, eyewitness reports claimed that ISIS had three military aircraft in its possession, and that its fighters had been flying the airplanes over captured military bases in northern Aleppo, Syria.
ISIS also has forced children to train as fighters, a war crime under international human rights law. This training reportedly took place in camps with names such as “Zarqawi Cubs Camps,” in tribute to al-Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to global security firm Flashpoint Intelligence, there have been multiple youth training camps in and around Mosul, as well as in Damascus, Aleppo, and al-Bukamal in eastern Syria.
ISIS fighters have also trained children how to use AK-47s and have reportedly used dolls to demonstrate beheadings. “Sometimes they force them to carry [real human] heads in order to cast the fear away from their hearts,” one Iraqi security official told NBC News. A September 2014 United Nations report found that ISIS deployed children in “active combat during military operations, including suicide bombing missions.” In February 2016, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point warned that ISIS was mobilizing children at an “increasing and unprecedented rate.”
Also known as:
- Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq
- Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
- Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – Zarqawi
- Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM)
- Al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS)
- Al-Tawhid
- Al-Tawhid and al-Jihad
- Al-Zarqawi Network
- Ansar Beit al-Maqdis
- Battar Brigade
- Brigades of Tawhid
- Daesh
- Dawla al-Islamiya
- Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham
- Islamic Caliphate
- Islamic Caliphate State
- Islamic State (IS)
- Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)
- Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
- Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
- Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
- Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
- Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS)
- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Mozambique
- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
- Islamic State Pakistan Province
- Islamic Youth Shura Council
- Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad (JTJ)
- Kateab al-Tawhid
- Monotheism and Jihad Group
- Mujahidin Shura Council
- Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia
- Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq
|
- Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers
- Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq
- Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers
- Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers
- Southern Province
- Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad Bilad al Raafidaini
- Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
- Unity and Holy Struggle
- Unity and Holy War
- Unity and Jihad Group
- Wilayah al-Hind (India)
- Wilayat Badiya
- Wilayat Barakah (Hasaka)
- Wilayat Kheir (Deir al Zour)
- Wilayat Raqqa
- Wilayat al-Tarabulus
- Wilayat Anbar
- Wilayat Barqa
- Wilayat Coast (Al Sahel)
- Wilayat Damascus (Dimashq)
- Wilayat Diyala
- Wilayat Fezza
- Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya
- Wilayat Halab (Aleppo)
- Wilayat Hama
- Wilayat Idlib
- Wilayat Khorasan
- Wilayat Kirkuk
- Wilayat Ninawa
- Wilayat Salahuddin
- Wilayat Pakistan
- Wilayat Turkey
- Wilayat Central Africa
|
